Institutional Voids, Investment Purposes, and Foreign Subsidiaries of Multinational Enterprises by Getachew, Yamlaksira S
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
6-13-2017 12:00 AM 
Institutional Voids, Investment Purposes, and Foreign Subsidiaries 
of Multinational Enterprises 
Yamlaksira S. Getachew 
The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor 
Prof. Paul W. Beamish 
The University of Western Ontario 
Graduate Program in Business 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of 
Philosophy 
© Yamlaksira S. Getachew 2017 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, International Business 
Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Getachew, Yamlaksira S., "Institutional Voids, Investment Purposes, and Foreign Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Enterprises" (2017). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 4624. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/4624 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
 
 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is motivated by two sets of research questions: (a) Whether, how, and when host-
country market and institutional conditions have implications for the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries? And (b) Whether, how, and when investment purposes/motives for which foreign 
subsidiaries are established relate to the extent to which the subsidiaries/their parents overcome 
the hazards of or capitalize on the opportunities from operating in locations of high institutional 
voids? 
The first essay examines how the decision to enter African markets relates to the exit probability 
of MNE subsidiaries. Using a longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese foreign subsidiaries 
operating in Africa and OECD countries, it finds that entry to Africa increases the hazard rate of 
subsidiaries, but that subsidiaries entering with more diverse investment purposes and greater 
market-seeking orientation have a better likelihood of survival. Consistent with the institutional-
based theory of corporate diversification, the research findings introduce purpose diversity and 
market-seeking orientation as potential mechanisms to mitigate the hazards of institutional 
voids/instability. Also, by considering the phenomenon of within-subsidiary diversity (of 
purposes) and its interaction with institutional conditions, the essay advances the notion of 
subsidiary scope and its implications.  
The second essay examines the relationship between country-level income distribution and the exit 
of foreign subsidiaries using longitudinal data from 6,699 Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries 
operating in 47 countries. It finds a strong empirical evidence of a curvilinear relationship between 
the nature of host-country income distribution and the probability of subsidiary exit. Whereas 
extreme levels of income distribution (i.e., highly egalitarian or highly dispersed) correspond to 
higher risk of subsidiary exit, intermediate levels of income distribution are associated with a 
decrease in exit probability. Further, this relationship is moderated by the level of host-country 
institutional development. 
The third essay draws on the modified one-tier bargaining model characterizing Chinese inward 
FDI in developing countries to advance a theory of political connections and their implications on 
MNE competitive advantage in developing countries. It develops a typology of political 
connections based on the approach to political action (transactional and relational) and the level of 
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participation (individual and collective). It argues that the collective-relational approach to 
political connections makes for superior competitive advantage, as the collective aspect facilitates 
access to and mobilization of resources and the relational aspect helps build favourable legitimacy. 
Further, it considers relevant organizational and institutional boundary conditions. The theoretical 
arguments integrate perspectives from the resource-based view and resource dependence theory 
and provide explanation to the rising prominence of Chinese MNEs in the developing world.  
On the whole, this dissertation makes contributions to a better understanding of institutional voids 
and their economic and strategic implications. As well, it generates useful theoretical and empirical 
insights regarding the investment purposes/motives of multinational enterprises operating in 
locations of high institutional voids.  
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        institutional voids, institutional instability, income distribution, subsidiary exit,  
        purpose diversity, survival analysis, market-seeking subsidiaries, political connection, 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Issues of host-country contexts have remained central to international business (IB) research and 
scholarship. Underlying research in such areas as host-country business systems (e.g., Jackson and 
Deeg, 2008; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), culture (e.g., Hofstede, 1980), and infrastructure (e.g., 
Hoskisson et al., 2013) is the need to understand the implications of host-country conditions for 
multinational enterprise (MNE) investment and subsequent management. Research on host-
country contexts falls within the location literature, which draws from works across multiple 
disciplines including international business (IB), strategic management, and economic geography 
(Cantwell, 2009).  The location literature in IB has specifically considered location (dis)advantages 
as one of the major determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) by MNEs (e.g., Dunning, 
1988). In fact, Dunning (2009) noted that location has become an increasingly vital element in 
determining the scope, pattern, form, and growth of MNE activity. Of the myriad location-specific 
factors influencing FDI, the presence (absence) of market-supporting institutions is arguably the 
most important and one that has received considerable scholarly attention (e.g., Chan et al., 2008; 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2013). This is even more important in developing 
countries where such market-supporting institutions are absent, weak, or fail to perform well (Peng 
et al., 2009; Zoogah et al., 2015). The concept of institutional voids represents this phenomenon 
(Mair and Marti, 2009).  
Institutional voids mainly represent limitations in market entry, information access, property rights 
protection, and contract enforcement (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Whereas the implications of 
these limitations for MNE investment, management, and strategy have been widely studied (e.g. 
Chan et al., 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011), a closer 
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examination reveals two potential shortcomings. First, research on the implications of institutional 
voids has largely drawn on insights from the new institutional economics (NIE) which emphasizes 
transaction cost effects. However, research leveraging insights from industrial organization theory 
suggest potential for market power effects as well (Porter, 1981; Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997). 
Second, we have a limited understanding of whether and how investment motivation(purposes) 
interact with host-country institutional contexts to affect subsidiary strategy and performance. 
Research in this area is important as host-country attributes interact with firm/subsidiary attributes 
and how these attributes influence investment of an MNE is likely to vary with differences in 
motives underlying such investment (Dunning, 2001; Mesquita, 2016).  
The investment motives literature holds that foreign affiliates of MNEs may be established to 
achieve any or a combination of the following purposes: (natural) resource-seeking, efficiency-
seeking, market-seeking, and strategic asset/capability seeking (Dunning, 1998; Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008). Such classification suggests the need to avoid adopting an aggregated treatment of 
MNE foreign investments by highlighting the inherent strategic as well as structural heterogeneity 
among MNE affiliates (subsidiaries). Investment motives define the strategic orientation of a 
subsidiary and the role it is expected to play in the MNE network. For example, an efficiency-
seeking subsidiary emphasizes securing the minimum cost of production by leveraging cheap 
labour, materials, or technology available in the host country (Dunning, 1998). As well, investment 
motives may have implications for the structure of the subsidiary. For instance, a resource-seeking 
subsidiary represents a vertically integrated extension of its parent MNE and accordingly the 
subsidiary’s activities are likely to be synchronized with both the parent MNE and ‘sister’ 
subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). A market-seeking subsidiary, on the other hand, 
represents a standalone unit, loosely linked to the parent MNE and its ‘sister’ subsidiaries (Nachum 
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and Zaheer, 2005). Such strategic and structural differences among these different types of 
subsidiaries is likely to have a bearing on how host-country conditions—such as market-
supporting institutions—relate to the exit likelihood of foreign subsidiaries.  
The overall thrust of this thesis, therefore, is to contribute to the location literature by advancing a 
better understanding of institutional voids, examining its interaction with investment motives (or 
purposes), and generating insights on potential implications for the MNE strategy of divesting their 
subsidiaries. A reverse of FDI, foreign divestment is a corporate-level strategy and an important 
topic in IB research. Its practical as well as theoretical importance notwithstanding, our 
understanding of this phenomenon is limited (Berry, 2013; McDermott, 2010). By examining how 
investment motives interact with host-country institutional and market contexts to affect foreign 
divestment, this dissertation looks to contribute to a better understanding of this phenomenon. 
Further, the three essays included in this dissertation contribute to the overall thrust by considering 
different aspects of host-country contexts (institutional and market, for example) and drawing on 
(and contributing to) the institutional voids literature, the NIE, foreign divestment literature, and 
the non-market strategy literature, among others. 
This chapter proceeds with a brief review of the extant literature pertaining to institutional voids, 
investment motive (purpose), and foreign divestment, before briefly discussing the outline of the 
dissertation and discussing its theoretical as well as empirical contributions. This chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of each essay in order to provide an overview of the research 
that constitutes the dissertation.  
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Institutional voids 
Institutions represent humanly devised restrictions that structure interactions and associated 
incentive structures (North, 1991). Fundamental to proper market functioning are institutional 
mechanisms that promote property right protection, contract enforcement, and information and 
market access, among others (World Bank, 2002).  The concept of institutional voids entails the 
absence or lack of these mechanisms. Institutional voids, therefore, are responsible for market 
imperfections. The dissertation leverages insights from Dunning and Rugman (1985) regarding 
market imperfections to submit that institutional voids can engender two different forms of market 
imperfections. The first, which is central to NIE, is transaction-cost market imperfection that 
constrain market exchanges and therefore limit efficiency. Such imperfections ‘…arise naturally, 
or at least are assumed to be exogenous to the MNE,’ (Dunning and Rugman, 1985: p. 229). This 
type of imperfection is responsible for the economic challenges MNEs encounter in the form of 
the increased costs associated with obtaining information and protecting property rights, for 
example. The second type is structural market imperfection, which results from potential to close 
markets and thereby secure market power by leveraging firm-specific advantages, such as 
advanced technology (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). By discouraging competition, institutional 
voids promote the formation of such imperfection. Unlike transaction-cost market imperfection, 
structural market imperfection results from firms’ actions and therefore is endogenous (Dunning 
and Rugman, 1985).  
A more complete understanding of institutional voids and their implications, therefore, requires a 
better understanding of the associated transaction-cost and structural market imperfections. For 
MNE subsidiaries, transaction-cost market imperfections are responsible for economizing 
challenges whereas structural market imperfections present strategizing benefits (Getachew and 
5 
 
5 
 
Beamish, 2017; Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 1991). The viability of MNE subsidiaries 
operating in locations of high institutional voids, therefore, is a function of how well they mitigate 
the associated economic hazards and leverage pertinent strategic benefits.  
As well, much of the existing research on institutional voids and market imperfections has 
emphasized their role in foreign investment (or entry), with little attention being paid to their 
implications for foreign divestment (or exit) (Berry, 2013). McDermott (2010) noted that limited 
scholarly attention has been paid to foreign divestment, despite its place as an integral area of 
IB/global strategy, and urged scholars in the area to redress the balance and foster better 
understanding of the phenomenon. As well, much of the research implicitly assumes that the effect 
of institutional voids and market imperfections on foreign investment is independent of the motives 
underlying such investments (Dunning, 2009; Mesquita, 2016). However, the validity of this 
assumption is questionable as existing research in the area suggests that such location factors 
interact with investment motives to influence FDI strategy and performance (Dunning, 2009; 
Mesquita, 2016). In fact, Mesquita (2016) called for future research to look into how investment 
motives influence (or interact with) location factors to influence FDI scope and patterns. By 
examining how investment motives interact with host-country institutions to influence foreign 
divestment, this dissertation seeks to respond to calls by McDermott (2010) to better understand 
foreign divestment and by Mesquita (2016) to examine the effects of investment motives as they 
interact with location factors.    
Investment Motives 
In the investment motives literature, Dunning (1998) elaborated on four major motives that drive 
MNE investments. We consider each in turn. The resource-seeking motive explains FDI in search 
of a resource that is not available in the home country or that is cheaply available in the foreign 
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country. Investments in resource-endowed countries are likely to have been driven by such 
motivation. The efficiency-seeking motive is pursued by a firm looking to secure lower production 
costs and economies of scale/scope. The market-seeking motive entails efforts to serve a market 
in the host country or in nearby regions. It also may involve reducing the transportation cost 
component to ensure better price competitiveness in the host country. The strategic asset seeking 
motive involves, for example, acquiring a new technological base or useful local knowledge. A 
related line of research on subsidiary mandate/charter has extended our understanding of the 
inherent heterogeneity among subsidiaries (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). 
Building on the investment motives literature, research on subsidiary mandate/charter looks at, 
among other things, the performance implications of the specific purposes for which subsidiaries 
are established (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998).  
Dunning (1998) has also examined the heterogeneity among subsidiaries (i.e., some are resource-
seeking, others market-seeking, and so forth). Combining these two streams leads to an argument 
that location-specific (e.g., institutional) advantages or challenges are unique to different 
subsidiaries depending on their investment motives. This dissertation integrates Dunning’s (1998) 
insight on investment motives with his work on institutions (e.g., Dunning and Lundan, 2008) to 
better appreciate the underlying interdependence between the two and understand how they 
interact to influence divestment of foreign affiliates. 
Foreign Divestment 
Foreign divestment entails “…the sale of international subsidiaries, closure of foreign plants, and 
exit from foreign markets.” (Soule, Swaminathan, and Tihanyi, 2014, p. 1032). Just as Dunning 
(1988) developed a theory of FDI, so too Boddewyn (1985) introduced a theory of foreign 
divestment. Extant research on foreign divestment suggests that it does not necessarily indicate 
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failure as it may result from a deliberate attempt by an MNE to better align itself with a changed 
environment, gain better efficiency through market transactions rather than hierarchical 
transaction, or secure a more efficient reallocation of MNE resources (e.g., Boddewyn, 1985). In 
fact, pertinent research in the area advocates the consideration of foreign divestment as a corporate 
strategy and underscores the value of considering it as being part of the internationalization process 
of firms (Berry, 2013; Boddewyn, 1985; McDermott, 2010).   
Boddewyn (1983) developed a Dunning-like ‘eclectic theory of foreign divestment’ in which he 
argued that MNEs are likely to divest their foreign affiliates when (a) competitive advantage is no 
longer secured; (b) internalizing no longer provides net-benefits and that market exchange is more 
favourable—perhaps because market-supporting institutions have developed over time; and (c) it 
is no longer profitable to internalize its net competitive advantages in the particular host country. 
Clearly, each of these conditions are likely to be contingent on the status of host-country conditions 
and associated changes. Also, the investment motives underlying FDI are likely to have 
implications for the corporate strategy of foreign divestment.  
Dissertation Overview 
This dissertation is organized as a collection of integrated essays. Figure 1 presents the structure 
of the dissertation, detailing the theoretical foundations underpinning each essay, along with both 
the theoretical and phenomenological contributions that link the essays together. Collectively, the 
dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the structural and transaction-cost market 
imperfections associated with institutional voids. Whereas transaction-cost market imperfections 
have been central to research in institutional voids, this dissertation brings a scholarly attention 
also to structural market imperfection which are endogenous to firms. Likewise, it advances our 
understanding of the strategic and economic implications of institutional voids for foreign 
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divestment. Also, by integrating insights from the investment motives and subsidiary 
mandate/charter literatures, the dissertation contributes to a better understanding of purposes 
underlying foreign investment and their performance implications. Further, the dissertation has 
contributions to the notion of foreign divestment especially from locations characterized by high 
institutional voids and market imperfections. Generally, each of the three essays constituting the 
dissertation makes conceptual and empirical contributions both at the level of the phenomena 
under consideration and, at a broader level, to the location, investment motives, and foreign 
divestment literatures.  
Essay 1 looks at foreign divestment in locations of high institutional voids and high institutional 
instability, which results from such exogenous forces as a sudden change of government 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Walsh, 2015; Zoogah, Peng, and Woldu, 2015). It also examines whether 
and how investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation interact with the institutional 
conditions to influence divestment of foreign subsidiaries. Essay 2 considers another host-country 
factor (i.e., income distribution) and examines whether and how host-country income distribution 
relates to the probability that market-seeking subsidiaries exit from the host country. Further, this 
essay looks at the potential interaction between host-country income distribution and institutional 
development to influence foreign divestment. Essay 3 draws on the modified one-tier bargaining 
model characterizing Chinese resource-seeking FDI in developing countries to advance a theory 
of political connection and its implications for competitive advantage (and by extension survival) 
of Chinese subsidiaries in their respective host countries.  
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Figure 1. Overview of the Dissertation 
Essay 1 
Foreign subsidiary exit from 
Africa: The effects of investment 
purpose diversity and orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
Essay 2 
Host-country income distribution 
and exit rates of market-seeking 
subsidiaries: The U-curve 
hypothesis. 
• Indicates the complex ways in 
which income inequality 
relates with subsidiary exit 
• Advances the notion that 
foreign divestment is 
contingent on the alignment 
of subsidiary structure and 
strategy with host-country 
conditions  
• Proposes to advance a 
theory of political 
connection with respect to 
MNE performance in 
developing countries  
• Seeks to develop a 
typology of political 
connections 
• Resource-based view 
• Political connection literature 
• Resource dependence theory 
 
Essay 3 
The collective-relational approach 
to political connection: A case for 
political rent? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Core theoretical 
foundation 
Institutional economics and OLI paradigm 
Dependent variables Foreign divestment Foreign divestment  
Supplementary 
theoretical foundation 
• Investment motives literature 
• Institutional voids literature 
• Real options perspective 
Competitive advantage and 
foreign divestment   
• Organizational ecology theory 
• Environmental munificence  
Contributions 
• Advances a more nuanced 
understanding of how 
institutions influence 
subsidiary strategy and 
performance 
• Identifies response 
mechanisms to institutional 
voids 
• Resource-based view 
• Resource dependence theory 
• Non-market strategy literature 
• Advances a theory of political 
connections and their 
implications on MNE 
competitive advantage in 
developing countries 
• Develops a typology of 
political connections and their 
implications on 
competitiveness  
10 
 
10 
 
Essay 1  
The first essay (Chapter 2) is entitled Foreign subsidiary exit from Africa: The effects of investment 
purpose diversity and orientation. It examines whether and how the decision to enter African 
markets relates to the exit probability of MNE subsidiaries. The implications of institutional 
voids/instability for the strategy and performance of foreign subsidiaries is well studied (e.g., 
Chan, Isobe, and Makino, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). Consistent with North’s (1991) 
notion of institutional economics, research in the area suggests that foreign affiliates operating in 
location of developed, stable market-supporting institutions are likely to register better 
performance and survive longer (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). Nonetheless, other studies 
have found empirical evidence in support of the alternative claim that subsidiaries operating in 
locations of high institutional voids/instability are more likely to register better performance than 
their counterparts (Chan et al., 2008). This essay draws on Williamson (1991) to argue that 
institutions have economizing as well as strategizing implications and that research in the area 
needs to consider both mechanisms to build a clearer understanding of how institutions relate with 
FDI strategy and performance. 
A result of transaction-cost market imperfections, economizing suggests that subsidiaries incur 
greater transaction and transformation costs in location of high institutional voids/instability, thus 
undermining their performance. The strategizing mechanism suggests that institutional voids 
provide opportunities for subsidiaries to close markets and secure market power.  Institutional 
voids limit the level of competition facing subsidiaries and make it easier for them to engage in 
rent-seeking behaviors to influence, for example, local and national governments. This essay 
argues that considering both the economizing and strategizing implications of institutions is 
necessary to fully understand how institutions influence subsidiary strategy (including foreign 
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divestment) and performance. It further argues that the dynamics and balance between these two 
mechanisms is context specific in that in certain contexts the economizing challenges may 
outweigh the strategizing benefits. Similarly, the strategic orientation of certain subsidiaries may 
help limit the economizing challenges and/or maximize the strategizing benefits.  
This essay explores these possibilities first by considering the implications of institutional 
voids/instability for subsidiaries operating in the African market. It then considers subsidiary-
specific attributes of investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation to understand 
whether and how such attributes influence the balance between economizing challenges and 
strategizing benefits, thereby influencing subsidiary exit. These arguments are tested using a 
longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese subsidiaries operating in Africa and OECD 
countries. The results yield support for the arguments. 
This essay makes theoretical contributions on multiple respects. First, by engaging the economic 
and strategic implications of institutional voids/instability and considering potential boundary 
conditions, it advances a more nuanced understanding of how institutions influence subsidiary 
strategy and performance. Second, by introducing the investment purpose diversity construct, it 
brings to the fore the notion of subsidiary scope.  Prior IB/strategy research has considered scope 
mainly at the firm level, thereby limiting our understanding of scope at the subsidiary level. Third, 
in considering investment motive (purposes), the essay departs from existing emphasis on the 
‘how’ questions (e.g., entry mode research) and focus on the ‘why’ questions of FDI. In so doing, 
the essay revives attention to this important topic in IB research. Fourth, by considering the 
interaction between institutional voids/instability and investment motives, the essay responds to 
calls to better understand the interplay between location-specific advantages and firm-/subsidiary-
specific attributes (Dunning, 2009; Mesquita, 2016). Fifth, the essay contributes to the institutional 
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voids literature by identifying investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientations as 
potential mechanisms to mitigate the hazards of operating in such environments. This essay has 
already been published in Global Strategy Journal.  
Essay 2 
The second essay (Chapter 3) is entitled Host-country income distribution and exit rates of market-
seeking subsidiaries: The u-curve hypothesis. It looks at the location-specific advantage of market-
seeking subsidiaries and whether and how host-country income distribution is related to the exit 
likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries, for which local market and networks of relationships 
are critical. This essay advances the notion that income distribution in the host country can 
influence the local market and relationships and thus the survival likelihood of market-seeking 
subsidiaries. Specifically, it postulates that a rise in income inequality from low levels is associated 
with a decrease in exit probability, but only to a point after which a rise in inequality level 
corresponds to a higher risk of subsidiary exit. Further, it argues that institutional development 
mitigates potential market/economic inefficiencies wrought by income inequality and facilitates 
coordination inside the subsidiary and outside in the product as well as factor markets. These 
predictions were tested using longitudinal data from 6699 Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries 
operating in 47 countries. The arguments received statistical support.  
This essay has several important theoretical and empirical implications. First, it advances a more 
refined understanding of location-specific advantages by acknowledging that such advantages 
need to be understood in conjunction with the specific motives of foreign investment. That is, 
depending on the investment motives underlying establishment of subsidiaries, some aspects of 
the local context may be more relevant than others. Research regarding the organization-
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environment relationship can benefit by first specifying which aspect of the environment is most 
relevant to the particular form of organization (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Second, by emphasizing 
the inherent structural and strategic differences between market-seeking subsidiaries and other 
forms of subsidiaries and looking at how host-country market conditions relate with foreign 
divestment, the essay advances the notion that foreign divestment is contingent on the alignment 
of subsidiary structure and strategy with host-country conditions. Third, by integrating insights 
from literature on environmental munificence and the new institutional economics, the essay seeks 
to leverage the underlying theoretical synergies and responds to calls for a joint consideration of 
economic and ecological perspectives (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Ulrich & Barney, 1984). 
Fourth, by attempting to explain the exit likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries, the essay 
contributes to the foreign divestment literature—which, despite being an integral element of IB 
research, has received only limited attention (Berry, 2013; McDermott, 2010). 
Essay 3 
The third essay (Chapter 4) is entitled The collective-relational approach to political connection: 
A case for political rent?  It seeks to build theory regarding non-market strategy associated with 
foreign direct investment in developing countries. Particularly, it draws on the modified one-tier 
bargaining model characterizing investment of Chinese resource-seeking MNEs in developing 
countries (Li et al., 2013) to advance a theory of political rent-seeking and its implications for 
foreign subsidiary competitive advantage.  As with Essays 1 and 2, it considers the interplay 
between investment motives and host-country conditions to influence viability of foreign direct 
investment. In particular, it examines the potential moderating effect of investments of resource-
seeking nature. This essay builds on the findings from Essay 1 regarding the implications of the 
strategizing mechanism for investments in locations of high institutional voids/instability to 
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develop a better understanding of this mechanism by considering a unique bargaining model of 
Chinese resource-seeking investments.  
In this model, the Chinese government directly bargains strategic and operational entry deals on 
behalf of a consortium of Chinese companies. These companies receive financial and 
infrastructural supports from the Chinese government and are expected to operate in the host 
country. In this bargaining model the Chinese government avails development assistance to the 
host country in the form of low-interest loans, infrastructural development, and grants in return for 
the host country to provide investment opportunities and facilitate entry and local operations of 
the Chinese MNEs. 
Building on Hillman & Hitt's (1999) arguments about the nature of political actions, Essay 3 
develops a typology of political connections based on the approach to political action 
(transactional and relational) and the level of participation (individual and collective). 
Accordingly, it identifies four alternative approaches to MNE-host country bargaining: individual-
transactional, individual-relational, collective-transactional, and collective-relational. By 
examining the natures of the bargaining models identified in related literature—namely, one-tier 
bargaining, modified one-tier bargaining, and two-tier bargaining—it matches the practical 
approaches with their corresponding theoretical category to build theory about their implications 
for competitive advantage. Also, by drawing on mechanisms from the resource-based view and 
resource dependence theory, it forwards propositions suggesting the relative superiority of the 
collective and relational approaches to political connections in securing greater competitive 
advantage. Competitive advantage or lack thereof is an important determinant of foreign 
divestment (Boddewyn, 1983). Further, propositions are presented on potential boundary 
conditions. This essay argues that the advantage of using the collective-relational approach to 
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political connection is contingent on the asset specificity of the respective investment and the 
development of host-country institutions (economic and political).   
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CHAPTER TWO 
Foreign Subsidiary Exit from Africa: The Effects of Investment Purpose Diversity and 
Orientation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Emerging markets are places of striking contrasts. On one hand, they are characterized by 
‘institutional voids’ (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011), where market-supporting institutions are 
absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role expected of them (Mair and Marti, 2009) and 
‘institutional instability’, resulting from such exogenous forces as a sudden change of government 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Walsh, 2015; Zoogah, Peng, and Woldu, 2015). These institutional 
conditions are in large part responsible for the exceedingly high levels of uncertainty which 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) face when conducting business there (Dai, Eden, and Beamish, 
2013; Williamson, 2000; North, 1991; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011, Xu and Meyer, 2013). Yet, 
with established markets fast becoming saturated, MNEs are increasingly turning to emerging 
markets for future growth potential. As well, the lack of institutions to foster competition in those 
markets means that MNE subsidiaries already operating in those markets are more likely to 
develop market power and thus generate supernormal profits (Chacar and Vissa, 2005; Chacar, 
Newburry, and Vissa, 2010; Miller and Eden, 2006).  
Underlying these arguments regarding the institutional context of emerging markets are two 
contrasting mechanisms: economizing and strategizing. The economizing mechanism emphasizes 
increased transaction and transformation costs associated with performing in locations with high 
levels of institutional voids/instability; the strategizing mechanism, however, supports the opposite 
view that missing/unstable institutions act as entry barriers, which afford MNE subsidiaries already 
operating in those locations with greater market power and rent-seeking opportunities 
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(Williamson, 1991; Porter, 1981). Do the strategizing upsides more than offset the economizing 
downsides associated with operating in locations of high institutional voids/instability? Do the 
economic implications outweigh the market power benefits? Or, do the effects cancel out? 
Answers to these questions are likely to be context dependent and contingent on several boundary 
conditions. This study seeks to shed light on the issue by examining the exit implications of entry 
to the African context and considering the effects of relevant boundary conditions.  
By emphasizing the remarkable degree of heterogeneity among emerging markets, recent research 
in the area calls for future research to advance a more fine-grained understanding of institutions 
and their performance implications (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Africa, for example, has distinct 
characteristics. Generally, the level of institutional voids is greater in Africa than in any other 
region in the world (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007; Zoogah et al., 2015). Also, highly unstable 
institutional environments and discontinuous institutional transitions beset foreign investment in 
Africa, perhaps more so than in any other part of the world (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007; Henisz, 
2000). The combined presence in the African markets of such institutional hazards makes for a 
complex operating environment for foreign subsidiaries (Jackson, 2004). Whereas economizing 
challenges abound, so do strategizing opportunities. In other emerging markets such as China and 
India—countries on which existent emerging markets research disproportionately relies—
institutional voids and instability are not nearly as high as in Africa and thus economizing 
challenges and strategizing opportunities are relatively limited (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Zoogah et 
al., 2015).  The African market, therefore, presents an interesting setting from which to generate 
fresh insights about the influences of institutional voids and dynamics on the performance of MNE 
subsidiaries. As well, research in a context that has largely been ignored by global strategy scholars 
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can promote better understanding of what Hoskisson et al., (2013) called the ‘traditional emerging 
markets’.  
Relatedly, the study considers relevant boundary conditions that may enable some subsidiaries 
operating in Africa better deal with, mitigate, or even capitalize on the lack and/or instability of 
institutions. Specifically, it considers two such conditions, namely subsidiary purpose diversity 
and purpose orientation, to understand whether/how these strategic factors can help to mitigate 
the hazards of institutional voids and instability. Research on investment purpose features in the 
investment motives literature. Dunning (1998), for example, identified four major categories of 
motives that underlie MNEs’ foreign investment: resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency 
seeking, and strategic-asset seeking. This classification not only indicates the limitation in a 
wholesale treatment of MNEs’ foreign investment but also fosters a better understanding of the 
inherent, strategic heterogeneity among MNE subsidiaries. A related line of research on subsidiary 
mandate/charter has refined this insight further (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998). Building on the investment motives literature, research on subsidiary mandate/charter looks 
at, among other things, the performance implications of the specific purposes for which 
subsidiaries are established (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). It also provides theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence suggesting that some subsidiaries may be responsible for a diverse group 
of purposes (Birkinshaw, 1996).  
By integrating insights from these related streams of literature, the study examines whether 
purpose diversity of subsidiaries operating in Africa influence their exit likelihood. Following a 
similar logic from the institutional-based view of diversification, the paper argues that subsidiaries 
which enter Africa with diverse investment purposes are in a better position to deal with 
institutional challenges than their counterparts. Also, it considers whether the type of investment 
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purpose assigned to a subsidiary influences its ability to mitigate the effects of incomplete markets 
in Africa. In particular, it examines how the market-seeking orientation of a subsidiary relates to 
its ability to overcome institutional voids. It is argued that the unique structure (i.e., less globally 
integrated and more locally responsive) and strategy (i.e., substantial reliance on host country 
market) of such subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010) makes 
for better learning and adaptation useful in reducing exit probability. 
These arguments were tested using a longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese subsidiaries 
operating in Africa and OECD countries. Selection bias is likely to be a major concern in trying to 
understand the survival implications of entry to Africa. Clearly, MNE subsidiaries operating in 
Africa are not randomly selected; rather, they have self-selected themselves into the African 
market and are more likely to have different characteristics from those investing elsewhere. As a 
result, the study employed an econometric strategy called Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to 
identify counterfactual cases of matching subsidiaries operating elsewhere. To achieve greater 
variation, it identified ‘control’ subsidiaries with an equal propensity of entering Africa but which 
actually entered the OECD group. Those subsidiaries entering Africa are considered to be the 
‘treatment’ group. Using this strategy creates a quasi-experimental condition, thus limiting 
endogeneity concerns (Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood, 2012). 
This study is important in at least five ways. First, by engaging the economic and strategic 
implications of institutional voids/instability and considering potential boundary conditions, it 
seeks to advance a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between institutions and 
subsidiary exit. Also, the use of a paired-sample design with substantial between-group variation 
in institutional conditions makes for a greater confidence in the results. Second, it brings to the 
fore the notion of subsidiary scope and its performance implications. Prior research in global 
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strategy has considered scope mainly at the firm level, thereby limiting our understanding of scope 
at the subsidiary level. Research on the diversity/type of subsidiary purposes can address this gap. 
Also, considering the potential interaction between subsidiary scope and investment location can 
help us understand how subsidiary scope may be contingent on the institutional conditions of the 
host country and how, if at all, subsidiaries modify their scope to embed elements of flexibility 
into their structure. Third, in looking at investment purposes, it departs from existing emphasis on 
the ‘how’ questions (e.g., entry mode research) and focus on those that look at the ‘why’ of 
investing in emerging markets. Fourth, it contributes to the institutional voids literature by 
suggesting response mechanisms operating at the subsidiary level. It finds that subsidiaries with 
diverse investment purposes and greater market-seeking orientation can deal with institutional 
voids/instability better than their peers. Fifth, global strategy research has largely ignored Africa 
as a research setting, limiting our understanding of this region. This research responds to the 
numerous calls to help fill this gap (e.g., Jackson, 2004; Walsh, 2015; Zoogah et al., 2015). 
In the sections to follow, theoretical arguments leading to the research hypotheses are presented. 
This is followed by a brief discussion of the design employed to answer the research questions, 
along with the modeling procedure utilized. Next, results are presented and their implications 
drawn. The paper concludes by discussing contributions, highlighting limitations and identifying 
promising directions for future research.  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The notion of institutions and their influences on organizations has been central to emerging 
market research. Institutional economists consider institutions, ‘…humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic, and social interactions’ (North, 1991: 97). Their view of 
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institution is as one that is created to bring order to exchanges and reduce attendant uncertainty 
(North, 1991). This view largely underpins our understanding of how institutions (or lack thereof) 
influence business strategy as well as performance. Weak and/or unstable institutions 
characterizing emerging markets pose economic challenges in the form of increased uncertainty 
and transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). Whereas 
research in global strategy has provided considerable support to this argument, some other research 
has provided contrasting evidence.  
Notably, Chan, Isobe, and Makino (2008) find that subsidiaries operating in countries with less 
developed institutions, on average, registered better performance than their counterparts. This 
finding was inconsistent with their prediction, which drew on arguments from institutional 
economics and the institutional voids literature. A potential explanation of this finding rests in the 
market failure literature in strategic management that points to the strategic opportunities inherent 
in the weakness and/or instability of institutions (Taussig and Delios, 2015). This literature 
suggests that less developed institutions create market power opportunities for those firms with 
the required set of resources and capabilities. Therefore, a potential explanation of such contrasting 
finding as that in Chan et al. (2008) rests in the possibility that the strategic advantages of weak 
institutions outweigh corresponding economic challenges. A joint consideration of the economic 
as well as strategic implications of institutions is, therefore, key for a better understanding of 
institutions and their influence on firm/subsidiary performance (Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada, 
2001; Williamson, 1999). 
Williamson (1991) has identified two different approaches to business strategy: economizing and 
strategizing. Whereas the former is mainly concerned with organizational efficiency, the latter 
emphasizes market power advantages. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) further clarified this 
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classification by identifying the theoretical underpinnings of each. Economizing holds that the 
route to competitive advantage is through minimization of transaction and transformation costs 
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Williamson,1991); strategizing suggests that competitive 
advantage results from limitations on competition and building defensible positions against 
competitive forces (Porter, 1981; Teece et al., 1997). Given that institutions help determine the 
levels of transaction/ transformation costs and market competition (North, 1990; Williamson, 
2000), they are likely to have both economizing and strategizing implications. 
The economizing implications arise largely from two sources: institutional voids and institutional 
instability (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).  Institutional voids refer to contexts “…where 
institutional arrangements that support markets are absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role 
expected of them” (Mair and Marti, 2009: 422). Institutional voids lead to informational problems, 
inefficient judicial systems (enforcement problems), and misguided regulation (competition 
problems) that render host markets less efficient (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). These problems give 
rise to increased levels of uncertainty and transaction costs (North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). On 
the other hand, emerging markets are also characterized by institutional instability arising, for 
example, from an abrupt change of government and/or discontinuities in government policies and 
actions (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007). Such changes and their consequences are usually difficult to 
predict and can adversely affect the capital, factor, and product markets in which MNE subsidiaries 
conduct their businesses (Khanna et al., 2005).  
Foreign subsidiaries operating in locations with institutional voids often face problems in obtaining 
(reliable) information about potential exchange partners. In advanced markets, such institutions as 
rating agencies, chambers of commerce, and other independent (third-party) organizations provide 
useful information about customers, distributors, and suppliers. In contrast, in emerging markets, 
26 
 
26 
 
MNE subsidiaries have to make do without this essential input. As a result, they face much greater 
uncertainty and transaction costs than their counterparts operating in advanced markets (Dhanaraj 
and Khanna, 2011; Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  
Locations with institutional voids are also fraught with enforcement problems. Even if partners 
have been identified and exchange contracts have been made, the issue of whether these partners 
will honor the transaction commitments is important. Strong contract and property rights 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g., sound and reliable court systems) are essential to provide 
incentives for honoring contracts; however, such mechanisms are largely missing in emerging 
markets, subjecting subsidiaries to the hazards of opportunistic behaviours and attendant 
inefficiencies (Williamson, 2000).  
Emerging markets are also lacking in institutions useful to promote competition in product as well 
as factor markets. For example, entry barriers in a subsidiary’s factor markets can decrease the 
number of suppliers available. In the product market, such barriers can limit the number of 
intermediaries with which a foreign subsidiary can work (Dhanaraj and Khanna, 2011; Khanna 
and Palepu, 1997). Such limits to competition in any of or both markets can undermine the 
bargaining power of the foreign subsidiaries, resulting in higher costs of operating (Porter, 1981). 
On the other hand, regulatory restrictions encourage rent-seeking practices by government 
officials—practices that may adversely affect the performance of foreign subsidiaries (World 
Bank, 2002). 
In addition to extant institutional voids, uncertainty occasioned by the dynamic, changing nature 
of institutions can affect the performance of foreign subsidiaries operating in emerging markets. 
Instability of government regulations and other institutional elements requires foreign subsidiaries 
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to frequently adapt to these changes (Meyer and Peng, 2016). Also, emerging markets such as 
those in Africa often have a highly fragile political climate, with political conflicts arising 
unexpectedly and promising countries suddenly falling into disorder (Zoogah et al., 2015). Since 
foreign subsidiaries are often considered by Africans as agents of imperialistic rule, they are highly 
susceptible to attacks following political crisis (Chironga et al., 2011). Such attacks may range 
from introducing policy changes that adversely affect operations to reneging on contracts and even 
to the expropriation of assets.  
These economizing challenges notwithstanding, weak institutions make for considerable 
strategizing (positioning) benefits. Two lines of arguments suggest a possible net-positive 
performance implication of operating in emerging markets. First, the lack of regulations promoting 
competition in the market where a focal subsidiary is operating can help the subsidiary secure 
market power and subsequently gain greater economic rent than would be possible otherwise. As 
well, because of their affiliation with MNEs, foreign subsidiaries are likely to have more resources 
with which to influence governments than local firms do and therefore can more easily (than in 
OECD countries) exploit institutional voids and weak governments to get an advantage1. This view 
of ‘institutional voids as opportunities’ is also emphasized elsewhere, albeit from a slightly 
different angle (Dhanaraj and Khanna, 2011; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Also in line with this 
view is the argument that increased local density typical of institutionally well-developed locations 
heightens competitive pressures, which in turn can increase subsidiary exit (Miller and Eden, 
2006).  
                                                          
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this mechanism.  
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Second, literature on the performance persistence of MNE affiliates operating in emerging market 
(Chacar and Vissa, 2005; Chacar et al., 2010) indicates that foreign subsidiaries tend to persist 
even in the face of poor performance because of (a) the understanding by MNE management of 
the relatively greater challenges of operating in emerging markets and thus a correspondingly 
greater allowance for substandard performance (i.e., strategic explanation); (b) the tendency for 
MNE managers to persevere with short-term losses and stay the course in the hope of developing 
experience and gradually building share, local identity, and useful political connections (Chacar 
and Vissa, 2005)(i.e., evolutionary/path-dependence explanation); and (c) the tendency to avoid 
the stigma associated with failing in emerging markets (i.e., behavioural explanation).  
 
The potential implications of institutional voids/instability for the exit probability of foreign 
subsidiaries is likely to depend on the balance between associated economizing challenges and 
strategizing opportunities. Williamson (1991) observed that economizing is much more 
fundamental than strategizing and that strategizing benefits seldom prevail in the presence of 
significant cost burdens in production, distribution, and organization. Teece et al., (1997) echo this 
view by arguing that organizing effectively and efficiently to identify and embrace opportunities 
is more fundamental to value creation and capture than seeking market power through such actions 
as raising rival’s costs and excluding new entrants. As well, economic rents in the strategizing 
(positioning) approach are monopoly rents (Teece et al., 1997), which are available only to a 
limited range of firms/subsidiaries and difficult to sustain in such dynamic institutional settings as 
those in most African countries. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:  
         Hypothesis 1:  MNE subsidiaries entering the African market face a greater likelihood of  
            exit than their counterparts entering the OECD market (the economizing  
                       mechanism is more potent than the strategizing mechanism). 
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Empirical testing of this hypothesis can only indicate which of the two countervailing mechanisms 
(i.e., economizing and strategizing) dominate in the context of MNE investment in Africa. 
Consideration of relevant boundary conditions is thus needed to gain a more refined understanding 
of the dynamics between these mechanisms and the corresponding implications for the exit 
likelihood of subsidiaries. MNE-and/or subsidiary-level strategies can help mitigate institutional 
hazards and/or harness market power opportunities, thus influencing subsidiary exit likelihood 
(Delios and Henisz, 2000; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Here, this study considers two such 
strategies: investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation. 
Investment Purposes Diversity  
Successful investments in uncertain environments require an understanding of the environment 
and associated dynamics (Miles and Cameron, 1982). The investment strategy to be used can 
reflect such understanding and preparation, or the absence thereof. One essential issue in the 
strategy formulation process is specifying the intended purpose(s) of the investment. Clearly, 
investment purposes are context dependent in that different investment locations and environments 
may be suitable for achieving different purposes. For instance, an environment suitable for 
advancing a research and development purpose may not be suitable for achieving a market access 
purpose. Likewise, some environments may be conducive for pursuing both purposes mentioned 
above, while some may not be suitable for any of the purposes.  
Discussion of investment purposes has featured in prior literature on investment motives. Dunning 
(1998), for example, elaborated on four major motives that drive MNE investments. The resource-
seeking motive explains FDI in search of a resource that is not available in the home country or 
relatively cheaper in the foreign country. Investments in resource-endowed countries are likely to 
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be motivated by a desire to access such resources. The efficiency motive is pursued by a firm 
looking to secure decreased production costs and scale and/or scope economies. The market-
seeking motive entails efforts to serve a market in the host country or in nearby regions. It also 
may involve reducing the transportation cost component to ensure better price competitiveness in 
the host country. The strategic asset seeking motive involves acquiring a new technological base. 
A related line of research has extended our understanding of subsidiary heterogeneity by providing 
evidence suggesting that subsidiaries can have diverse purposes, possibly spanning across multiple 
categories (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998).  
Drawing on the investment motives literature and acknowledging that foreign subsidiaries may 
have diverse investment purposes can generate unique insights about subsidiary scope, its 
interaction with institutional environments, and its performance implications. The number and 
relatedness of purposes a subsidiary is expected to achieve in the host country determines its 
activities and thus its scope. Also, investment purposes specify the rationale for a move to a given 
market and define the behavior and orientation of the focal subsidiary (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). 
Virtually every decision regarding the subsidiary, including one on entry mode choices, is likely 
to be influenced by the selected investment purpose(s) (Franco, Rentocchini, and Marzetti, 2010).  
In general, adaptation and learning are essential elements of operating in such emerging markets 
as Africa (Luo and Peng, 1999); having diverse purposes can foster both. Thompson (2011) 
suggests that, under the norms of bounded rationality, firms entering environments fraught with 
uncertainties seek ways to buffer their technical core or infuse in their structures elements that help 
in adapting to changes.  In the context of MNEs, having diverse purposes for a subsidiary is likely 
to promote possible resource reallocation, which refers to the reassignment over time of resources 
from deteriorating areas/activities to more promising ones (Adner, 2007; Klingebiel and Adner, 
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2015). In fact, Adner (2007) argued that existing work on flexibility has disproportionately focused 
on what he calls ‘flexibility as a redirection of activity’ (redirecting activities across subsidiaries 
in response to environmental changes) and suggested that future research explores ‘flexibility as 
reassignment of resources’ (shifting resources to a more favourable activity in a subsidiary). This 
paper considers the latter. Subsidiaries with diverse purposes have the option to abandon an 
investment purpose and reassign resources to more attractive others (Adner, 2007) and the value 
of such option is greater in emerging markets characterized by missing/unstable institutions.  
Institutional voids tend to limit the flexibility of organizations operating in them (Santangelo and 
Meyer, 2011). As such, MNEs entering markets with high institutional voids may need to deploy 
mechanisms that help them secure flexibility which the environment does not provide. A simple 
syllogism may clarify: Flexibility is essential when operating under institutional voids (Khanna 
and Palepu, 1997); such environments limit flexibility (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011); therefore, it 
is incumbent on the firm to devise its own mechanism of flexibility. One such mechanism is having 
diverse investment purposes. An MNE subsidiary with diverse investment purposes can better 
respond to changes in, for example, government regulations as resources can readily be 
reconfigured to focus on a purpose least affected by the change or to revise resource allocations 
among the functions/activities targeted at the purposes.  
Furthermore, entering emerging markets with diverse investment purposes can promote 
exploration, which in turn can facilitate learning about the business environment, experimenting 
with different activities, and understanding what works and what does not (Sorensen and Stuart, 
2000). Subsidiaries having diverse investment purposes are likely to develop a better 
understanding of the host-country environment and build useful connections because of their 
potential exposure to different markets/industries and interactions with different host-country 
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partners (Hashai et al., 2010). Such exposure and connections can provide access to information 
useful in exploring opportunities. The global strategy literature on business groups points to a 
diversification premium when operating in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), a 
finding leading to the institutional-based theory of corporate diversification which posits that 
diversified firms overcome market imperfection prevalent in emerging markets (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000; Peng et al., 2005; Wan, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Following similar logic, 
this study contends that subsidiary level diversification—in the form of purpose diversity—can 
help mitigate the hazards and/or expand the opportunities of conducting business in locations of 
high institutional voids. These, therefore, lead to the following hypothesis: 
          Hypothesis 2: Investment purpose diversity negatively moderates the relationship between  
           entry to Africa by an MNE subsidiary and its exit likelihood such that it  
                      weakens or reverses the positive relationship described by H1. 
 
Market-seeking Orientation  
Foreign investments with greater market-seeking orientation are undertaken to serve the host-
country (and at times, regional) markets through local production and distribution of 
goods/services, rather than exporting from the home country or other third countries (Dunning, 
1998; Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Unlike their counterparts, foreign subsidiaries with greater 
market-seeking orientation are more loosely coupled with their parent MNE and sister subsidiaries. 
They often play a more limited role in the global value-chain process than, for example, resource-
seeking subsidiaries and are more locally responsive to the tastes and needs of their actual and 
potential customers (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). This attribute of market-seeking subsidiaries 
provides them with greater learning opportunities and an enhanced ability to fill institutional voids.  
Out of the desire to serve local markets emerges the need for greater local embeddedness of 
subsidiaries with greater market-seeking orientation. Such embeddedness, in turn, enables the 
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subsidiary to have greater exposure to the host market and to build important ties and networks 
with relevant host-country stakeholders (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). As a result, the 
subsidiary is likely to garner relevant host-country knowledge, which may prove useful in 
mitigating the adverse effects of institutional voids. Likewise, the connections established and the 
familiarity developed can make it easier for such subsidiaries to more easily access and more 
successfully work with local intermediaries. Also, in response to adverse institutional conditions 
in the host country, MNEs may relocate their subsidiaries. However, the need for greater local 
embeddedness of market-seeking subsidiaries makes it difficult to exercise this option2.  
Moreover, because market-seeking subsidiaries usually act as standalone units (operationally less 
integrated with the parent MNE as well as sister subsidiaries), adverse conditions in the host-
country institutional environment are less likely to directly affect the parent MNE and sister 
subsidiaries. As a result, parent MNEs are more likely to tolerate poor performance of market-
seeking subsidiaries than other kinds of subsidiaries. Subsidiaries with (natural) resource-seeking 
orientation, for example, tend to be a part of their respective parents’ supply-chain and thus have 
operations closely synchronized with those of the parent MNEs and ‘sister’ subsidiaries (Nachum 
and Zaheer, 2005). As a result, when adverse institutional conditions affect the focal subsidiary, 
the parent MNE and associated sister subsidiaries are likely to feel the effects, prompting the MNE 
to terminate the focal subsidiary. The foregoing arguments, therefore, lead to the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: The level of market-seeking orientation negatively moderates the relationship  
            between entry to Africa by an MNE subsidiary and its exit likelihood such that it  
            weakens or reverses the positive relationship described by H1. 
 
 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research Context 
The last decade has seen a rapid surge in the economic development of Africa, attracting the 
attention of investors. In 2012, the continent registered a 5 percent increase in its FDI inflows 
while the global FDI inflow decreased by 18 percent (UNCTAD, 2013). A possible factor behind 
such a difference is the higher average rate of return for foreign investment made in the continent. 
In fact, the rate of FDI return is higher in Africa than in any developing region of the world (Leke 
et al., 2010).  
Despite such progress and promising prospects, the continent is still fraught with systemic 
challenges with performance implications for MNEs operating there (Chrysostome and Lupton, 
2011). Most, if not all, of the challenges are related to the paucity of effective institutions. Also, 
many African countries are characterized by a high degree of political instability and a lack (or 
absence) of rule of law (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007). Similarly, ineffective financial institutions 
and inadequate regulatory infrastructures give rise to unstable macroeconomic environments, 
which in turn lead to high uncertainty and greater perceived risk of investment (Asiedu, 2002).  
The use of the African context was motivated by several reasons. First, by focusing on the African 
context, the study attempts to respond to a call for a greater focus of global strategy research on 
emerging economies whose institutional environments are completely different from those of 
developed economies, not just in their basic natures but also in the way they influence 
organizational behavior and performance (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna et al., 2005; Peng 
et al., 2008). In fact, such distinction has been made even among emerging economies in that 
economies such as those in Africa have considerably higher levels of institutional voids/instability 
and thus merit separate consideration (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Also, the relevance to developing 
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countries of conventional management theories—especially those concerned with the relationship 
between organizations and contexts—has been questioned (Kiggundu, Jørgensen, and Hafsi, 1983) 
and calls for a contextualization of international business (IB) theories have been made (e.g., 
Welch et al., 2011). In fact, the issue of context and how it relates with MNE performance and 
behaviour is fundamental in IB scholarship (Shenkar, 2004; Vernon, 1994). The distinct 
institutional context of African countries, thus, presents an ideal setting to better understand 
international business and strategy in a market where institutions are weak and/or unstable.  
Second, Africa’s economic momentum and future growth prospects have attracted unprecedented 
levels of FDI activity (UNCTAD, 2013). Indications are that this trend is set to continue. Clearly, 
along with such increased activity and focus on the continent comes the need for a better 
understanding of the economic and institutional realities not just in the continent but in each 
country as well. Recognizing this need, the Academy of Management (AOM) launched the AOM 
Africa Initiative in 2011, issued a Call for Papers on management topics related to Africa, and held 
its first global conference in Africa in January, 2013.  
Third, despite an increasing interest in research about emerging economies, high quality research 
in such contexts has paid very limited attention to Africa (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Zoogah et al., 
2015). Even from the limited research examining issues in the continent, a significant portion 
concerns issues of corporate social responsibility and most use country-level, macro indicators 
which provide but a telescopic view of situations on the ground.  Such a shortage of empirical 
work about Africa is more troubling for IB whose main unit of analysis is MNEs operating across 
countries and regions. This study, thus, looks to address the gap and takes a modest step toward 
bringing more scholarly attention to Africa.  
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Data and Sample 
To test the hypotheses, the study uses a longitudinal data of Japanese overseas investments in 
Africa obtained from the Toyo Keizai (TK) dataset. The dataset is based on an annual survey of 
general managers of Japanese overseas subsidiaries throughout the world. This dataset is ideal to 
test the hypotheses for several reasons. First, the longitudinal nature of the data is useful not only 
in increasing confidence in the results and underlying causal arguments (Bono and McNamara, 
2011), but also in conducting survival analysis, which require data on multiple points. Second, it 
contains a fairly comprehensive data on foreign investment activities in Africa, a region largely 
missing from the mainstream global strategy research in part due to the lack of access to reliable 
data (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Third, Japan has been one of the major home countries for outward 
foreign investment throughout the world.   
To achieve the empirical purpose, the study employed data on Japanese multinational subsidiaries 
operating in Africa. Some essential data screening and cleaning were conducted to develop a 
suitable dataset. Also, to ensure that the study focuses on FDIs with significant foreign investment, 
the study followed Beamish and Inkpen’s (1998) suggestion and limited the sample to subsidiaries 
having at least 20 employees. Also, following Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino (1994), the study 
restricted the sample to those subsidiaries that were at least two years old to consider only those 
subsidiaries that reached an initial period of stabilization. These procedures resulted in a final 
sample of 126 Japanese subsidiaries operating across 28 African countries, extending over 19 years 
(1990  ̵2008), and constituting 998 subsidiary-year cases. Table 1 presents a list of these African 
countries along with the number of subsidiaries operating there. Data about relevant parent-level 
factors were obtained from the Nikkei-NEEDS dataset.  
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Understanding the exit implications of entry to the African market is complicated because of the 
inherent self-selection bias. To account for this concern, the study used a control (counterfactual) 
sample of comparable subsidiaries operating elsewhere. Accordingly, it identified matching 
subsidiaries operating in OECD countries to ensure enough variability in the characteristics of 
business/institutional environment between the ‘treated’ (i.e., African subsidiaries) and the 
‘control’ subsidiaries (i.e., OECD subsidiaries). It employed the PSM procedure to identify 
matching control subsidiaries (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). First, a comprehensive list of 
subsidiaries operating in 29 OECD countries is complied. Then, these subsidiaries were pooled 
with the treatment subsidiaries and a probit model was fitted by using subsidiary size, subsidiary 
age, foreign ownership ratio, the number of foreign parents, parent size, and parent R&D intensity 
to predict the propensity of a subsidiary to enter Africa. Using the estimated propensity score, the 
study identified 123 control subsidiaries matching the 126 treated subsidiaries. These 123 control 
subsidiaries are spread across 10 OECD countries. Three of the treated subsidiaries share matching 
subsidiaries with other three treated subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are retained in the final sample 
(per Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). The final sample includes 249 subsidiaries. 
Table 1. List of African host countries and number of subsidiaries 
Country No. of 
Subsidiaries 
Country No. of 
Subsidiaries 
Algeria 2 Mozambique 2 
Angola 1 Niger 1 
Burkina Faso 2 Nigeria 22 
Cameroon 2 People’s Rep. of the Congo 1 
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 1 Senegal 1 
Egypt 14 South Africa 34 
Ethiopia 3 Sudan 1 
Ghana 3 Swaziland 1 
Ivory Coast 4 Tanzania 7 
Kenya 5 Togo 1 
Madagascar 3 Tunisia 2 
Malawi 1 Uganda 3 
Mali 2 Zambia 3 
Mauritius 2 Zimbabwe 2 
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To verify the success of the matching procedure, two sets of tests were conducted. First, as reported 
in Table 2, t-test of means was run on the covariates used to develop the matching model. Results 
show no statistically significant differences between the means. Second, a probit regression was 
conducted using the sample of 249 matching subsidiaries to predict the probability of entering the 
African market. As shown in Table 2, estimates for the covariates used in the matching model are 
insignificant, indicating that the matching process was reasonably sound. The use of the PSM 
technique provides for a more randomized sample of subsidiaries with counterfactual cases, thus 
helping address potential endogeneity concerns (Reeb et al., 2012). 
Table 2. Comparison of subsidiaries in Africa and OECD countries across variables using t-tests 
and probit regression on matching model 
 t-test of means Matching model 
Variables African subsidiaries OECD subsidiaries β p-value 
Subsidiary age 14.71   15.11 -0.00      0.97 
Subsidiary size 2.26    2.32 -0.43      0.29 
Ownership ratio 43.45   44.65 -0.00      0.99 
Sector dummy 2.34    2.43 -0.64      0.14 
Number of foreign 
parents 
Parent size                                     
Parent R&D intensity 
1.38 
 
             4.24   
             0.02                           
   1.40 
 
   4.29 
  0.05 
-0.17 
 
 0.09 
-0.00 
     0.66 
 
     0.53 
     0.64 
Purpose diversity 0.70         0.90***   
Market-seeking 
orientation 
0.44         0.59***   
Institutional voids 45.85       25.91***   
Institutional instability 0.76        0.29***   
Years before exit 5.74        6.57***   
Constant            2.83      0.12 
Number of 
observations 
          2150  
Log-likelihood          -178.39  
Wald χ2            4.12  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001(two-tailed) 
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Variables  
As with any survival analysis, the dependent variable is made up of two components. The first 
represents the length of time in years a subsidiary takes to cease operation or to be right-censored 
(i.e., not cease operation within the time frame of the analysis). In the model, this is a random 
variable, whereas the censoring time is fixed to the year 2008. The second component is an exit 
indicator given by the following function. 
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In the above function δi represents the censoring result for a given subsidiary. Ti  is the failure time. 
A subsidiary is assigned 1 if Ti  is less than or equal to Ui, which is the censoring time. If otherwise, 
a subsidiary is said to be right-censored because there is no way to tell when that subsidiary will 
experience the event. In keeping with previous studies that used the same dataset, this study 
considers a subsidiary terminated when its records no longer appear in the dataset (e.g., Delios and 
Beamish, 2001). The data used in the study are published on a yearly basis, so this is the metric 
for specifying time. 
Key Independent Variables 
Entry to Africa. This variable underlies the baseline, main effect argument. Clearly, one of the 
most important strategic decisions of MNEs is a decision on investment locations. This decision 
is captured with a dichotomous variable assuming a value of ‘1’ for subsidiaries entering Africa 
and ‘0’ for those entering any of the OECD countries included in the sample. Here, the study makes 
a reasonable assumption that at the start MNEs need to confront a strategic decision of either to 
enter the African market or not to. Such a regional orientation of MNE location decision is 
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consistent with the theoretical and empirical evidence underlying the regionalization/semi-
globalization literature in IB (e.g., Arregle et al., 2013, Rugman and Verbeke, 2004).  
To observe the differences in institutional environments of the two broad investment destinations 
(i.e., Africa and OECD), data on the levels of institutional voids and institutional instability were 
compiled. The study uses the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom measures to 
establish the level of institutional voids (Kane, Holmes, and O’Grady, 2007). The index aggregates 
measures on multiple aspects of economic freedom. It is a time series data providing indices from 
1995 onwards. This study followed Dikova and van Witteloostuijn's (2007) approach and used the 
1995 score for the years between 1990 and 1994 inclusive. The index can assume values ranging 
from zero to 100, higher values indicating better overall economic freedom. The values on this 
index were subtracted from 100 to develop the institutional voids variable so that higher values 
indicate greater institutional voids. Institutional instability was measured using the POLCON 
measure of political constraints that captures the distribution of power across the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of government to provide an estimate of how difficult it is for host 
government to change the rules of the game in a way that adversely affects the interest of the 
foreign subsidiaries (Henisz, 2000).  
Investment purpose diversity. This variable was used as a moderator in the models, and it was 
developed out of the TK dataset using the following procedure. Related theoretical arguments 
suggest that having multiple purposes provides adaptability/flexibility advantage in response, for 
example, to unexpected policy change. Nonetheless, the degree of relatedness between or among 
the purposes is also important in determining the feasibility of adaptation. A concept in the real 
options perspective called the subadditivity of option portfolios holds that options which are within 
a given category or affected by the same environmental factors have lower value in managing 
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uncertainty than more diverse options (Belderbos, Tong, and Wu, 2014); that is, when one purpose 
is affected, the others will also be so, limiting the opportunity for the subsidiary/firm to redirect its 
focus and stay in operation (i.e. less ability for resource reallocation). However, a subsidiary with 
multiple, unrelated purposes is less likely to see all its purposes adversely affected by a policy 
change. As a result, in response to a policy change that makes a purpose less attractive, such 
subsidiary can reconfigure its resources to focus on the purpose(s) not(less) affected by the policy 
change. 
Therefore, it is essential that the variable developed contains information about both the number 
of purposes a subsidiary performs as well as the degree of relation between or among those 
purposes. The following procedures were used to develop this variable. First, investment purposes 
of each subsidiary as specified by the respective general managers were identified. Next, using 
Dunning’s (1998) classification of investment motives, the investment purposes were categorized 
into four categories: resource seeking, efficiency seeking, market seeking, and strategic-asset 
seeking. A fifth category was also included to represent other investment purposes that are not 
specified in the data. The investment motives and the subsidiary mandate (charter) literatures were 
consulted and feedback from three colleagues was obtained in classifying the purposes along the 
motive categories. These categories were used to decide on the relatedness of purposes. That is, 
purposes that fall into two different categories are considered unrelated. Table 3 presents the 
frequency distribution of the investment purposes and motive categories used in this study. Then 
the widely-used entropy measure was adopted to calculate purpose diversity scores for each 
subsidiary. The mathematical function used to calculate the investment purpose diversity is as 
follows: 
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In the above function, Pi is the share of attention given to the i
th investment purpose. Here the study 
assumes that equal attention is given to each purpose. A useful feature of the entropy measure is 
its ability to capture the two essential elements of investment purpose diversity: (1) the number of 
investment purposes a subsidiary has; and (2) the degree of relatedness among these investment 
purposes (Palepu, 1985). Two subsidiaries having an equal number of investment purposes may 
differ in their overall investment purpose diversity score because of differences in the degree of 
relatedness among their respective purposes. A detailed and technical illustration of the procedure 
used to develop this variable is available in the Appendix.  
Table 3. Frequency distribution of investment purposes and motives 
 OECD subsidiaries African subsidiaries 
Motive 
category 
Investment purpose Frequency 
(purpose) 
Frequency 
(motive) 
Frequency 
(purpose) 
Frequency 
(motive) 
Efficiency 
seeking 
Labour intensity 214 768 247 824 
Tax breaks for investment 38 198 
Building international networks 
of production 
343 330 
Export to Japan 138 49 
Financing and currency hedging 35 0 
Market 
seeking 
Market access 1078 1468 672 844 
Building international networks 
of distribution 
216 141 
Export to other countries 39 31 
Building new businesses 39 0 
Controls business of the area 18 0 
Trade conflict 78 0 
Resource 
seeking 
Natural resources, materials 42 42 173 173 
Strategic 
asset 
seeking 
Alliance with customers in 
Japan 
70 476 2 146 
Information gathering, royalty 
revenue 
338 126 
Research and development 68 18 
Others Other purposes 34 34 83 83 
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Market-seeking orientation. This is another moderating variable developed out of the TK dataset. 
First, for each subsidiary, the number of investment purposes falling into the market-seeking 
category was counted. Such investment purposes include market access, building new business, 
and building international networks of distribution. Then, this number was divided by the total 
number of purposes the subsidiary has to arrive at the market-seeking orientation score. The value 
of this variable ranges from 0 percent (indicating no market-seeking orientation) to 100 percent 
(indicating high market-seeking orientation). 
Control Variables 
To account for other potential explanations, the study controlled for several variables found at 
three different levels. First at the subsidiary-level, it controlled for a number of variables which 
have been shown to be theoretically related to subsidiary exit.  It introduced subsidiary age variable 
to control for subsidiary age as young firms have a higher probability of exit than old ones (Carroll 
and Delacroix, 1982). As subsidiary size has been shown to influence exit (Moulten and Thomas, 
1993), it controlled for it using the log of number of employees as its proxy. This variable is time-
variant and can also proxy for many subsidiary characteristics, such as the extent of local linkages, 
economies of scale, and importance within intra-firm and external networks (Yang, Mudambi, 
Meyer, 2008). Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) found a statistically significant relationship between 
foreign ownership level and subsidiary exit probability. Therefore, the study controlled for foreign 
ownership level by using the combined percentage of equity ownership of the foreign partners in 
the focal subsidiary. It also controlled for sector effect by introducing two dummy variables for 
three sector groups namely, primary, secondary, and tertiary.  
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It also included parent-level controls to account for alternative explanations of subsidiary exit 
arising from parent affiliation. Makino and Beamish (1998) found that the presence of multiple 
foreign partners increases managerial complexity, thereby influencing exit. As such, the study 
controlled for the number of foreign partners listed as parents of the focal subsidiary. It also 
controlled for parent size and used log of the combined number of employees of the parent 
companies as its proxy. The parent size variable is time-variant. Intangible assets of the parent is 
related to the exit probability of its subsidiary (Delios and Beamish, 1999) As such, the study 
included a parent-level research and development (R&D) intensity variable. This variable is 
measured as a ratio of R&D expenditure to the total sales.  
To control for the effects of time and periodic crisis on the exit probability of subsidiaries, the study 
used the strata option in stcox estimation in STATA version 14. As a result, it specified baseline hazard 
of the model to each stratum of three periods namely, 1990  ̵1995, 1996 ̵ 2001, and 2002 ̵ 2008. By so 
doing, it minimized the effect of unobserved heterogeneity among periods on the exit probability of 
subsidiaries. The specified baseline hazard adjusts for such extraneous periodic events as the Asian 
financial crisis that occurred in the 1996 ̵ 2001 period in the model and that influenced investments 
from Asian countries, including Japan. The paper also introduced host-country fixed effects to account 
for unobserved heterogeneity among the countries that may explain differences in the exit probability 
of foreign subsidiaries. 
Statistical Method 
To test the hypotheses, the study employed an extended Cox regression model (Kleinbaum and 
Klein, 2005). It can help estimate the parameters without the need to make any assumptions about 
the underlying hazard distribution. The model develops a hazard function used to determine the 
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probability that a subsidiary experiences an event (i.e., exit), given it has survived up to time t. The 
hazard function that is denoted by ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋(𝑡)) is as follows: 
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ho(t) represents the baseline hazard function that is left unspecified and reflects the underlying 
hazard rate when the values of all covariates X1,…Xp1 and X1(t),…Xp2(t) equal to 0. X(t) stands for 
the variables in the model and Xi denotes the i
th time-independent variable, while Xj(t) the j
th time-
dependent variable. βi’s and σj’s denote their corresponding coefficients. The extended Cox 
regression model accommodates the use of time-variant covariates (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005) 
and produces a hazard ratio associated with each explanatory variable, along with corresponding 
confidence interval estimates.  
RESULTS 
Table 3 describes the data and provides useful statistic for subsidiaries operating in Africa and 
those in the OECD countries. The greater subsidiary years to subsidiary cases ratio for subsidiaries 
operating in OECD countries than those in African countries suggests that on average subsidiaries 
survive longer in the former than in the latter. This finding is also supported by the greater median 
number of years for the OECD subsample. The median time represents a parameter estimate for 
the number of years it takes for 50 percent of the subsidiaries to experience the event (i.e., exit). 
Relatedly, the hazard rate among African subsidiaries appears to be greater and the study used the 
log-rank test to examine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the exit rates 
between the two subsamples. The result shows a statistically significant difference in the exit rates 
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of subsidiaries in the two subsamples (χ2 = 7.25, p < 0.01), suggesting that African subsidiaries 
face a greater hazard rate.  
Table 4. Data summary 
Items OECD subsidiaries African subsidiaries Total 
Number of countries 10 28 38 
Institutional voids(mean) 25.90 45.85 35.07a 
Institutional instability(mean) 0.29                                                           0.76 0.50a 
Subsidiary years 1164 986 2150 
Subsidiary cases 123 126 249 
Exits 64 80 144 
Median survival(years) 11 9 8a 
a mean values 
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix on all the variables used in the models as well as the 
institutional voids and instability variables. The correlations between all of the variables in the 
models are low and thus multicollinearity was not a concern. A collinearity diagnostic was 
conducted on all the variables using the variance inflation factor (VIF) method. The calculated 
VIF scores for all the variables are below 5, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. To 
validate the baseline assumption that the African market has a significantly different institutional 
environment from the OECD market, the study introduced the institutional voids and institutional 
instability variables. The high, positive correlation between these variables and the treatment 
variable is consistent with the expectation. As shown in Table 4, the African group faces 
significantly higher institutional voids (t = -76.72, p < 0.001) and institutional instability (t = -
53.75, p < 0.001) than the OECD group.  
 
 
 
Since the response variable is subsidiary exit and the models include a time-variant covariate, the 
study used the extended Cox regression to test its hypotheses. The partial likelihood procedure was 
employed to estimate regression parameters. The study followed the estimation procedures 
outlined in Singer and Willet (2003). Table 5 presents results from the tests. The analyses resulted 
in five models. First, the full model (i.e., Model 5), which includes all the variables and interaction  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 2150) 
                      
Variables Mean SD     1   2   3    4    5    6    7    8   9   10   11   12    13 
Subsidiary age 14.89 10.18 1              
Subsidiary size 2.28 0.61 2 0.24             
Ownership ratio 43.74 33.26 3 0.02 -0.21            
Sector dummy 2.37 0.55 4 -0.06 -0.36 0.30           
Number of foreign 
parents 
1.39 0.61 5 0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.09          
Parent size 4.26 0.73 6 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.25         
Parent R&D 
intensity 
0.04 0.02 7 -0.02  0.06 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.17        
Entry to Africa 0.46 0.50 8 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04       
Purpose diversity 0.81 0.68 9 -0.08  0.11  -0.00 -0.10 -0.02  0.13 -0.09 -0.15      
Market-seeking 
orientation 
0.52 0.34 10  -0.04 -0.10  0.18 0.26 -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.28 0.39     
Period dummies  0.93
  
0.81 11 0.08 -0.05  0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.08    
Institutional voids 35.05 11.68 12 0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.18 0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.86 0.24 -0.14 -0.00   
Institutional 
instability 
 0.50 0.31 13 0.08 0.03 -0.18 -0.17 0.01 -0.14 -0.06 0.76 0.12 0.05 -0.07 0.80  
Survival (years)  6.17 4.19 14 0.39  0.15 -0.02 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.11 0.07 0.47 -0.03 -0.11 
Correlation coefficients greater or equal to |0.05| are significant at a 5% level 
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Table 6. Results from the extended Cox regression model  
Independent   Variables Model 5 Model 4 Model 3       Model 2     Model 1 
 
Subsidiary age   0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
Subsidiary size -0.083* 
(0.042) 
-0.083* 
(0.042) 
-0.079 
(0.042) 
-0.077* 
(0.042) 
-0.079 
(0.042) 
Ownership ratio  -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Sector-  Primary Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Secondary         0.081 
(0.458) 
-0.004 
(0.449) 
0.208 
(0.450) 
0.071 
(0.448) 
0.071 
(0.448) 
             Tertiary 0.900† 
(0.488) 
0.820 
(0.481) 
0.957* 
(0.484) 
0.784 
(0.481) 
0.784 
(0.481) 
Number of foreign parents 
Parent size 
 
Parent R&D intensity 
-0.175 
(0.167) 
0.279 
(0.128) 
-0.070 
(0.120) 
 
-0.169 
(0.166) 
0.300† 
(0.127) 
-0.076 
(0.118) 
 
-0.182 
(0.166) 
0.255 
(0.125) 
-0.074 
(0.120) 
 
-0.173 
(0.166) 
0.276 
(0.122) 
-0.088 
(0.115) 
-0.173 
(0.166) 
0.271 
(0.122) 
-0.168 
(0.107) 
Country Dummies                          Included Included Included Included Included 
Entry to Africa 1.366** 
(0.515) 
1.103* 
(0.432) 
1.314* 
(0.515) 
0.660* 
(0.322) 
 
Market-seeking orientation -0.175 
(0.266) 
-0.350* 
(0.174) 
0.040 
(0.241) 
  
Purpose diversity 0.177 
(0.235) 
0.264 
(0.211) 
-0.137 
(0.169) 
  
Purpose diversity × Entry 
to Africa 
-0.631* 
(0.264) 
-0.761* 
(0.297) 
   
Market-seeking orientation 
× Entry to Africa 
-0.292† 
(0.092) 
 -0.585* 
(0.281) 
  
Number of observations 2150 2150 2150 2150 2150 
Log-likelihood -766.063 -768.428 -769.833 -771.705 -773.374 
χ2 testing model against 
null model 
79.97*** 77.24*** 74.43*** 102.84*** 70.68*** 
χ2 testing model against 
Model 5 
N/A 3.38† 4.51* 8.72*** 17.20*** 
AIC 1477.10 1566.86 1569.66 1571.41 1575.32 
†p < .10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001(two-tailed) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Baseline hazards in all models are specific to the stratum of period that includes 1990-1995, 1996-2001, and 
2002-2008. 
 
terms, was run. Then, the significances of the interaction and main effects were examined by 
dropping one or more variables from the full model and comparing the log-likelihood of each 
nested model to that of the full model. The resulting Chi-square statistic was used to determine the 
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significance of the variables or interactions excluded from the full model. Model 4 excludes the 
interaction term between the entry to Africa variable and market-seeking orientation; whereas, 
Model 3 excludes the interaction term between the entry to Africa variable and purpose diversity. 
Model 2 excludes the interaction terms as well as the moderating variables. Model 1 further 
excludes the main effect. Model 1 is the most reduced model in which the treatment variable (i.e., 
entry to Africa) is also excluded. The corresponding Chi-square statistic resulting from comparing 
the log-likelihood of  Model 1 and the full model indicates that the full model which includes the 
entry to Africa variable is superior to the reduced model (χ2 = 17.20, p < 0.001). A significant 
regression coefficient for the treatment variable in Model 5 provides support for H1 (β=1.366, p < 
0.01), suggesting that entry to Africa subjects Japanese subsidiaries to increased hazard. Consistent 
result was found from a one-tailed test deemed appropriate given the directional prediction of H1 
(β=1.366, p < 0.01).  The beta coefficient corresponds to a hazard ratio of around 3.923, suggesting 
that Japanese subsidiaries that enter the African market have a 2924 percent higher chance of 
exiting at time t than those that enter the OECD market. This represents the value of the effect size, 
suggesting the substantive significance of the finding. Figure 2 shows the estimated hazard of 
Japanese subsidiaries operating in OECD countries and those in African countries. 
                                                          
3 The hazard ratio is calculated as eβ, interpreted as a percentage of change in hazard probability for 1% change in the 
explanatory variables. Caution need to be exercised when applying such interpretation for log-transformed variables as 
the changes are in log-transformed terms.  
4 The percentage is determined by subtracting 1 from the corresponding hazard ratio.  
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Figure 2. Estimated hazard of subsidiaries operating in the OECD countries and Africa 
 
The second hypothesis presents a moderation effect of purpose diversity on the relationship 
between the strategy of entering the African market and exit probability. Model 3 provides 
estimates of parameters useful in testing this prediction. These findings indicate that exclusion of 
this interaction effect from the full model results in an inferior model, suggesting that the 
interaction term is a significant predictor (χ2 = 4.51, p < 0.05). The negative, statistically significant 
beta coefficient of the interaction term supports the prediction in Hypothesis 2 (β = -0.631, p < 
0.05). This result suggests that greater purpose diversity weakens the positive relationship between 
entry to Africa and exit likelihood. To gain further insight into the interaction effect, the result is 
plotted in Figure 3. As shown in the figure, when purpose diversity is high, entry to Africa is 
associated with a reduced likelihood of exit. That is, Japanese subsidiaries with high purpose 
diversity are less likely to exit the African market than those with low purpose diversity. Also, the 
study follows Aiken and West (1991) to test simple slopes at high (1SD above the mean) and low 
(1SD below the mean) values of purpose diversity. The slopes when purpose diversity is high and 
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low are both significantly different from zero (β=0.512, p<0.01 and β=1.370, p<0.01, 
respectively), confirming the results.  
 
Figure 3. Moderating effects of purpose diversity 
 
Model 4 presents results for a test of H3, which predicts a negative moderation effect of the market-
seeking orientation variable on the relationship between the entry of a subsidiary to Africa and its 
exit likelihood. In line with the expectation, comparison of log-likelihood Model 4 with that of 
Model 5 suggests that exclusion of the interaction term of entry to Africa and market-seeking 
orientation results in a Chi-square statistic that is marginally significant (χ2 = 3.38, p < 0.1). 
Hypothesis 3 is marginally supported (β = -0.292, p < 0.10), such that, from Japanese subsidiaries 
entering the African market, those with a greater market-seeking orientation have a lower exit 
probability than their counterparts. Figure 4 shows this moderation effect in which high market-
seeking orientation lowers the greater exit rate associated with entry to Africa. Simple slope tests 
were conducted at high and low levels of the market-seeking orientation variable. The effect of 
entry to Africa on exit likelihood is significantly different from zero for both levels (β = 1.400, p 
< 0.01 and β = 1.202, p < 0.05 at low and high levels respectively).  
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Figure 4. Moderating effects of market-seeking orientation 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Two of the three core areas in IB are MNEs and comparative national business systems (Shenkar, 
2004; Vernon, 1994). MNEs exist in virtually every country in the world, where they face different 
national business systems. While emerging markets have been an area of growing scholarly 
interest (Wright et al., 2005), the focus of studies on such markets has been limited to select 
countries and regions, with regions such as Africa largely underrepresented (Xu and Meyer, 2012). 
A better understanding of these regions and their institutional environments no doubt advances our 
appreciation of emerging markets on a number of fronts, not least of which is on how MNEs deal 
with associated institutional voids and the performance implications of their actions. 
From the descriptive analyses, the study finds that Japanese subsidiaries entering the African 
market have a lower median life of nine years compared to 11 years for those entering the OECD 
market. While this indicates the increased hazard of subsidiaries operating in Africa, the relatively 
smaller than expected difference in the median years suggests that institutional challenges facing 
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subsidiaries operating in Africa may to a certain extent be offset by the decreased competitive 
pressures of operating there.  Also, as expected, the levels of institutional voids and institutional 
instability facing subsidiaries entering the African market are significantly greater than those 
facing subsidiaries entering the OECD market. These two variables are central to the increased 
levels of uncertainty facing subsidiaries operating in Africa (Zoogah et al., 2015).   
Results regarding the first hypothesis provides support to the exit implications of MNEs’ location 
decisions. It was found that, on average, the strategy of entering the African market is associated 
with greater exit likelihood. The paired-sample design presented counterfactual cases of Japanese 
foreign subsidiaries making the alternative decision (i.e., entry to the OECD market), thus 
providing greater confidence in building causal arguments between the location strategy and exit 
likelihood. The finding is consistent with several recent studies suggesting the economizing 
challenges of operating in Africa (Hochberg et al., 2015; UNCTAD, 2015).  
The findings regarding the first hypothesis generates several important insights. First, comparison 
of subsidiary exit probabilities across two broad, disparate groups of investment locations illustrate 
the effects of context on the long-term performance (or exit) of MNE subsidiaries. By doing so, 
the study brings attention to comparative national business systems (Shenkar, 2004; Vernon, 
1994). In fact, Shenkar (2004) has urged scholars to investigate the potentially disparate influences 
of business environments at different investment locations. A similar call has been made to 
consider the contextual boundary conditions of IB theories and develop a richer understanding of 
the interplay between context and business performance (Welch et al., 2011).  
Second, the results shed some light on the economizing and strategizing implications of 
institutional voids/instability. Whereas investment in the OECD market benefits from the highly 
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developed institutional environments that reduce market imperfections and promote efficient 
operations (i.e., economizing benefits), it is also subjected to more intense competitive pressures 
as entry barriers are largely limited and market power mechanisms such as collusive behaviours 
are largely discouraged (i.e., strategizing challenges). In contrast, institutional voids characterizing 
the African environment diminish imitative and competitive pressures and make for rather easier 
development of market power (North, 1991). The findings suggest that, in the African market, the 
economizing downsides of institutional voids/instability are, on average, more potent than the 
associated strategizing opportunities in determining the exit probability of Japanese foreign 
subsidiaries. That is, in such regions as Africa, the challenges arising from the lack (absence) of 
market supporting institutions outweigh the benefits of decreased competitive intensity. This 
finding is consistent with and provides empirical evidence for the notion that economizing is more 
fundamental than strategizing (Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 1991). 
Test of the second hypothesis provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
entry to Africa and exit likelihood. Results indicate that entry to Africa is related to a lower exit 
likelihood for subsidiaries with high purpose diversity. The theoretical arguments in support of 
this finding suggest that subsidiaries with diverse investment purposes can benefit from enhanced 
abilities of adaptability and learning, which are crucial when operating in such dynamic and 
institutionally less-developed locations (Jackson, 2004; Teece et al., 1997).  Subsidiaries with less 
diverse purposes are more susceptible to adverse changes in the environment (Belderbos et al., 
2014), limiting their ability to redirect focus and remain in operation. However, for subsidiaries 
with more diverse purposes, it is less likely for an environmental change that affects one of the 
purposes to also affect the other; hence, in such a situation, these subsidiaries can remain viable 
by redeploying more of their resources and attention to the purpose that is not adversely hit by the 
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change. From a real options perspective, such advantage is termed a flexibility option as it fosters 
managerial flexibility to switch between purposes in response to new information (e.g., Chung et 
al., 2010; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000). 
Subsidiaries that enter locations like Africa with diverse investment purposes are also in a better 
position to respond to or fill institutional voids. Extant research on diversity acknowledges that as 
well as the benefits it confers, it has several downsides. Included in the possible downsides of 
diversity are (a) growing strain on management to manage different purposes and deal with 
uncertainty along different environmental domains/markets (Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988); 
b) increased coordination cost; and c) inefficiencies from conflicting ‘dominant logics’(Markides, 
1992). Diversity, therefore, makes economic sense only to the extent that its drawbacks are more 
than offset by its benefits (Williamson, 1985). The institutional-based view of diversity suggests 
that the extent to which diversity offers net-benefit is contingent on institutional factors, such that 
in locations where market-supporting institutions are missing, diversity offers considerable 
benefits (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Peng et al., 2005; Wan, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). The 
finding not only offers an additional support to the institutional-based view of diversity, but also 
extends our understanding by introducing the notion of within-subsidiary diversity.  
By looking at the phenomenon of within-subsidiary diversity (of purposes) and its interaction with 
institutional conditions to affect subsidiary exit, the study advances the notion of subsidiary scope 
and its implications. Prior research in global strategy has largely focused on scope at the firm level 
(e.g., Peng et al., 2005). Diversification has, therefore, been considered in a limited way whereby 
the firm operates multiple strategic business units (or subsidiaries) potentially across different 
industries and/or institutional environments. The subsidiary scope notion advanced here, however, 
responds to the need to gain better understanding of the heterogeneity of MNE subsidiaries. Some 
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subsidiaries discharge a broad range of responsibilities –for example, production, marketing, and 
central R&D for product development—whereas, others perform just a single activity (e.g., 
manufacturing) (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). This study also contributes to a better 
understanding of not just subsidiary scope, but its implications on foreign subsidiary exit as well.  
Adner (2007) raised the notion of flexibility as reassignment of resources, noting that existing 
treatments of flexibility have largely focused on flexibility as redirection of activity and future 
research needs to look at flexibility through reallocation of resources. Similarly, treatments of 
flexibility in global strategy research have emphasized the flexibility advantage from shifting 
value-chain activities from a country experiencing adverse changes to a more favourable country 
within the MNE’s network (Belderbos and Zou, 2007; Chung et al., 2010). Whereas case studies 
suggest that MNEs such as GM and Qantas engage in reallocation by releasing resources from 
existing activities and redeploying them to new opportunities (Maitland and Sammartino, 2012), 
this study identifies investment purpose diversity as a potential lens through which to study such 
reallocations. More importantly, it identifies investment purpose diversity as a possible response 
to institutional voids/instability, thereby (a) bringing to the fore a response mechanism that has 
received less attention and (b) engaging a response that reflects the strategic decision making of 
MNEs when investing in emerging markets. 
The result of the third hypothesis suggests that the kind of purpose a subsidiary emphasizes also 
matters. The study finds that when operating in institutionally weak/turbulent regions, subsidiaries 
with greater market-seeking orientations have a lower exit probability than their peers. It argues 
that the structural difference between market-seeking subsidiaries (i.e., less globally integrated and 
more locally responsive) and their counterpart is responsible for the differential exit rates. Being 
less globally integrated makes it possible for the parent MNE to tolerate adverse changes in the 
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host country of the focal subsidiary because such adverse change is less likely to affect the parent 
MNE and sister subsidiaries (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). Also, being more locally responsive 
facilitates the building of ties and networks with important local stakeholders, thereby fostering a 
better access to intermediaries and greater understanding of the host-country environment. Such 
access and knowledge can help market-seeking subsidiaries to more successfully operate in 
locations of institutional voids. 
From a measurement standpoint, the use of the market-seeking orientation variable makes two 
important contributions. First, unlike previous research which has used proxies—such as whether 
a subsidiary sells to unaffiliated customers or affiliated customers (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 
2010)—to determine whether a subsidiary is market-seeking, the approach of looking at the 
specific investment purposes to identify market-seeking subsidiaries is not only straightforward 
but also likely to provide a more accurate picture. Second, the use of the term ‘orientation’ in the 
market-seeking orientation variable reflects the reality that subsidiaries may have a diverse 
portfolio of purposes, which can include purposes falling into more than one category. The market-
seeking orientation, thus, measures the proportion of a subsidiary’s purposes falling into the 
market-seeking category, allowing us to determine whether a subsidiary has more market-seeking 
orientation than another subsidiary. Results regarding investment purpose diversity and market-
seeking orientation thus contribute to the global strategy literature by reemphasizing past attention 
to an important aspect of MNEs investments—investment purpose. The measures introduced here 
can inform future research in the area.    
For practitioners, the empirical evidence suggests that investments in Africa have a higher 
probability of exit than those in OECD countries. Given the rather paradoxical anecdotal evidence 
and reports regarding both the merits and hazards of entering the African market, the findings 
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provide some clarity. The crux of the study, however, is about how subsidiaries can mitigate the 
hazards of operating in the African market. Accordingly, it finds that subsidiaries with diverse 
investment purposes are in a better position to deal with institutional voids/instability in Africa 
and accordingly have an even lower chance of exit than their counterparts in the OECD market. 
Further, subsidiaries entering the African market with a greater market-seeking orientation are 
more likely to develop local networks and build a better local knowledge base, thus lowering their 
exit likelihood.  
The robustness of the findings to variations in the study sample and model specification were 
examined. Not all African countries have similar levels of institutional voids and institutional 
instability. To examine whether the results are driven by potential outliers in the sample, the 
models were reestimated for different sample compositions. To assess whether results might be 
influenced by an unusual data distribution in one or more countries, alternative paired-matches 
were developed. The models were rerun after five countries with the lowest and highest average 
values for institutional voids and institutional instability variables had been removed. While the 
values of the estimates did fluctuate, their signs and statistical significances remained unaltered. 
Models were rerun by replacing the entry to Africa variable with institutional voids and 
institutional instability variables. Once again, the results were consistent with the findings using 
the entry to Africa variable. 
While it produced some useful insights, the study is not without limitations. The use of subsidiaries 
from only one country (i.e., Japan) may limit the generalizability of the findings to subsidiaries 
from other countries. In fact, the characteristics and behaviors of subsidiaries from different places, 
for example from developed countries and emerging countries, differs significantly (Wright et al., 
2005). As such, the study should be replicated using subsidiary and MNE data from other home 
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countries. It should be noted, however, that the use of a single home country data served an 
essential statistical purpose of controlling for variance arising from home-country heterogeneity. 
Also, the purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation variables introduced in this paper need 
to be further examined to verify the extent to which the measures used capture the essence of the 
variables. As well, this study is limited to considering only formal institutions and an interesting 
direction for future research is to study informal institutional voids and consider the potential 
dynamics between formal and informal institutional voids.  
A viable extension of this work would be to look at how developments in the institutional 
conditions and competitive intensity across African countries influence the exit likelihood of 
subsidiaries and examine whether the moderating effects of investment purpose diversity and 
market-seeking orientation change accordingly. A growing number of African countries are 
continuously liberalizing their economies, with new regulations replacing the old ones (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2010). Also, MNEs from advanced countries are increasingly witnessing 
competition arising from emerging market MNEs, including those from Africa. It would be 
interesting to study the comparative pace of growth in the level of competition and institutional 
development and accordingly identify suitable strategies for better performance and survival. 
Further extensions and refinements are also possible regarding the investment purpose diversity 
and the market-seeking orientation variables introduced in this paper. For example, as illustrated 
in the Appendix, the purpose diversity measure includes within-purpose diversity and between-
purpose diversity. Future research needs to explore the potential contributions of each component 
with respect to adaptability and/or flexibility. Relatedly, future research needs to explore the extent 
to which diversity of purpose may help respond to or fill institutional voids. Whereas diversity can 
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provide flexibility advantages, too much diversity is likely to introduce complications in 
coordination and management (Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988; Markides, 1992).  
In closing, this study demonstrates that the strategy of entering the African market, on average, 
increases exit probability. However, subsidiaries with more diverse investment purpose and/or 
greater market-seeking orientation have a lower exit likelihood than their counterparts.  In short, 
the study suggests that subsidiaries can mitigate the hazards of institutional voids/instability by 
having diverse investment purposes and/or greater market-seeking orientation.  
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APPENDIX. PURPOSE DIVERSITY MEASURE5 
Consider a firm having N investment purposes. The entropy measure of purpose diversity is 
given by the following function: 
PD=
1
)/1ln(
i
ii PP  
Where, Pi is the share of attention given to the i
th   investment purpose. Here it was assumed that 
equal attention is given to each purpose. A useful feature of the entropy measure is its ability to 
consider both the number of the investment purposes and the degree of relatedness among them. 
Dunning’s (1998) classification of investment motives was used to categorize the purposes. The 
classification includes four categories and in the data there is another category called ‘others’ 
which includes purposes which cannot clearly fall into any of the four motives. The purposes 
within a motive category are more related to one another than purposes across categories. The N 
investment purposes thus aggregate into M motive categories (see Table 3 in the paper).  
Total diversification is a sum of related diversification and unrelated diversification. To calculate 
related diversification (within category diversity), two steps were followed: 
1st. calculate diversity under each category. 
DRj=
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln(  
Where, Pji is the share of a purpose in a motive category. For example, if a subsidiary has two 
purposes in the market-seeking category, then Pji will be ½.  
2nd. Sum diversification scores of each segment 



M
j
jj PDRRD
1
 
Where, Pj is the share of a category from the total set of categories. For example, if a subsidiary 
has a market-seeking motive, a resource-seeking motive, and an efficiency-seeking motive, then 
Pj is 1/3.   
Unrelated diversification measures how subsidiary’s purposes spread across diverse categories 
and is measured by the following: 



M
j
jj PPDU
1
)/1ln(          
So, total diversification equals the sum of RD + DU. This is the investment purpose diversity 
variable used in the paper.  
                                                          
5 The procedures used here are adapted from Palepu (1985) 
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To illustrate, let us calculate diversification scores of four hypothetical cases. 
Case 1 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported seven purposes spread across three motive 
categories) 
Resource seeking       Efficiency seeking        Market seeking      Strategic-asset seeking   Other 
P1               P2          P3         P4        P5                                          P6                   P7 
DR (resource seeking)=
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln( = (1/2) ln(2) + (1/2) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69 
DR(Efficiency seeking)= 
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln( = (1/3)ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) =1.0986 
DR(Strategic) =  
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln( = (1/2) ln(2) + (1/2) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69 
Therefore, RD= 


M
j
jj PDRRD
1
= 0.69(1/3) + 1.0986(1/3) + 0.69(1/3) = 0.8262 



M
j
jj PPDU
1
)/1ln( = (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + 1/3) ln(3) = ln(3) =1.0986 
Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 0.8262 + 1.0986 = 1.9248 
Case 2 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported five purposes spread across two motive 
categories) 
Resource seeking          Efficiency seeking      Market seeking      Strategic-asset seeking     Other 
P1               P2              P3         P4        P5                                      
DR (resource seeking)=
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln( = (½) ln(2) + (½) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69 
DR(Efficiency seeking)= 
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln( = (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3)ln(3) =1.0986 
Therefore, RD= 


M
j
jj PDRRD
1
= 0.69(1/2) + 1.0986(1/2) = 0.8943 



M
j
jj PPDU
1
)/1ln( = (1/2) ln(2) + (1/2) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69 
Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 0.8943 + 0.69 = 1.5843 
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Case 3 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported three purposes all in the same motive 
category) 
Resource seeking               Efficiency seeking          Market seeking      Strategic-asset seeking     
Other 
                                           P3         P4        P5                                      
DR(Efficiency seeking)= 
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln( = (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3)ln(3) =1.0986 
Therefore, RD= 


M
j
jj PDRRD
1
= ln(3) (1/1) = 1.0986 



M
j
jj PPDU
1
)/1ln( = (1/1) ln(1) = ln(1)= 0 
Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 1.0986 + 0 = 1.0986 
Case 4 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported single purpose in a single motive category) 
Resource seeking               Efficiency seeking          Market seeking      Strategic-asset seeking     
Other 
                                                      P4                                           
DR(Efficiency seeking)= 
iej
ii PjPj )/1ln( = (1/1) ln(1) = ln(1) = 0 
Therefore, RD= 


M
j
jj PDRRD
1
= 0 (1/1) = 0 



M
j
jj PPDU
1
)/1ln( = (1/1) ln(1) = ln(1)= 0 
Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 0 + 0 = 0 
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CHAPTER THREE  
Host-Country Income Distribution and Exit Rates of Market-Seeking Subsidiaries: The U-
Curve Hypothesis 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of income inequality has captured the attention of numerous scholars and philosophers 
across multiple disciplines. Simon Kuznets and Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureates in Economics in 
1971 and 2001 respectively, and many other prominent academics have studied the issue and made 
theoretical contributions. As well, theories of class and economic inequality have been featured in 
the works of influential philosophers and thought leaders such as Rousseau, Weber, Marx, and 
Rawls, among others. From economics to sociology and to epidemiology, different disciplines 
have considered societal income inequality as a relevant area of investigation. However, the 
organization and management fields have been largely silent on this issue (Bidwell, Briscoe, 
Fernandez-Mateo, and Sterling, 2013; Davis, 2015). This is curious for at least two reasons. First, 
increasing levels of income inequality around the world have been attributed, at least partly, to the 
practices and policies of organizations (Bidwell et al., 2013; Davis and Cobb, 2010). Second, 
organization and management scholars have at their disposal an ‘interdisciplinary tool kit’(Bidwell 
et al., 2013) and ‘an impressive set of mechanisms’ (Davis, 2015) to study such socio-economic 
phenomena as income inequality. 
Most studies of income inequality have naturally featured macro-economic issues, paying little 
attention to its relationship with economic organizations (See Davis and Cobb, 2010; Sorensen 
and Sorenson, 2007 for exceptions). Even more limited is our understanding of how income 
inequality relates to organizational performance. One potential approach to fill this gap is by 
extending arguments from existing theory on the relationship of income inequality and economic 
growth. Yet existing literature in the area offers conflicting suggestions. Increasing inequality 
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promotes market/economic efficiency (Okun, 1975; Welch, 1999), hence contributing to better 
organizational performance. On the other hand, increasing inequality engenders socio-economic 
pressures that may adversely affect performance (Bowles, 2012; Klasen, 2008). Such divergent 
perspectives may indicate that the relationship between income inequality and organizational 
performance may not be simple and that a linear specification could be misleading. This study 
seeks to empirically explore this possibility. Using data on Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries 
operating in 47 countries, the study examines the relationship between income inequality and 
foreign subsidiary exit. It also investigates whether this relationship is moderated by the level of 
host-country institutional development. 
This study is important in at least three fundamental ways. First, it responds to calls for 
organizational and management research to look into pressing challenges facing society (e.g., 
Davis, 2014; Walsh, Weber, and Margolis, 2003) and examine the potential interaction between 
income inequality and institutional development (Lawrence et al., 2015). In fact, Walsh et al., 
(2003) lamented the lack of attention to social issues in management scholarship and urged future 
research to rediscover the ‘lost cause’ of management research. Rising income inequality has 
increasingly become a practical concern in a number of societies. In these societies, top income 
earners are taking an increasingly greater share of the productivity gains and as a result the middle 
class that once fostered business growth is rapidly shrinking. Some consider this trend a by-product 
of the shareholder capitalism in which stockholders and their agents (i.e., managers) are getting 
the upper hand in the power struggle and thus a greater share of the residual surplus (e.g., Bidwell 
et al., 2013).  
Excessive inequality is associated with wide-ranging social ills, such as reduced levels of life 
expectancy, social mobility, and school performance and higher degrees of anxiety, mental illness, 
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and high-school dropouts, among others (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). Perrow (1991) argued that 
“organizations have absorbed much of society” (p.1). As such, they too can experience the 
implications of the challenges facing society. This study seeks to explore this possibility. Davis 
(2015) emphasized the fruitfulness of such research in organization and management. Potential 
results can inform public policy on income inequality, institutional development, and national 
competitiveness. 
Second, in examining the potential influence of income distribution on market-seeking 
subsidiaries, the study advances the notion that the effects of environmental variables can be best 
understood by identifying a form of organization for which such variables are more relevant. 
Research regarding the organization-environment relationship can benefit by first specifying 
which aspect of the environment is most relevant to the particular form of organization 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991). Market-seeking subsidiaries differ from other forms of subsidiaries in at 
least two fundamental ways. Structurally, they tend to operate as standalone units, loosely coupled 
both with other subsidiaries in their respective MNE network and with their respective parent firms 
(Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). As a result, a decision to terminate market-seeking subsidiaries is 
likely to have a relatively little, if any, effects on the operations of the MNE’s network of 
subsidiaries. Strategically, market-seeking subsidiaries are undertaken to serve particular markets 
by local production and distribution, rather than by exporting from the home country or from a 
third country (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). As such, they tend to 
rely heavily on host-country market and institutional conditions. Therefore, such variables as host-
country income distribution and institutional development are relevant aspects of their operating 
environment. 
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The availability of a sufficient market in a host country is important, especially for market-seeking 
subsidiaries, in deciding to invest and continue operation there. Determining market potential in 
advance is difficult, and some indicators are used for the purpose. Existing literature has largely 
relied on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Per Capita Income (PCI) figures (e.g., Brouthers, 
Gao, and McNicol, 2008). Often, both serve as useful indicators of host-country market 
attractiveness. Nonetheless, they do have limitations, not least of which is their sensitivity to 
outliers. An increase in the income of few wealthy households in a country may increase the total 
(i.e., GDP) and average (i.e., PCI) national incomes and give a wrong impression that the actual 
income of the average households has increased over the period. Since such aggregate figures do 
not provide information about the sources of increased GDP, perceived market potential may be 
overstated. Income distribution figures, in contrast, provide information about the distribution of 
income, about what percentage of the income goes to what percentage of the society. Therefore, 
they can provide a more refined insight about demand (spending) patterns and investment potential 
of a market. 
Third, in trying to answer the research questions, the study integrates insights from the 
environmental munificence literature and the new institutional economics. Such integration 
leverages the underlying theoretical synergies and responds to calls for a joint consideration of 
economic and ecological perspectives (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Ulrich & Barney, 1984). 
Indeed, the interdisciplinary nature of the phenomenon under consideration (i.e., income 
inequality) demands such an approach. The study draws on insights from the literature on 
environmental munificence (e.g., Castrogiovanni, 1991; Dess and Beard, 1984) to develop 
arguments for the relationship between host-country income distribution and exit probability of 
market-seeking subsidiaries. Loosely integrated to the global value-chain of their respective 
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MNEs, market-seeking subsidiaries face more acute selection pressures arising both from their 
exposure to local environments and from their loose integration with parents (Bradley et al., 2011). 
In presenting arguments on how institutional development interacts with income distribution to 
influence subsidiary exit, the study builds on mechanisms from the new institutional economics 
(e.g., North, 1990; Williamson, 1981).  
The following section presents a brief review of related literature, development of theoretical 
foundations, and discussion of arguments leading to the research hypotheses. These are followed 
by discussion of the research design, which specifies the research context, data and sample, 
empirical model, and the statistical approach used to test the hypotheses. Next, results are 
presented along with discussions of their implications. The study concludes by discussing 
theoretical and practical contributions, highlighting limitations, and suggesting directions for 
future research. 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Market-seeking subsidiary  
Of general interest in this paper are foreign subsidiaries operating in their respective host countries. 
However, not all foreign subsidiaries operating in a given host country have similar resource 
requirements; nor are they equally (or similarly) dependent on what the host-country has to offer. 
As a result, clustering foreign subsidiaries into a single group can be problematic. In fact, the 
purpose for which subsidiaries are formed and their mandates determines the level of dependence 
on and interaction with their host-country environment (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). For example, 
subsidiaries with a (natural) resource-seeking motive tend to be a part of their respective parents’ 
supply-chain and thus have operations closely synchronized with those of the parent MNEs and 
‘sister’ subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). To that end, the study focused only on market-
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seeking foreign subsidiaries since such subsidiaries tend to operate as standalone units, with 
several value-chain activities located in the same host country, and depend more heavily on host-
country market and institutional conditions (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
Nachum and Zaheer (2005) identify several potential explanations for foreign market-seeking 
investments, all of which relate to market failure of one sort or another (Williamson, 1981). 
Imposition by the host government of import restrictions is one of the reasons for MNEs to 
establish market-seeking subsidiaries in the host country, as such restrictions make infeasible 
servicing a particular market via exports. Another factor behind market-seeking investments is the 
need to reduce transaction costs, for example those arising from transportation and associated 
uncertainties. Entry of market-seeking subsidiaries to their respective host country is also driven 
by the need for geographic proximity to the target market. Such proximity can facilitate easier (and 
better) access to information about the needs and wants of actual and potential customers. Viability 
of market-seeking subsidiaries rests, in large part, on whether the parent MNE is achieving its 
purposes through the subsidiary and is getting net-benefits from its investments. Generally, foreign 
firms are quick to adapt to unfavourable environmental aspects in the host country by terminating 
their subsidiaries operating there (Mata and Freitas, 2012). This is especially true of firms having 
market-seeking investments in the host country, as the strategic importance of such subsidiaries is 
decidedly linked to the host-country environment and their termination has little, if any, impact on 
the global MNE network (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
International business (IB) research has identified a host of factors explaining subsidiary 
exit/survival. Organizing these factors by levels—namely subsidiary, firm, and country—can 
facilitate better understanding. Factors at the subsidiary level include ownership (level and mode) 
(Guar and Lu, 2007), entry mode (acquisition or greenfield) (Slangen and Hennart, 2008), level of 
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diversification (Li, 1995), industry relatedness to the parent (Lu and Xu, 2006), host-country 
experience and learning (Kim, Lu, and Rhee, 2012), and possession of intangible assets (Delios 
and Beamish, 2001). Included in the firm-level factors category are parent experience (Guar and 
Lu, 2007; Delios and Beamish, 2001), parent age and size (Lu and Xu, 2006), and sister subsidiary 
experience (Kim et al., 2012). Host-country level factors include local density and competition 
(Miller and Eden, 2006), level of economic development relative to home country (Tsang and Yip, 
2007), and institutional development (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). All these factors can 
explain exit of market-seeking subsidiaries. Nonetheless, given that such subsidiaries are 
substantially different from their counterparts in terms of both structure and strategy, it is possible 
to find some factors that apply more to these subsidiaries than to other forms of subsidiaries 
(Castrogiovanni, 1991). This research argues that host-country income distribution is one such 
factor and seeks to examine its relationship with the exit likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries. 
The study uses the concept of environmental munificence to frame its argument on how an aspect 
of the host-country environment (i.e., income distribution) relates with exit likelihood of market-
seeking subsidiaries. Environment munificence refers to the level of resources available and is 
usually measured by industry or economy growth (Dess and Beard, 1984; Castrogiovanni, 1991). 
The study considers host-country munificence. Host-country munificence reflects the ability of the 
host-country resources and markets to support sustained growth (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Less 
munificent host countries are characterized by shortage of resources, stagnating or declining 
demand, and environmental threats (Goll and Rasheed, 2005). The study argues that host-country 
munificence for market-seeking subsidiaries varies with the levels of income distribution. Such 
variation reflects the overall stock of resources and demand available for market-seeking 
subsidiaries operating in the host country. Host-country resources include productive inputs (e.g., 
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local human, material, and capital resources), marketing resources (e.g., distribution outlets and 
customer base), and information resources (e.g., accurate and timely policy-related information) 
(Luo, 2003). The level of resource munificence (or scarcity) corresponding to different levels of 
income distribution can determine the survival and growth of market-seeking subsidiaries in the 
host country (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003).  
The decision mechanism involving termination of market-seeking subsidiaries is different from 
that of other types of subsidiaries. Natural (resource)-seeking subsidiaries, for example, represent 
a vertically integrated extension of the parent firm and consequently exit decisions of such 
subsidiaries has to consider not just the host-country performance of the focal subsidiary but the 
role it plays in the global supply chain of the parent firm as well (Brouthers et al. 2008). As a 
result, a firm may decide against terminating such subsidiaries even if they register a sub-par 
performance in their host-country operations. Such complications are not likely to feature in the 
exit decisions of market-seeking subsidiaries. That is, because of their limited, if any, integration 
with the global supply-chain of the firm, their exit decisions is likely to be based on their present 
performance/future prospects (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Further, unlike other types of 
subsidiaries, market-seeking subsidiaries tend to locate several value-chain activities in the host 
country (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). These peculiar properties of 
market-seeking subsidiaries suggest the importance of considering host-country munificence. 
Ultimately, the decision to terminate market-seeking subsidiaries is likely to be contingent on their 
host-country performance, which in turn depends on host-country munificence. 
Through the process of making available or withholding resources, environments influence 
organizations (Aldrich, 1979). The relationship between the host-country environment and market-
seeking subsidiaries, therefore, can be couched as the interface between the subsidiaries and 
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sources of host-country resources. Given that market-seeking subsidiaries tend to target market 
opportunities in the host country and perform several value-chain activities there, their long-term 
performance depends on resource provisions from the ecosystem of suppliers, partners, 
distributors, consumers (Pierce, 2009). These entities largely determine the level of host-country 
munificence. High munificence environments allow management to pursue opportunities and 
perform activities that will enhance the firm’s value (Brauer and Wiersema, 2012). In contrast, 
low munificent environments limit management’s ability to pursue additional value-generating 
opportunities. In such environments termination of a subsidiary is considered a viable strategic 
alternative as the firm might want to redirect its resources and capabilities to locations/subsidiaries 
with greater potential (Brauer and Wiersema, 2012). In fact, such behavior is indicative of the 
selection pressure subsidiaries face at the corporate level and is consistent with the argument that 
in such multi-level entities as MNEs, Darwinian selection processes at the unit (subsidiary) level 
may lead to adaptions at the corporate (MNE) level (Usher and Evans, 1996).  
Income distribution and subsidiary exit 
A limited amount of research has attempted to examine the relationship between national income 
distribution and organizations. Sociologists, for example, have documented how inequality in a 
society is accounted for by differences and changes in compensation across organizations (for a 
review, see Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Sorensen and Sorenson (2007) examined the link between 
corporate demography (i.e., the number and variety of organizations operating in a region) and 
income inequality. They found that increases in the number of firms within industries correspond 
to higher income inequality within the society; whereas, increases in the number of industries 
within a given economy decreases inequality levels. Likewise, Davis and Cobb (2010) argued that 
changes in the relative size of the largest organizations in an economy corresponds to changes in 
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income inequality. They noted that economies with a higher proportion of the labour force 
employed by large organizations face lower levels of income inequality.  
Informative though these studies are, they sought to explain income inequality. These studies 
investigated how the nature and configuration of organizations influence the distribution of 
income. Given that social issues are central to research in sociology, the emphasis on income 
distribution as a dependent variable is justified. The intended contribution is, however, to the 
organization and management field in general and to IB/strategy in particular. As such, the study 
emphasizes organizational performance and examine if and how it is related to host-country 
income distribution. To better understand this relationship, the following conscious decisions were 
made: (a) at a conceptual level, the study looks at market-seeking subsidiaries as they target local 
demand for which host-country income distribution is a more relevant environmental variable and 
(b) at an empirical level, the study considers a long-term performance measure (i.e., exit) as it is 
less likely to have the effect of income inequality reflected in short-term performance measures 
(You and Khagram, 2005).  
To establish arguments about the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit, the 
study draws on prior studies regarding the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth. The decision to draw on this stream of literature is appropriate given that host-country 
market potential, often proxied by economic growth (e.g., Brouthers et al. 2008), is a relevant 
consideration for market-seeking subsidiaries. A number of studies documented the relationship 
between income inequality and economic growth (e.g., Easterly, 2007; Okun, 1975). Research in 
the area offers conflicting perspectives, however. For example, an IMF study reports that greater 
income inequality is strongly associated with shorter spells of economic growth (Berg et al., 2014). 
The study finds that a 50 percent decrease in the inequality levels of some of the most unequal 
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nations could lead to a 200 percent longer duration of economic growth.  In contrast, others argue 
that inequality is vital for a given economy and forms the basic foundations on which strong 
economies lie. Okun (1975), for example, noted that more efficiency comes at the expense of 
greater inequality. Welch (1999) wrote along the same lines: “It is not much of an exaggeration to 
say that all of economics results from inequality. Without inequality…there would be no trade, no 
specialization, and no surplus….” (p.2). 
The presence of divergent perspectives about the relationship between inequality and economic 
performance may be indicative of a non-linear model specification. In fact, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2003) examined data used to study the relationship and found that linear structures were wrongly 
imposed on the data. This finding helped explain, in part, the mixed results regarding the 
relationship between inequality and economic growth. Similarly, Hasanov and Izraeli (2011), 
using a longitudinal data of 48 U.S. states, found a non-linear relationship between inequality and 
economic growth showing that a rise from a lower level to an average level of income inequality 
increases growth, while any increase in inequality above the average level decreases growth.  
Integrating insights gleaned from these studies with the notion of environmental munificence 
discussed earlier, this study argues that income distribution has a non-monotonic relationship with 
the exit probability of foreign subsidiaries. That is, highly egalitarian and highly dispersed income 
distribution are associated with decreased levels of host-country munificence in the form of 
resources and demand, thus increasing the exit probability of market-seeking subsidiaries. In 
contrast, intermediate levels of income distribution correspond to greater host-country 
munificence and thus lower likelihood of exit for market-seeking subsidiaries. Hence, the study 
argues that income distribution is transitively associated with foreign subsidiary exit through its 
influences on environmental munificence. Below, the nature of the proposed relationship is 
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examined in fair detail by considering host-country munificence associated with shifts to and away 
from two extreme states of income distribution.  
Highly egalitarian income distribution  
An increase in income inequality from a low level can release resources and expand the 
munificence of the host-country environment. To elaborate this argument, consistent with Hannan, 
Carroll, & Polos (2003), the study identified three relevant aspects inherent to the environment in 
which market-seeking subsidiaries conduct their business: customers (demand), access to qualified 
and motivated labour force, and availability of related (or supporting) local businesses. An increase 
in income inequality from a very low level can broaden the potential market available for the 
foreign subsidiaries. Economic historians have documented how a growing middle class ushered 
in a period of remarkable business and economic growth (Adelman & Morris, 1967; Landes, 
1998). The introduction of industrial society and the development of financial structures led to 
increasing income inequality (Barro, 2000). These increases were largely due to increased 
economic productivity, which allocated an increased share of wealth to the middle class. This in 
turn created a strong and stable demand for products and services provided by companies, thereby 
creating a virtuous cycle (Landes, 1998). 
With an increased allocation of wealth to the middle class comes a greater perceived incentive for 
education and training (Bapuji, 2015). This can boost both public and individual investments in 
education, resulting in an increased supply (i.e., both quantity and quality) of labour for 
subsidiaries. The incentive for developing skills and knowledge also influences labour markets 
inside each subsidiary and across the population. As well, motivation of and competition among 
workers in both the internal and external labour markets can contribute positively to subsidiary 
and population performance. Friedman (1962) argued that inequality encourages people to have 
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higher aspirations and work harder, thereby increasing productivity. Also, research indicates that 
the success of innovative activities vitally relies on location-bound factors, such as labour market 
conditions (Porter, 2011). 
Another important component in the host country of market-seeking subsidiaries is the availability 
of local industries and firms to support the foreign subsidiary population. Since market-seeking 
subsidiaries tend to perform several functions—including procurement, production, and 
marketing—in the host country, the presence of related industries and organizations is crucial. 
Delgado, Porter, & Stern (2010) argued that a presence of strong clusters (i.e., a large presence of 
related industries) is associated with the growth and survival of start-up firms. Lippmann, Davis, 
and Aldrich (2005) identified two types of entrepreneurship activities in a host country: 
opportunity-driven and necessity-driven. Local ventures established to support a population of 
foreign subsidiaries seek to take advantage of the special needs of the population and thus are 
likely to be opportunity-driven. They found an inverted-U shape relationship between economic 
inequalities and the formation and growth of opportunity-driven businesses in that the relationship 
is positive at lower levels of income distribution. This finding is consistent with the argument that 
highly egalitarian income distribution limits the incentives to saving and investment (e.g., Bowles, 
2012) and suggests that as inequality increases from low levels, the formation and growth of related 
industries is likely to increase. This in turn can expand the resource base (or factor pool) for 
market-seeking subsidiaries, thus decreasing their exit likelihood. 
 
Highly dispersed income distribution  
A rise in income inequality after a threshold level can influence the aggregate demand available to 
a population of market-seeking subsidiaries.  As more income increasingly gets into the hands of 
the few, a greater majority of the society will have a smaller share of the total income of the country 
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and thus will have a lower ability to consume (You and Khagram, 2005). The propensity to 
consume concept suggests that high income people have a higher tendency of saving, thus a lower 
propensity of consumption, than low income people (Stiglitz, 2009). If host-country consumption 
is lacking, MNEs will see little reason to support their market-seeking subsidiary operating there. 
This is especially true given that MNEs’ internal capital market seeks to efficiently allocate capital 
across the available network of investments, thus posing a greater selection pressure on the market-
seeking subsidiaries with sub-par prospects (Bradley et al., 2011; Williamson, 1981). Hence, as 
host-country income inequality becomes excessively high, so does the probability of relocating 
MNE resources away from the subsidiary operating there, thus increasing its exit likelihood.  
Lippmann et al. (2005) finding of an inverted-U shape relationship between income inequality and 
the formation and growth of opportunity-driven businesses suggests that after a certain level, any 
increase in income inequality leads to a lower number and growth of opportunity-driven local 
businesses. A reduction in the number of local business to support the population of foreign 
subsidiaries represents a contraction in the munificence of the host country (Castrogiovanni, 1991). 
Such contraction deprives market-seeking subsidiaries of access to quality inputs, reduced prices, 
and opportunities for subcontracting and outsourcing (Pe’er, Vertinsky, and Keil, 2016). These 
limitations are likely to adversely affect their efficiency and exert selection pressures both at the 
local and corporate levels.  
In addition, the presence of relational resources such as trust reflects the munificence of the host-
country environment. Trust is usually the basis on which interactions of firms are established 
(Powell, 1996). Not all interactions of businesses are contractual, however. Even when there are 
contractual bases, not every issue is in the purview of a contract. Consequently, dealing with local 
suppliers, distributors, and partners requires a certain element of trust. Trust helps decrease 
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transaction costs (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). A very high income inequality has been 
shown to damage this important element. Costa and Kahun (2003), for example, found that greater 
income inequality erodes the levels of trust and civic participation in a society. Such eroded trust 
may prove detrimental to businesses. Fukuyama (1995) suggested that organizations operating in 
a society characterized by a higher level of trust fare better than those operating in low-trust 
societies. 
Also, high income inequality affects the quality and quantity of human resource available for 
subsidiaries. At higher levels of inequality, human capital development, investment on education, 
and employee motivation become very low (Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999). A highly 
dispersed income distribution can also give way to socio-political instability and increased political 
risks that may pose threats to subsidiary survival. Such instability has the potential to discourage 
saving and investment and limit business transactions. It may also exert pressures on governments 
to get involved in efforts of income redistribution—efforts that may deter capital accumulation 
and investment (Bénabou, 1996). Recently, Davis (2015) argued that highly dispersed 
income/wealth distribution is associated with business exit:  
In the United States, …income inequality and wealth inequality are at their 
highest levels in a century…major employers go bankrupt (General Motors, 
Chrysler) or disappear entirely (Circuit City, Borders, Eastman Kodak, 
Blockbuster), to be replaced by pop-up businesses with the size and lifespan of a 
fruit fly….( p. 6) 
 
Taken together, an increase in income inequality from very low levels is likely to result in a release 
of resources and a more munificent environment with respect to market demand, labour market 
conditions, and ecosystem of related and support industries, all of which are critical for market-
seeking subsidiaries. Such improvement in munificence is, however, only to a certain threshold 
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level of income inequality. The marginal contribution of income inequality in expanding host-
country resource base diminishes as income inequality increases and is likely to be negative at 
extremely high levels of income inequality. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
      Hypothesis 1: A U-shaped relationship will exist between the national income  
        distribution level and the exit probability of market seeking   
                   subsidiaries.  
 
 
Income inequality and free-market institutional development 
As with the levels of income inequality, the institutional development of host countries ranges 
from very low to very high levels. However, the relationship between income inequality and the 
development of economic institutions does not appear to be straightforward. According to standard 
measures, nations such as the Netherlands and most Scandinavian countries do have well-
developed market-supporting institutions along with relatively lower levels of income inequality. 
In contrast, other countries such as Singapore and Chile have relatively well-developed market 
institutions, but with higher levels of income inequality (see, for example, the data summarized in 
Table 7). Nonetheless, income inequality and institutional development levels can interact to 
influence the success of foreign subsidiaries (Lawrence et al., 2015). As argued above, highly 
egalitarian/dispersed income distribution can limit environmental munificence of the host country. 
Institutions are likely to provide mechanisms to mitigate the resource limitation which such 
extreme income distributions may generate.  
Institutions provide formal and informal rules of the game that structure interactions between or 
among agents, including organizations (North, 1990). At a country level, institutional development 
generally refers to the extent to which incentive mechanisms are in place to support market 
operations (North, 1990; Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). Institutions reduce transaction and 
information costs associated with exchanges, thereby reducing uncertainty and establishing a 
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stable structure of exchanges (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha, 2005). In countries of high institutional 
development, markets are more efficient and costs associated with regulatory burdens, information 
asymmetries, property right protection, partner search, and contract enforcement are relatively 
lower (Xu and Meyer, 2013).  
The extent to which highly egalitarian/dispersed income distribution discourages the formation of 
local support and related industries is likely to be dependent on the level of host-country 
institutional development. The effect is likely to be less pronounced in host countries with high 
institutional development, as ease of obtaining licenses, tax advantages, regulation reliefs and so 
forth encourages the formation of new businesses and thus expand the opportunity for market-
seeking subsidiaries to access useful inputs and complementary services (Hoskinson et al., 2000; 
Khanna et al., 2005). Further, strong property rights in such countries provide incentives for 
investment and property ownership (Bowles, 2012) and hence market-seeking subsidiaries 
operating in these countries are likely to be constrained less by extreme income distribution in 
accessing resources from related and/or supporting industries. In countries with less developed 
institutions, the absence of a strong and reliable legal system to protect property rights is likely to 
exacerbate the effects of extreme income distribution on the availability of related and/or 
supporting industries (Lippmann et al. 2005).  
Also, stronger protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts in institutionally 
developed locations facilitates the interaction of market-seeking subsidiaries with local 
support/related industries and reduces associated transaction costs (Williamson, 1981). Such 
benefits can compensate for challenges arising from, for example, resource contractions at higher 
levels of income inequality. Subsidiaries operating in countries with less-developed institutions 
operate under inefficient judicial systems and thus are more likely to suffer the consequences of 
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exchange partners’ opportunistic behaviours (Williamson, 1981). For market-seeking subsidiaries 
operating in host-countries with extreme income inequality, such hazard is likely to compound the 
already greater selection pressure and increase exit likelihood. Efficient judicial systems encourage 
arm’s length transactions and greater cooperation between partners (Khanna et al., 2005). In the 
absence of such a system, foreign subsidiaries need to use alternative mechanisms such as 
leveraging the potential of trust in cooperative undertakings (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). 
Nonetheless, extreme levels of income inequality are likely to compromise trust and make for an 
even worse situation (Costa and Kahun, 2003). In locations of well-developed institutions, 
however, the downsides of depressed trust occasioned by extreme income inequality can be offset 
by the presence of an efficient judiciary system.  
Another key element in defining the long-term performance of market-seeking subsidiaries is the 
presence of an attractive product market (i.e., demand) in the host country. North’s (1990) 
economic institutional theory argues that the economic performance differences between nations 
are due largely to differences in their institutions. Better national economic performance presents 
market opportunities to be exploited by market-seeking subsidiaries (Brouthers et al. 2008). 
Further, high income inequality in countries with high institutional development does not 
necessarily imply decreased aggregate demand (or purchasing ability). The availability of credit 
and related financial instruments in such countries makes for easier access to products and services. 
Heathcote, Perri, & Violante (2010) find that in institutionally developed countries, such as the 
US, access to financial markets and instruments substantially limited the effects of income 
inequality over consumption inequality. Consequently, market-seeking subsidiaries operating in 
institutionally developed host countries may be less likely to suffer from limited aggregate demand 
associated with highly egalitarian/dispersed income distribution.  
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The availability of a skilled and motivated workforce is another essential element determining the 
munificence of the host country. Greater income inequality leads to lower human capital 
accumulation and economic performance (Chiu, 1998). However, such a prediction is more likely 
to be weaker in the context of institutionally developed countries. In such countries, better access 
to education and related institutions may lead to a relatively higher human capital accumulation 
even if there is a high level of inequality within the society. On the other hand, extreme income 
inequality in institutionally developed countries may not necessarily lead to a lack of skilled human 
power as such countries have a better potential to attract skilled labour from elsewhere. Also, the 
potential negative effect of extreme inequality on motivation and life satisfaction tends to be 
stronger in the institutionally under-developed countries than in the developed ones (Graham and 
Felton 2005).  
Taken together, the presence of well-developed institutional structures in a host country can 
decrease transaction costs and promote better incentive alignment and protection of property 
rights. As a result, the level of institutional development weakens the negative effects of extreme 
income inequality on subsidiary exit such that subsidiaries operating in countries with higher levels 
of institutional development are less likely to suffer from the negative consequences of extreme 
income distributions. Likewise, foreign subsidiaries operating in countries with less developed 
institutions are deprived of the potential benefits of institutions and are thus more exposed to the 
negative effects of highly egalitarian/dispersed income distribution. These arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis: 
           Hypothesis 2: The U-shaped relationship between income distribution and exit   
             probability of market-seeking subsidiaries will be negatively moderated by  
            the level of institutional development 
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METHODS 
Data and sample 
This study uses a very large longitudinal dataset, published annually by Toyo Keizai Inc., on 
Japanese subsidiaries throughout the world. To test the hypotheses, the study used 17 years of data 
(the 1990– 2006 period). The dataset is suitable for this study for at least two reasons. First, a study 
about the relationship of inequality and subsidiary exit benefits from cross-country comparisons.  
The dataset provides subsidiary-, MNE-, and country-level data. Second, the time series nature of 
the dataset enables the development of stronger causal attribution. Since the majority of Japanese 
foreign investments were made not long before the start of the observation (Kim et al., 2012) and 
subsidiary age data is included in the models (Guo, 1993), left-truncation was not a series concern. 
The sample constitutes 6,699 Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries across 47 countries. In arriving 
at this sample, several data cleaning procedures were conducted. The study used data only from 
countries having a minimum of five subsidiaries so that the country-level inequality variable has 
sufficient subsidiary-level data. It excluded countries for which inequality data are not available. 
In addition, a list-wise deletion was applied for cases with missing data in any of the variables 
under study. To ensure that the final sample includes only viable subsidiaries for which a study of 
income inequality is more relevant, the study followed Beamish and Inkpen’s (1998) suggestion 
and restricted its sample to subsidiaries having at least 20 employees. In addition, following 
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino (1994), the study removed subsidiaries with fewer than two 
years of operation to consider only those subsidiaries that reached an initial period of stabilization.   
Variables 
The dependent variable consists of two components. The first represents the length of time in years 
a subsidiary takes to cease operation or to be right censored (i.e., not cease operation within the 
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time frame of the analysis). In the models, this is a random variable, whereas the censoring time 
is fixed to the year 2006. The second component is a censoring indicator given by the following 
function: 
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 …………………………………………………………….(1) 
In the above function, δi represents a censoring result for a given subsidiary. A subsidiary is 
assigned 1 if Ti, that is the number of years before experiencing the event (i.e., exit), is less than 
Ui, that is the number of years covered by this study. If otherwise, a subsidiary is said to be right-
censored because there is no way to tell when that subsidiary will experience the event. The stset 
function in STATA was used to declare the data to be survival-time data and consider two 
components in combination. In line with previous studies that used the same dataset, the study 
considered a subsidiary terminated when its records are no longer found in the dataset (Delios and 
Beamish, 2001). The data we use for the study are published on a yearly basis, so this is the metric 
for specifying time. 
The key independent variable in this study is the level of inequality. The study used one of the 
most commonly used measures of income inequality—the Gini coefficient. Also called the Gini 
index, it measures the extent to which the income distribution of individuals or households in a 
given society deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A coefficient of zero signifies complete 
equality, whereas a coefficient of 100 represents a complete inequality. The Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIIDv4) was used to collect Gini coefficients for the 47 countries 
in the analysis. The database integrates inequality data from various sources and its coverage and 
comparability is far better than other income inequality datasets (Solt, 2014).  
91 
 
91 
 
The study period was divided into three (i.e., 1990-1995, 1996-2001, and 2002-2006) and average 
levels were used to represent the smoothed values of income inequality for the years in each period. 
This approach is consistent with research in the area (Forbes 2000; You and Khagram, 2005) and 
justified by at least two reasons. First, because exit decisions are likely to be based on trends 
extending over several years, it is conceptually more appropriate to use averages over a longer 
period rather than single year data. In fact, prior research on the distribution of income inequality 
data suggests that variations within countries over time explained only a very small fraction of the 
total variation (Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998). Second, averaging the data over a longer period helps 
minimize measurement error. A substantial part of the variation in income inequality within 
countries across time is likely to result from measurement errors and averaging helps to reduce it 
(You and Khagram, 2005). By considering period averages, the study treats the Gini index as a 
period-dependent variable in the models. That is, the hazard function for subsidiary i at time t is 
dependent on the value of the respective Gini index for period p and the corresponding values of 
the remaining variables in the model. The sensitivity of the results was tested by varying the 
lengths of the periods used and findings remain qualitatively similar.  
The moderating variable in the study is free-market institution development. The Heritage 
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom measures were used to represent the level of free-market 
institutional development (Kane, Holmes, and O’Grady, 2007). The index aggregates measures on 
multiple aspects of economic freedom. It is a time series data providing indices from 1995 
onwards. The index can assume values ranging from zero to 100, higher values indicating better 
overall economic freedom. 
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Table 7. Country-level data on number of subsidiaries, inequality, and institutions 
Country 
 
Region 
 
# of 
sub. 
Mean 1990-95 Mean 96-01 Mean  02-06 Gini 
Grand 
Mean 
Inst. 
Grand 
Mean 
Gini Inst. Gini Inst. Gini Inst. 
Rep of Korea  
 
 
 
 
 
Asia 
351 30.9 72.0 30.5 70.8 30.9 67.9 30.8 70.2 
China 1,271 42.4 52.0 46.3 53.3 52.9 53.0 47.2 52.8 
Hong Kong 314 34.7 88.6 43.9 89.2 46.0 89.5 41.6 89.1 
Vietnam 69 34.0 41.7 35.0 41.7 38.2 47.3 35.7 43.6 
Thailand 694 45.0 71.3 42.5 67.8 41.5 64.9 43.0 68.0 
Singapore 440 38.4 86.3 38.3 87.2 40.6 88.2 39.1 87.2 
Malaysia 319 42.8 66.7 44.2 71.9 41.3 60.9 42.8 66.5 
Philippines 171 41.0 55.0 44.4 61.8 43.2 58.4 42.9 58.4 
Indonesia 356 33.4 54.9 32.7 59.3 34.1 53.5 33.4 55.9 
India 69 48.6 45.1 48.8 48.9 49.0 52.1 48.8 48.7 
Pakistan 9 31.7 57.6 29.3 55.5 30.2 55.4 30.4 56.2 
Sri Lanka 9 32.3 60.6 34.0 64.3 38.5 61.6 35.0 62.2 
Iran 8 44.3 35.9 42.8 35.9 41.7 43.6 42.9 38.5 
Norway  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
6 22.9 67.4 23.9 67.4 24.9 66.6 23.9 67.1 
Sweden 15 22.2 61.4 23.2 64.2 23.3 70.3 22.9 65.3 
Denmark 7 23.6 67.8 22.3 67.8 23.0 73.5 23.0 69.7 
UK 280 33.8 77.9 34.3 76.7 34.5 78.7 34.2 77.8 
Ireland 5 33.2 68.5 32.0 74.5 31.1 80.9 32.1 74.6 
Netherlands 78 25.8 70.5 24.1 70.5 26.4 74.5 25.4 71.8 
Belgium 60 23.8 64.3 26.4 64.3 26.3 69.0 25.5 65.9 
France 121 28.7 64.4 28.1 59.4 27.4 59.9 28.1 61.2 
Germany 242 26.7 69.8 26.7 67.0 27.8 69.7 27.1 68.8 
Switzerland 16 30.6 77.7 28.2 77.7 28.1 79.2 29.3 78.2 
Portugal 11 31.8 62.4 35.2 65.0 36.1 64.1 34.4 63.8 
Spain 42 33.0 62.8 34.3 63.5 31.8 68.3 33.0 64.9 
Italy 45 32.1 61.2 34.0 60.8 33.8 63.8 33.3 61.9 
Poland 5 28.0 50.7 29.3 59.2 30.7 60.9 29.3 56.9 
Russian Fed. 11 37.6 51.1 41.2 51.5 40.4 51.2 39.7 51.3 
Austria 18 28.7 70.0 26.3 66.7 26.8 68.5 27.3 68.4 
Czech Rep. 12 21.5 67.8 25.5 69.0 26.1 66.4 24.4 67.7 
Hungary 14 29.6 55.2 29.3 59.8 27.9 63.7 28.9 59.6 
Turkey 7 43.5 60.3 41.5 58.4 40.8 53.3 41.9 57.3 
Canada  
North 
America 
91 28.3 69.4 30.6 69.6 31.7 69.4 30.2 71.5 
USA 1,108 34.6 76.7 36.9 76.5 37.2 79.3 36.2 77.5 
Mexico 55 47.4 63.1 48.0 59.1 46.0 64.8 47.2 62.3 
Panama 13 50.4 71.6 50.4 71.9 49.5 66.4 50.1 70.0 
Colombia  
 
South 
America 
 
7 48.3 64.5 50.3 65.1 51.0 61.9 49.9 63.8 
Venezuela 9 40.3 59.8 42.5 54.9 41.5 49.2 41.4 54.6 
Peru 5 51.8 56.9 54.0 66.5 50.8 63.2 52.2 62.2 
Chile 9 50.1 71.2 50.3 74.6 48.9 77.3 49.8 74.4 
Brazil 134 51.9 51.4 51.8 56.2 49.7 61.9 51.1 56.5 
Argentina 13 42.3 68.0 44.7 71.4 44.9 56.2 44.0 65.2 
Egypt  
Africa 
9 31.9 45.7 33.9 53.9 32.8 54.8 32.9 51.5 
Nigeria 14 45.0 47.3 47.2 51.8 42.4 49.3 44.9 49.5 
South Africa 7 55.9 60.7 55.9 63.5 56.6 64.8 56.1 63.0 
Australia Oceania 133 29.7 74.1 30.8 76 31.6 78.3 30.7 76.1 
New Zealand 17 31.9 80.0 33.4 80.0 32.9 81.5 32.7 80.5 
Subsidiaries 
total 
- 6,699 - - - - - 
Source: SWIID, Heritage Foundation, and TK dataset 
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As with the inequality data, yearly disturbances were smoothed and period average values were 
used. For the 1990-1995 period, there is only one observation and it was used in lieu of the period 
average. The use of the economic freedom data as a measure of free-market institutional 
development is common in management research (e.g., Meyer et al., 2009; Shinkle, Kriauciunas, 
and Hundley, 2013). Also, the time series nature of the data makes it compatible with the 
subsidiary and inequality data used.  
To account for other possible alternative explanations of exit, several control variables from 
multiple levels were introduced. First at the subsidiary-level, control variables were introduced for 
a number of variables which have been shown to be theoretically related to the exit of subsidiaries. 
Subsidiary age variable was used to control for subsidiary age as young firms have a higher 
probability of dying than old ones (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982). As subsidiary size has been 
shown to influence exit probability of organizations (Moulten and Thomas, 1993), the study 
controlled for it using number of employees as its proxy. This variable is time-variant6 and is 
logarithmically transformed to normalize the data distribution. Industry fixed effects were 
introduced to account for differences in exit likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries associated 
with industry attributes.  
Parent-level controls were also introduced to account for alternative explanations of subsidiary 
exit resulting from parent affiliation. Makino and Beamish (1998) found that the presence of 
multiple foreign partners increases managerial complexity, thereby influencing exit. As such, the 
study controlled for the number of foreign parents. Guar and Lu (2007) found a statistically 
                                                          
6 To ensure that data on time-varying variables correspond to data on the variables of interest (i.e., income inequality and 
institutional development), period average values were used. Therefore, the time-varying variables vary across the three 
periods under consideration. Such approach is also logical as, in the dataset, the time-varying variables under 
consideration tend to vary in a fairly longer period than a year. 
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significant relationship between foreign-parent ownership level and subsidiary exit probability. 
Therefore, the study controlled for the level of foreign ownership in subsidiaries. Larger parents 
may have greater flexibility in reallocating resources among a broader portfolio of global 
subsidiaries (Delios and Beamish, 1999). Thus, parent size control was introduced and was proxied 
by the number of employees of the parent company. The parent size variable is time-variant and 
is logarithmically transformed to normalize the distribution. The study also introduced parent 
international experience variable as it has been shown to be related to subsidiary exit probability 
(Guar and Lu, 2007). The variable is measured as the combined number of years of international 
experience possessed by parent(s) prior to the establishment of a focal subsidiary. Intangible assets 
of the parent can also influence exit probability of its subsidiary (Delios & Beamish, 1999). As 
such, a parent-level research and development (R&D) intensity variable was included. This 
variable is measured as a ratio of R&D expenditure to the total sales. 
Time and country fixed effects were also introduced. To control for the effects of time and crisis 
on the exit probability of subsidiaries, the study included period fixed effects. It did so by 
introducing two dummies for the three periods under consideration (i.e., 1990-1995, 1996-2001, 
and 2002-2006). By so doing, it can account for changes in exit probability associated, for 
example, with the 1997 Asian financial crisis that influenced investments from Asian countries, 
including Japan. The study also introduced host-country fixed effects to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity among the countries that may explain differences in the exit probability of foreign 
subsidiaries. Technically, these fixed effects allow each country to have a different intercept to 
capture the cross-sectional differences among the countries. This was achieved by introducing 46 
country dummy variables.   
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Modeling procedure  
To test the hypotheses, the study used fixed effects extended Cox regression. It can help estimate 
the parameters without the need to make any assumptions about the underlying hazard distribution. 
The model develops a hazard function to determine the probability that a subsidiary experiences 
an event (i.e., exit), given it has survived up to time t. The hazard function that is denoted by 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋(𝑡)) is as follows:  
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ho(t) represents the baseline hazard function that is left unspecified and reflects the underlying 
hazard rate when the values of all covariates X1,…Xp1 and X1(t),…Xp2(t) equal to 0. X(t) stands for 
the variables in the model and Xi denotes the i
th time-independent variable, while Xj(t) the j
th time-
dependent variable. βi’s and δj’s denote their corresponding coefficients. The extended Cox 
regression model accommodates the time-variant nature of some of the covariates used in the 
models (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005) and produces a risk ratio associated with each explanatory 
variable. The use of Cox regression is consistent with the objectives of the study. Unlike logit and 
probit methods which consider whether a subsidiary has exited or not, Cox regression further 
relates a subsidiary’s exit status to the number of years it took for a subsidiary to exit or be right-
censored. Also, by introducing the exit indicator component, it corrects for issues associated with 
a censoring of subsidiaries which have not exited within the study period but may do so later. A 
fairly detailed assessment of the advantages of event history methods (of which Cox regression is 
one) over logit models is available in Allison (2010). Nonetheless, the robustness of the findings 
was checked using a fixed effects logit model and results remained consistent.  
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RESULTS 
The study tested the main effect of income inequality on subsidiary exit using data on Japanese 
market-seeking subsidiaries from a globally representative sample of host countries. To further 
elaborate the main effect, sub-group analyses were conducted in which the dynamics in the nature 
of the proposed relationship and distributional differences in exit probabilities of the subgroups 
were examined. The study also tested the moderation effect of institutional development on the 
relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit. To examine the substantive 
significance of the findings, statistical findings were complemented with graphical representations 
and discussion of effect sizes.  
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables used in the study. 
The correlations between the variables in the models are not so high as to cause concerns of 
multicollinearity. As a further diagnostic, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores were calculated 
for the variables. Multicollinearity was not a serious concern as the VIFs for all the variables in 
the models were below 5 (i.e., the highest VIF being 4.3). Variables were mean centered before 
computing interaction terms and transformations.   
The study tested its hypotheses using fixed effects extended Cox regression. Table 9 includes 
models used for this purpose. It used the partial likelihood procedure to estimate regression 
parameters. The study followed estimation procedures outlined in Singer and Willet (2003) to first 
fit the full model (i.e., Model 5), which includes all the variables and interaction terms. Then test 
of significance of the interaction and main effects were conducted by dropping one or more 
variables from the full model and comparing the log-likelihood of each nested model to that of the 
full model. The resulting Chi-square statistic was used to determine the significance of the 
variables or interactions excluded from the full model. Model 4 excludes interaction terms of Gini 
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coefficient with institutional development. Models 3 excludes the second-order Gini coefficient to 
test for the presence of a curvilinear relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit. 
Model 2 further excludes the first-order Gini coefficient. Model 1 excludes the main effect of 
institutional development.  
The Chi-square statistics resulting from comparing the log-likelihood of each model with that of 
the full model suggests that the full model offers the best fit to the data. This indicates that the 
introduction in the successive models of the main and interaction effects resulted in superior 
models. Model 2 excludes both the first-and second-order Gini coefficient variables, thus allowing 
for assessment of the main-effect argument. The Chi-square statistics resulting from comparing 
the log-likelihood of this model with that of the full model indicates that the exclusion of these 
variables resulted in an inferior model, suggesting the statistical significance of these variables (χ2 
= 38.58, p < 0.001). The significant beta coefficients of these variables in the full model offer 
support to Hypothesis 1. That is, the linear term of the income inequality measure has a negative 
beta coefficient (β=-0.745, p<0.01), whereas the quadratic term of the same variable has a positive 
coefficient (β=0.009, p<0.01), thus lending support to Hypothesis 1. The inflection point was 
calculated and sub-group analyses conducted to examine the curvilinear relationship between 
inequality and subsidiary exit in more depth.  
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variables Mean SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Subsidiary age 13.17 9.52 1             
Subsidiary size 2.08 0.52 2 0.11            
Ownership ratio 75.63 27.54 3 0.12 -0.13           
Number of foreign 
parents 
1.52 0.97 4 -0.11 0.08 -0.14          
Parent size 4.60 4.76 5 0.01 0.18 -0.01 0.12         
Parent R&D 
intensity 
4.76 4.89 6 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.79        
Parent international 
experience 
14.30 10.69 7 -0.44 -0.02 -0.07 0.09 0.05 0.01       
Industry dummies - - 8 0.06 -0.21 0.11 -0.11 0.02 0.07 0.01      
Year dummies - - 9 0.16 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 0.06 -0.20     
Country dummies - - 10 0.25 -0.11 0.30 -0.12 0.01 0.06 -0.09 0.17 -0.13    
Institutions 68.30 12.14 11 0.29 -0.19 0.30 -0.14 -0.05 0.03 -0.18 0.25 -0.18 0.24   
Gini coefficient 39.69 6.87 12 -0.16 0.12 -0.15 0.13 0.03 0.00 0.19 -0.18  0.26 -0.30 -0.43  
Subsidiary survival 6.37 4.17 13 0.49 0.19 0.05 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.11  0.66 0.03  0.07 0.03 
Correlation coefficients greater or equal to |0.05| are significant at a 5% level.  
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Table 9. Results from the extended Cox regression model 
Independent Variables      Model 5 Model 4 Model 3 Model 2 Model 1 
Controls      
Subsidiary age -0.044*** 
(0.003) 
-0.044*** 
(0.003) 
-0.045*** 
(0.003) 
-0.045*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.047*** 
(0.003) 
Subsidiary Size -0.832*** 
(0.041) 
-0.827*** 
(0.041) 
-0.843*** 
(0.041) 
-0.843*** 
(0.041) 
  -0.809*** 
(0.040) 
Ownership ratio -0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.006** 
(0.001) 
Number of foreign 
parents 
-0.162*** 
(0.025) 
-0.161*** 
(0.025) 
-0.172*** 
(0.025) 
-0.169*** 
(0.025) 
 -0.162*** 
(0.025) 
Parent size 4.19e-07 
(0.000) 
4.17e-07 
(0.000) 
5.41e-07 
(0.000) 
4.80e-07 
(0.000) 
6.70e-07 
(0.000) 
Parent R&D intensity  2.26e-06* 
(0.000) 
2.24e-06* 
(0.000) 
2.18e-06* 
(0.000) 
2.23e-06* 
(0.000) 
2.11e-06* 
(0.000) 
Parent international 
experience 
  0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Main effects      
Institutions -0.198* 
(0.084) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
  -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
 
Gini coefficient -0.745** 
(0.266) 
-0.137*** 
(0.027) 
0.007* 
(0.003) 
  
Gini coefficient2 0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
   
Interactions      
Gini coefficient × 
Institutions 
0.010* 
(0.004) 
    
Gini coefficient2 × 
Institutions 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
    
Number of 
subsidiaries 
6,699 6,699 6,699 6,699 6,699 
Number of countries 47 47 47 47 47 
Log likelihood -29,334.35 -29,337.26 -29,350.71 -29,353.63 -29,375.06 
χ2 model against 
null model 
2,261.38*** 2,255.56*** 2,228.64*** 2,222.80*** 2,180.09*** 
χ2 model against 
Model 5 
N/A 5.82* 32.74***                   38.58*** 81.17*** 
AIC 58,698.69 58,700.51 58,725.43 58,729.27 58,769.86 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001(two-tailed) 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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The inflection point was estimated to be at a Gini coefficient of 387. Consistent with a procedure 
used by Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997), extended Cox regression models were fitted by 
classifying the entire sample into two subgroups: subsidiaries operating in countries with Gini 
scores of up to 38 (n1=3,380) and those operating in countries with Gini scores of above 38 
(n2=3,319). In doing so, the intention was twofold. The first was to corroborate the finding of a 
curvilinear relationship by calculating slopes for the relationship at both below and above the 
inflection point. As Table 10 shows, in line with the theory and empirical evidence discussed 
earlier, the relationship between the Gini coefficient and subsidiary exit is negative to the left of 
the inflection point, but positive to the right. The second intention was to compare effect sizes or 
the sensitivity of subsidiary exit to changes in Gini indices across the two subgroups. The model 
for subgroup 1 indicates that the rate of subsidiary exit decreases by about one percent for a unit 
increase in Gini coefficient, ceteris paribus. In contrast, the model for subgroup 2 suggests that the 
chance of subsidiary exit increases by about 3 percent for a unit increase in Gini coefficient. This 
implies that the sensitivity of change in exit rate is slightly greater at higher levels of income 
inequality (i.e., above the inflection point). 
In a separate post-hoc analysis, extended Cox regression models were run for three subsamples: 
subsidiaries operating in locations of low inequality (i.e., Gini indices of at most 34 or below -1SD 
of the mean), moderate inequality (i.e., Gini indices of between 34 and 45 or between -1SD and 
                                                          
7 𝜆(𝑥) = 𝑒(
(−0.1369𝑥)+0.0018𝑥2+⋯ )
    
     Calculate the partial derivative of the hazard function with respect to x (i.e.,  
𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
) 
      And set 
𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 0 to find the inflection point 
                                                                =>  
𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 𝑒(
(−0.1369𝑥)+0.0018𝑥2+⋯ )
  * (−0.1369 + 0.0036𝑥) = 0 
       If (-0.1369 + 0.0036x) = 0, then  
𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥
= 0. Thus, 0.0036𝑥 = 0.1369  => 𝑥 ≃ 38 
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+1SD of the mean), and high inequality (Gini indices of at least 45 or above +1SD of the mean). 
Figure 5 shows that over time subsidiaries operating in host countries with moderate Gini indices  
 
Table 10. Results from subgroup analyses 
Independent 
Variables 
Subgroup 1 Subgroup 2 
 β (s.d) 95% Conf. Interval β (s.d) 95% Conf. Interval 
Subsidiary age     -0.040*** 
(0.004) 
  [-0.048       -0.034]    -0.052*** 
(0.005) 
    [-0.062     -0.043] 
Subsidiary Size   -0.872*** 
(0.058) 
  [-0.985       -0.758] 
 
  -0.792*** 
(0.059) 
    [-0.908     -0.676] 
Ownership ratio    -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
  [-0.008       -0.004]  -0.005** 
(0.001) 
    [-0.007     -0.003] 
Number of foreign 
parents 
  -0.168** 
(0.043) 
  [-0.253       -0.083] 
 
  -0.156*** 
(0.032) 
    [-0.218      -0.094] 
Parent size -1.61e-07 
(0.000) 
  [ -1.47e-06  1.15e-06]    -0.4.35e-08 
    (0.000) 
    [1.35e-06  1.27e-06] 
Parent R&D 
intensity 
 2.69e-06* 
(0.000) 
  [1.80e-06    3.58e-06]   2.90e-06* 
(0.000) 
  [1.97e-06  3.82e-06] 
Parent international 
experience 
   0.011*** 
(0.003) 
  [0.006        0.016]    0.014*** 
     (0.003) 
     [0.008       0.019] 
Industry dummies  Included - Included - 
Year dummies  Included - Included - 
Country dummies Included - Included - 
Institutions -0.013 
(0.003) 
  [-0.019        -0.006] -0.005 
(0.003) 
     [ -0.011      0.001] 
Gini coefficient -0.013* 
(0.003) 
  [-0.019       -0.007]  0.034* 
 (0.007) 
      [0.019        0.050] 
     
Number of 
subsidiaries 
3,564  3,135  
LR chi2       1, 430.49       859.03 
Log likelihood    -15,694.259    -11,497.354 
Prob > chi2         0.00        0.00 
Note: Subgroup 1 is made up of observations with Gini Coefficient of less or equal to 38; whereas, subgroup 2 consists 
of observations with Gini Coefficient of greater than 38.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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Figure 5. Smoothed hazard estimates for subgroups of subsidiaries 
experience a lower likelihood of exit than their counterparts, providing additional support to the 
proposed curvilinear relationship. 
Model 4 in Table 9 serves to test the moderating effect of institutional development in the 
inequality-subsidiary exit relationship. Excluding interaction effects of the linear and quadratic 
forms of the Gini coefficient with the institutional development variable results in an inferior 
model, suggesting the presence of a significant interaction effect (χ2 = 5.82, p < 0.05). Results in 
the full model (i.e., Model 5) support Hypothesis 2 as the coefficient for the interaction of 
institutional development with the linear term of Gini coefficient is positive (β = 0.01, p < 0.05) 
and negative with the quadratic term of the Gini coefficient (β = -0.001, p < 0.05). This suggests 
that institutional development attenuates the curvilinear relationship between income inequality 
and subsidiary exit.  
A battery of robustness tests was conducted to examine the sensitivity of the findings to variations 
in the study sample, source of data, and model specification. To examine whether the results are 
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driven by outliers in the sample, the models were reestimated for different sample compositions. 
A potential problem is that the results might be influenced by an unusual data distribution of one 
or more countries. To explore such possibility, models were run by removing five countries with 
the lowest and highest average values for the variables of interest (i.e., income inequality and 
institutional development). While the values of the estimates did fluctuate, their signs and 
statistical significances remain unaltered.  
Also, the models were rerun using alternative data sources for each of the main independent 
variables. While the SWIID used in the analysis provides the most comprehensive and comparable 
Gini data, it was essential to verify the sensitivity of the results to the use of Gini data from another 
source. Consequently, the models were reestimated using the World Bank’s Gini data8. Similarly, 
Models were rerun by considering the World Bank’s Governance indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi, 2005) as an alternative proxy to institutional development. In each case, the signs 
and significances of the coefficient estimates did not change. Another potential problem with the 
results of the study arises from region-specific differences that may influence inequality levels. To 
control for this effect, the sample countries were classified into six regions namely Asia, Europe, 
North America, South America, Africa, and Oceania and models were respecified by including 
five region dummies. Results remain robust.  
While the use of the fixed effects estimation can control for potential endogeneity concerns arising 
from omitted variables, other potential sources of endogeneity remain. The income inequality 
variable in the models might be endogenous as it could be affected by the actions of the 
                                                          
8  Average indices were used for each country as they are measured at different times for different countries and only a 
single observation was available for over a third of the countries.     
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subsidiaries. It could be the pattern in the exit of the subsidiaries that is shaping host country 
income distribution. As well, there might be a possibility that market-seeking subsidiaries self-
select into countries with certain levels of income distribution. To mitigate such endogeneity 
concerns, a two-stage instrumental variable approach was used. This approach requires identifying 
an exogenous variable strongly correlated with the independent variable (i.e., income inequality), 
but not with the error term in the second stage model (Semadeni, Withers, and Certo, 2014). 
Following prior literature (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz, 2013), host-
country ethnic fractionalization and its squared term were used as instrumental variables. Data on 
ethnic fractionalization compiled by Alesina et al. (2003) was used and a two-stage residual 
inclusion (2SRI) approach was applied. This approach generates unbiased and consistent estimates 
from non-linear second stage models such as Cox regression model (Hausman, 1978; Terza, Baus, 
and Rathouz, 2008). Results of the study remain robust. 
DISCUSSION 
Income inequality is a global phenomenon. However, some countries have more of it than others, 
as shown in Table 7. Our understanding of its potential relationship with business performance has 
been limited at best. The major objective of this paper is to make a modest contribution in this 
respect. It argues that the relationship between income inequality and foreign subsidiary exit can 
be complex both in terms of its fundamental nature and in its associated contingencies. The 
empirical evidence supports a curvilinear relationship between inequality and subsidiary exit. It 
was found that an increase in income inequality from the lowest point to the inflection point is 
accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the exit probability of market-seeking subsidiaries. 
This observation suggests that market-seeking subsidiaries operating in such countries as the 
Netherlands (i.e., average Gini of 25.4) tend to benefit from increasing inequality, as such increase 
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corresponds with a reduction in their exit probability. In this respect, Sweden’s experience is 
telling: an increase in its Gini coefficient has been associated with a greater economic efficiency 
(The Economist, 2012) which can, in turn, decrease the chances of subsidiary exit.  
The relationship between subsidiary exit and income inequality follows a different pattern after 
the inflection point. The benefits of increasing income inequality to subsidiaries, in terms of 
decreasing their exit probability, reaches maximum levels at this point. Beyond this point, 
increases in inequality tends to introduce resource limitations, resulting in increased exit 
likelihood. This finding is consistent with the argument that an increase in income inequality 
engenders multifaceted challenges (see for example, Bénabou, 1996; Easterly 2007) that can 
increase subsidiary exit probability.  
The general finding of a non-monotonic relationship of inequality and subsidiary exit is consistent 
with that of Hasanov and Izraeli (2011) who found an inverted U-shape relationship between 
inequality and economic growth. They identified that in the United States, state-level Gini scores 
of below 0.17 or above 0.50 were associated with negative growth rates and the highest rates of 
growth occur when the Gini values are in the 0.33 to 0.35 range. Since business entities form a 
significant part of a given economy and are directly affected by trends in economic development, 
this finding can be considered an extension to the organizational level of the similar pattern they 
observed at a macro-level. Similarly, the findings of this study are in line with that of Lippmann 
et al.(2005) in which they found a similar form of relationship between economic inequality and 
the formation of opportunity-based ventures that can support operations of subsidiaries in their 
host-country.  
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A closer look at the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit reveals an 
interesting insight. The findings suggest that subsidiaries operating in countries occupying 
symmetrical positions with respect to the inflection point (for example, Austria with an average 
Gini of 27.3 and Thailand with an average Gini of 43) can have a roughly equal chance of exit. 
Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the outcome (i.e., subsidiary exit likelihood) to changes in inequality 
levels differs across the countries. A move to a less egalitarian society in Austria is likely to be in 
the best interest of subsidiaries operating there as it, on average, decreases their exit likelihood. 
However, such a move in Thailand will likely have the opposite implication. Instead, a move to a 
more egalitarian society in Thailand may be required to improve environmental munificence and 
thereby decrease exit likelihood of subsidiaries. This insight extends the arguments in the market 
attractiveness literature that emphasizes aggregate (e.g., GDP) and average (e.g., Income Per 
Capita) income characteristics by suggesting that dispersion (variance) of income is also an 
important indicator.  
Further post-hoc analyses confirm the results. First, as presented in Figure 5, subsidiaries operating 
in locations with moderate income inequality levels have, on average, a lower probability of exit 
than those operating elsewhere. Further, sub-group analyses of subsidiaries operating in countries 
with different levels of inequality (i.e., below and above the inflection point) provide evidence 
supporting the hypothesized non-monotonic relationship. Generally, the results indicate two ways 
of decreasing subsidiary exit associated with income inequality: high income inequality countries 
ought to work towards reducing income inequality; whereas, low income inequality countries need 
to adopt policies that can push their inequality levels to intermediate levels. However, the subgroup 
analyses indicate that high inequality countries have more to benefit, in terms of reduced subsidiary 
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exit rate, from reduced income inequality than do low inequality countries from increased income 
inequality.  
The results of the study also show another layer of complexity in the relationship between 
inequality and subsidiary exit. It was found that host-country institutional development moderates 
the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit.  As depicted in Figure 6, across 
different levels of inequality, subsidiaries operating in countries with high institutional 
development have a lower exit probability than their counterparts operating in countries with low 
institutional development. This suggests that institutional development improves environmental 
munificence and thus counterbalances host-country resource limitations associated with extreme 
income distributions, thus highlighting the need to consider the interaction of institutional  
 
Figure 6: Interaction between income inequality and institutional development 
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development and income inequality in examining potential hazards facing market-seeking 
subsidiaries. The results of this study inform MNEs’ market-seeking investments in at least three 
important ways. First, they stress the importance of considering income distribution within a 
country when assessing investment potential and performance. Second, they highlight the 
dynamics between the levels of income inequality and subsidiary exit and how a move to a 
more/less egalitarian society relates with subsidiary exit depending on the prevailing level of 
income inequality. Third, they show how the relationship of income inequality and subsidiary exit 
can be contingent on host-country institutional development.  
However, certain limitations and future directions should be noted. First, the proxy used for 
inequality is the Gini coefficient. In spite of its widespread use, this measure may not perfectly 
capture the construct—income inequality. Recent works in economics, for example, have used 
ratio measures such as top 5 percent shares that provide information about what percentage of the 
total national income is accounted for by the top 5 percent of the population (Piketty and Saez, 
2006). Future research can test the robustness of the findings by using alternative indicators of 
income inequality. Second, the empirical tests are based on data from Japanese MNEs and 
subsidiaries. As such, before any generalization can be made, the study needs to be replicated using 
subsidiary and MNE data from other home countries. It should be noted, however, that the use of 
a single home country data serves an essential statistical purpose of controlling for variance arising 
from home-country heterogeneity.  
Future research needs to look at institutional antecedents/underpinnings of economic inequality, 
as such research may provide a more refined understanding of how inequality is associated with 
business termination. Research in the varieties of capitalism stream has been looking at the 
institutional differences across different versions of capitalism and how different institutional 
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arrangements can give rise to different levels of income inequality (Judge, Fainshmidt, and Brown, 
2014). Future studies on economic inequality and business exit can clearly draw on this literature 
to produce more refined insights. Another fruitful direction is to empirically examine the 
relationship between income inequality and environmental munificence. The study wove together 
relevant theoretical arguments to establish the relationship between the two and connect income 
inequality with foreign subsidiary exit. However, empirical investigations of the underlying 
relationship would not only help verify the robustness of the findings but also make for a nuanced 
understanding of the ways through which inequality influences resource dynamics of the 
environments in which subsidiaries operate.  
We also see potential in a single host-country replication of this study so that the focal locus shifts 
from countries to regions, provinces, or cities. Do regional, provincial, or city differences in 
income distribution explain differences in the loss/retention of market-seeking subsidiaries? These 
are questions of considerable practical as well as theoretical import. For example, Reich (2014) 
argued that an unequal distribution of income was responsible for Detroit’s economic problems. 
Future empirical research looking at the causal link between income distribution and business exit 
can help advance better understanding, while also testing Reich’s thesis. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Davis (2015) identified income inequality as one of the three most important topics organization 
and management researchers need to study. To the best of our knowledge, this study is among the 
first to directly examine the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit. The study 
finds empirical support for the relationship between inequality and subsidiary exit probability. In 
particular, it finds a non-monotonic association between inequality and subsidiary exit in that the 
relationship between the two is negative at lower levels of inequality but positive at higher levels 
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of inequality. This finding is important as it shows the complex ways in which income inequality 
relates with the exit of market-seeking subsidiaries.  
The study also examined whether income inequality interacts with institutional development to 
affect subsidiary exit likelihood. It finds that institutional development mitigates potential resource 
limitations wrought by income inequality and facilitates coordination inside the subsidiary and 
outside in the product as well as factor markets. This finding, therefore, suggests that market-
seeking subsidiaries operating in countries with very high income inequality and low institutional 
development have a greater likelihood of exit than such subsidiaries operating elsewhere.  
The results of this study have important theoretical as well as managerial implications. From a 
theoretical standpoint, this research makes a case for the influence of socio-economic forces on 
subsidiary performance. It contributes to the stream of literature examining the effects of 
environmental influences on subsidiary exit. In fact, a fundamental question in IB scholarship is 
how environmental context influences foreign subsidiary performance and MNE behavior 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Clearly, understanding how social forces influence business 
performance and what businesses (or governments) have to do to manage these forces has 
considerable theoretical merit. 
From a practical standpoint, the research suggests the need for organizations to consider socio-
economic forces more closely and critically. Particularly, the study shows how the probability of 
subsidiary exit changes along different levels of income distribution. In addition, this study 
provides firms with useful information about exit risks associated with different investment 
locations having different income distributions. Finally, for host country governments, the results 
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provide empirical evidence about when and how inequality relates to business exit, thereby 
informing their policy decisions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
The Collective-Relational Approach to Political Connection: A Case for Political Rent? 
INTRODUCTION 
“China does not have a competitive edge over its Western counterparts in an open market. 
But in a closed market like Africa’s, Chinese companies are able to gain from government 
influence,” - a Beijing-based energy consultant, January 20069.  
MNEs from the advanced economies have long dominated trade and FDI flows throughout the 
globe. However, this extended domination has been threatened lately by new MNEs from the 
emerging markets. Unlike their counterparts from the advanced economies, most MNEs from such 
emerging markets as the BRICS10 are newcomers to the global scene and thus need to find unique 
ways to thrive amid the challenges and multifaceted threats characterizing cross-border 
investments. The introduction to the global competitive environment of these new MNEs has been 
surfacing some important aspects of competitive advantage. The Sino-African case can be 
illuminating in this respect. In 2009, China surpassed US as the largest single country trading 
partner of Africa (OECD, 2011). Similarly, Chinese outward FDI to Africa has been rapidly 
increasing over the last decade, while MNEs from the developed economies have continued to 
divest from continent (UNCTAD, 2015). As well, on average, the performance in Africa of 
Chinese MNEs compares favorably with that of their Western counterparts (Alden & Davies, 
2006; Stevens and Newenham-Kahindi, 2017). What underlies such a performance edge? 
Answering this question can provide important theoretical as well as practical insights. 
The resource-based view (RBV) holds that competitive advantage can result from possession of 
valuable and rare organizational resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Here, emphasis is on 
                                                          
9 China: Greasing wheels in Africa’, Energy Compass, 20 January 2006.   
10 An acronym that stands for Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa   
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resources found inside the organization as potential sources of competitive advantage. Dyer & 
Singh (1998) extended the RBV argument by suggesting that organizational resources that provide 
competitive advantage can be outside the organization and be embedded in the networks of 
relationships the organization forms with others such as suppliers, distributors, and partners. 
Drawing on the network and embeddedness literature in economic sociology (e.g., Granovetter, 
1985), Dyer & Singh (1998) offer useful insight on the locus of valuable and rare resources.  
However, Dyer & Singh (1998) considered only relationships in the market and did not consider 
possible non-market relationships. Developments in the IB literature and non-market strategy 
literature, however, have long acknowledged the strategic importance of relationships with 
governments (e.g., Boddewyn, 2016; McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory, 2002; Schuler, Rehbein, 
and Cramer, 2002). Research in these areas has also pointed to potential downsides of direct 
political connections—downsides that may adversely affect the competitive position of the 
business in question (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010). 
Direct political relationships confer useful political resources; creating and maintaining these 
relationships may be costly, however. Indeed, assuming the norm of rationality, organizations will 
choose to build political relationships when their potential benefits outweigh their costs. In 
contrast, the dynamics between benefit and cost distributions is likely to change when the political 
relationships are indirect as in the case of the Chinese modified one-tier bargaining model—a 
model especially used to support resource-seeking investments of state-owned MNEs (Li, 
Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro, and Chen, 2013). In this model, the Chinese government directly 
bargains strategic and operational entry deals on behalf of a consortium of Chinese companies. 
These companies receive financial and infrastructural supports from the Chinese government and 
are expected to operate in a predetermined host country. In this bargaining model the Chinese 
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government provides development assistance to the host country in the form of low-interest loans, 
infrastructural development, and grants in return for the host country providing investment 
opportunities and facilitating entry and local operations of the Chinese MNEs. 
This study builds on Hillman & Hitt's (1999) arguments about the nature of political actions in 
order to put forward a theoretical explanation for political connections and their implications on 
MNE competitive advantage in developing countries. It conceptualizes the modified one-tier 
bargaining model as a relational and collective approach to political connection and argue that this 
approach enables Chinese MNEs to access useful political resources, without the direct costs 
involved in creating and maintaining the linkage. Further, it puts forward theoretical arguments 
suggesting that the relational aspect of this approach confers pragmatic legitimacy on the Chinese 
subsidiaries. These gains in resources and legitimacy arising from the unique bargaining model 
are likely to serve as mechanisms linking political connection and competitive advantage. The 
bargaining model creates an imperfect factor market for political resources—a market in which 
Chinese companies have a substantial access to political resources, with potential performance 
returns. We view such returns as political rents.  
As well as its potential contribution to the stream of literatures concerned with identifying the 
locus of critical resources and specifying the condition in which political resources can make for 
competitive advantage, this paper seeks to achieve the following five purposes. First, by 
considering alternative governance mechanisms to structure non-market exchanges/transactions 
between or among MNEs and governments (i.e., host and home), the study seeks to contribute to 
a better understanding of the different approaches to political connection and their respective 
implications for market competitiveness. Examination of the special governance mechanism 
characterizing investment of Chinese SOMNEs helps us responds to a call by Wright et al. (2005) 
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for a greater understanding of emerging market multinationals and the implications of their 
strategic orientations for extending or refining existing theories. 
Second, the study brings to the fore the issue of MNE- host country bargaining—an issue that has 
received only limited attention despite its key role in informing early IB research (Eden, Lenway, 
& Schuler, 2004; Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1971). The MNE-host government relationship is 
vital as it affects virtually every aspect of MNE’s strategy and performance. This research 
addresses the political dimensions of international business and has considerable theoretical 
appeal. In fact, scholars have argued that this is an area in the IB literature with considerable 
promise for building a unifying IB theory (Dunning, 1993; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, Eden, 2006; 
Grosse and Behrman, 1992). Third, by examining the roles of host and home governments in the 
bargaining process, the study brings the State back in to IB research and contribute to resolving 
the limitation that most IB research is too MNE-centric (Hennart, 2009) and treats as exogenous 
host-country politics and the state (Agmon, 2003). Likewise, by looking at the strategic interaction 
between national states and MNEs, it departs from IB research that examines MNEs’ exchanges 
in the (economic) market and consider the nature and implications of exchanges in the political 
market.  
Fourth, it seeks to contribute to IB/strategy research in emerging markets and specifically to the 
literature focusing on how MNEs deal with institutional voids—absence or lack of market-
supporting institutions (Mair and Marti, 2009). Whereas MNEs employ non-market strategies to 
mitigate economic challenges institutional voids pose (Dorobantu, Kaul, and Zelner, 2016; 
Getachew and Beamish, 2017), understanding the nature of these international political strategies 
is limited. By introducing a typology of approaches used to structure exchanges between host 
countries and MNEs and examining their implications for the divestment of foreign subsidiaries, 
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the study intends to advance the extant understanding of such strategies.  Fifth, the research 
indicates potential for integrating perspectives from the RBV and the resource dependence 
perspective to explain competitive advantage. Here, the study argues that the bargaining model 
characterizing the entry of Chinese MNEs elicits the complementary aspects of resource 
mobilization and legitimacy in helping subsidiaries secure competitive advantage. 
The following sections include discussion of related literature on political connections, sources of 
competitive advantage, and MNE-developing host government bargaining models. These are 
followed by the development of a typology of alternative governance structures (bargaining 
models). The next part presents five propositions regarding the relationships between these 
governance structures and the competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries as well as the 
associated mechanisms and boundary conditions. Finally, the implications of this study for further 
theoretical development and practice are discussed.  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Developing countries feature contexts starkly contrasting to those elsewhere. MNEs operating in 
these markets, for instance, need to deal with or mitigate challenges from greater levels of 
institutional voids. Information asymmetries, weak property right protection, and higher 
monitoring and enforcement costs plague MNE investments in locations of high institutional voids 
(e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Likewise, unstable political, 
economic, and institutional conditions constrain such managerial undertakings as planning and 
adapting (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000). Unlike those in advanced markets, states in 
emerging markets play a more active role in not only regulating foreign firms but also running 
their own business enterprises (i.e., state-owned enterprises) (Xu & Meyer, 2012). In emerging 
markets, the political environment (of which the state is an integral part) is key and influences the 
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strategy and performance of foreign subsidiaries. For example, a recent study of 150 North 
American and European-based MNEs operating in Africa indicated that many of them incurred 
significant losses mainly due to regulatory issues and bribery (Hochberg, Klick, & Reilly, 2015).  
Given the challenging operating environments and active role of states in emerging markets, 
MNEs often find it essential to forge political connections or partake in the political market 
(Faccio, 2006). This is especially true of emerging-market MNEs (EMNEs), most of which 
consider politics an integral part of their business (Park and Luo, 2001; Wang et al., 2012). For 
example, Chinese MNEs leverage Guanxi and government ties to substitute for weak institutional 
arrangements as well as facilitate their international expansion (Wang et al., 2012). These 
connections afford strategic advantages through better access to useful information and protection 
from political hazards (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Like 
economic markets, political markets entail exchanges/transactions. Connected MNEs need to 
provide something in return for the strategic advantages states set at their disposal (Bonardi, 
Holburn, and Bergh, 2006). Connected MNEs may be required, for example, to keep excess 
employment, pay higher wages, or even financially support the ruling party of the state (Brockman, 
Rui, and Zou, 2013).    
Competition within economic markets is an integral subject of emphasis in international business 
practice as well as scholarship. However, the notion of competition has been extended less to 
political markets in which policies, information, and financial supports are exchanged (Bonardi et 
al., 2006; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Competition in the political market, like in economic markets, 
requires deployment of organizational resources and adoption of apposite strategies, called 
political strategies (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Political strategy of a firm 
represents, “…those actions taken to favorably position the firm in its nonmarket environments by 
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managing those uncertainties and resource dependences stemming from the influence and/or 
resistance of other nonmarket actors that (can) affect the firm’s overall economic performance’’ 
(Mahon, 1993; p. 196). Of interest here is a political strategy MNEs employ to structure their 
relations with host-country governments. Whereas earlier research in the area has considered the 
rationale behind such strategies (e.g., Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio et al., 2006), we have limited 
understanding of the different types of political strategies employed by MNEs with disparate 
experiential backgrounds (for example, MNEs from advanced markets vs EMNEs) and the relative 
performance implications of these strategies. 
An important aspect of MNEs’ political strategy in their respective host country is the bargaining 
model they adopt to structure their relationship with the host government (Ramamurti, 2001; 
Vernon, 1971). The chosen MNE-host country bargaining model governs the interaction between 
MNEs and their respective host government. Bargaining between the two parties determines, 
among other things, MNE entry to and performance in the host-country (Boddewyn, 2016; Eden 
et al., 2004; Nebus & Rufin, 2010; Ramamurti, 2004; Vernon, 1971). These bargaining parties 
have different natures and responsibilities, resulting in clear conflicts of interests and goals. MNEs 
are business organizations and thus are accountable to their owners; whereas, host-governments 
are political entities whose accountability is to the society in the host country. Whereas MNEs’ 
overriding purpose is to maximize returns (i.e. profits) (Friedman, 1970), host governments look 
to maximize returns (e.g., tax revenue, job opportunities) from the MNEs. While the bargaining is 
to develop mechanisms for mutual satisfaction of their interests, contracts arising from the 
bargaining process are hardly complete and threats of opportunistic behavior abound. 
Incompleteness of contracts and potential for opportunistic behavior translate to greater 
uncertainty and transaction costs. Expropriation is a potential manifestation of such opportunistic 
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behavior. Expropriation may take a direct or an indirect form. Direct expropriation involves a 
situation where an MNE is forced by the host-government to relinquish its ownership rights on its 
investment in the host-country. Indirect expropriation takes the forms of deliberately tampering 
with the environment to make it hostile for the MNE to operate. Included in this form of 
expropriation are excessive taxation, exchange rate manipulations, bribes, and new permit 
requirements (Azzimonti & Sarte, 2007). In recent decades, direct expropriation has increasingly 
made way for indirect expropriation as host-governments have come to realize that more value can 
be had through the latter than the former (Chifor, 2002).  
A key theoretical question is, therefore, how best to align the incentives of the exchange partners, 
resolve attendant conflict of interest, and minimize hazards from opportunistic behaviours. This 
study builds on Hillman and Hitt's (1999) arguments about the nature of political actions to identify 
alternative governance structures (or bargaining models) used for organizing MNE-host 
government exchanges. In so doing, it extends the argument of alternative governance structures 
to organize economic transactions to the realm of the political market where policies, regulations, 
information, and financial supports are exchanged (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Hillman and 
Hitt, 1999). Also, by integrating insights from the Transaction Cost Politics (TCP) literature, the 
resource-based view, and the social capital perspectives, the study examines the implications of 
these governance structures for competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries. Such competitive 
advantage is assumed to reflect the effectiveness of a governance structure. Further, it identifies 
potential institutional boundary conditions by considering whether and how the development of 
host-country economic and political institutions determine the effectiveness of a governance 
structure. 
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SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
The RBV holds that valuable and rare resources and capabilities undergird competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). While anything thought of as a strength or weakness can be a 
resource (Wernerfelt, 1984), three broad categories are widely recognized. These categories 
include physical capital resources, human capital resources, and organizational capital resources 
(Barney, 1991). While it is generally accepted that resources and capabilities are possessed by 
organizations, relatively little attention has been paid to their origin. Barney (1986) discussed this 
issue and suggested that organizations acquire critical resources from strategic factor markets. 
However, even here the source of resources is discussed in aggregate.  
Dyer & Singh (1998) addressed the same issue of locus of critical resources and capabilities, but 
with some degree of specificity. They suggested that some critical organizational resources may 
span boundaries and be embedded in the inter-firm relationships with suppliers, distributors, and 
partners. This work extended the RBV arguments in two ways. First, it advanced the notion that 
inter-firm linkages can give rise to valuable, rare, and inimitable resources and capabilities. In the 
traditional RBV literature, limited attention was paid to relationships as important sources of 
critical resources and capabilities. Indeed, the organizational capital resources category includes 
“…informal relations among groups within a firm and between a firm and those in its 
environment,” (Barney, 1991: 101). However, little research looked at the micro-foundations of 
resources as potential explanation of competitive advantage. Even in Barney’s (1991) definition, 
only informal relations are considered, with no room for the formal and regular relationships a 
firm may have and out of which it secures valuable, rare, and inimitable resources and capabilities.  
Second, Dyer & Singh (1998) contributed to Barney's (1986) earlier work on the strategic factors 
market concept that concerns the ultimate sources and locus of critical resources and capabilities. 
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By drawing on an earlier work in economic sociology on embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), Dyer 
& Singh (1998) identified inter-firm linkages as useful sources of strategic factors. Unlike other 
sources of strategic factors, inter-firm linkages enable access to several different types of resources 
and capabilities such as information and financial resources. Nonetheless, such linkages also need 
to be maintained on a regular basis, and clearly some costs would be incurred for that purpose.   
The emphasis in Dyer & Singh (1998), however, is on market-based inter-firm linkages; the 
relationship firms form is conceptualized as one with parties actively involved in the firm’s value 
chain, namely upstream and downstream strategic alliance partners. However, developments in 
the IB and non-market strategy literatures pointed to non-market (political) relationships. 
Boddewyn & Brewer (1994), for instance, argued that international business fundamentally differs 
from domestic business in the greater attention accorded to political factors and the relationship 
with governments of different host countries. They suggested a move away from considering 
political forces merely as constraints and emphasized the value to international business managers 
of appreciating the merits of developing a political behavior capability. Table 11 presents a 
summary of related research in IB and non-market strategy. 
Political behavior involves, “…the acquisition, development, securing, and use of power in 
relationship to other entities, where power is viewed as the capacity of social actors to overcome 
the resistance of other actors,” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 120). It is conceptualized as an 
important source of political resources and capability. These political resources and capabilities 
entail “…intelligence and cognitive maps about non-market environments, better access to  
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Table 11: Summary of IB/strategy research on political behavior and its resource and/or  
    legitimacy implications 
Articles Approach 
(Theoretical or 
Empirical) 
Major Arguments 
Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994 Theoretical Examined the political nature of IB and the role of 
government as a factor of production 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999 Theoretical Studied the process of political strategy formulation 
Park & Luo, 2001 Empirical Chinese companies use guanxi as a strategic mechanism 
to overcome competitive and resource disadvantages by 
cooperation and exchange of favours with competitors 
and government authorities 
Child & Tse, 2001 Theoretical The behavior and strategies of Chinese MNEs are 
informed by political and economic motives of the 
Chinese government 
McWilliams et al., 2002 Empirical Extended the RBV argument to show its use to analyze 
the effectiveness of non-market strategies 
Henisz & Zelner, 2005 Theoretical Cultivating local allies is further enhanced by the 
legitimacy such partners may provide when incentive 
alignment among the various partners can be maintained 
Hillman & Wan, 2005 Empirical Institutional factors and the search for legitimacy dictate 
political strategy 
Bonardi et al., 2005  Theoretical Discussed competition in political markets 
Frynas et al., 2006 Theoretical Discussed the long-term process of acquiring, sustaining, 
and exploiting firm-specific political resources in 
international business 
Holburn & Bergh, 2008 Theoretical Discussed strategies firms use to improve the nature of 
their regulatory environment 
Oliver & Holzinger, 2008 Theoretical Firm’s dynamic political management capabilities 
determine effectiveness of political strategies 
Okhmatovskiy, 2010 Empirical Firms with indirect political ties get access to resources 
and legitimacy, while avoiding costs associated with 
political connection 
Sun et al., 2009 Empirical Political affiliation can help a firm access critical physical 
as well as financial resources  
Sun et al., 2010 Empirical Declining and even negative value of deep political 
embeddedness by MNE in stable emerging markets 
Holburn & Zelner, 2010 Empirical Organizational capabilities in assessing and managing 
policy risks developed in home countries of weak 
institutions helps when investing in host countries with 
similar institutions.  
Forstenlechner & Mellahi, 2011 Empirical Building legitimacy with the wider community is 
particularly important in emerging markets 
Sun et al., 2011 Theoretical Identified four political tie archetypes of which none 
recognized the case of ties created by national 
governments to facilitate the entry and operations of 
MNEs in other countries 
Doh et al., 2012 Theoretical Integration of institutional and strategic perspectives 
would help advance study of non-market strategy, 
especially in emerging countries 
Wang et al., 2012 Empirical Examines the role of home states in foreign investments 
Li et al., 2013 Empirical Introduces the modified one-tier bargaining model 
Duanmu, 2014 Empirical  Examines the influence of home state on expropriation 
risk 
Stevens and Newenham-Kahindi, 
2014 
Empirical Explores the value of legitimacy spillover from home 
states to firms in their foreign operations. 
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decision makers and opinion makers….” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 135). In keeping with Dyer 
& Singh (1998), Boddewyn & Brewer (1994) advanced the notion that critical firm resources 
figure in the linkages firms maintain with other parties, in this case with governmental parties. 
However, to the extent that government parties do not directly feature in the market exchanges (at 
least in capitalist systems) their work expands the scope of such relationships to non-market 
interactions.  
Further refinement and discussion of this idea featured in the non-market strategy literature 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Holburn and Bergh, 2008; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Schuler et al., 2002) 
and the IB literature (Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006; Sun, Mellahi, & Liu, 2009; Sun et al., 
2010). Along with these developments, however, came the recognition that political connections 
may become liabilities and their returns may not justify the associated costs. That is what the 
empirical evidence of Sun et al. (2010) seems to suggest. They found that deep embeddedness in 
political networks has adverse effects on organizational performance as such embeddedness takes 
away the ability and willingness to build market-based capabilities. In the absence or lack of such 
market-based capabilities, organizations may be vulnerable to market dynamics that require 
application of such capabilities. As well, political connections may become a liability in times of 
significant changes to government officials. In such events, a firm’s prior affiliation may work 
against the firm. In addition, creation and maintenance of political relationship has associated 
costs.  
The degree to which the attendant liabilities materialize and associated costs accrue depends 
largely on the nature of the political linkage (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). A direct political linkage takes 
the form of active involvement of the firm in creating and/or maintaining the connection. In this 
case, the firm is likely to incur the entire amount of the associated costs and to encounter the total 
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effects of the potential liabilities. Another way of securing political connections is indirectly 
through a proxy or proxies. Hillman & Hitt (1999) coined such connection as collective. Collective 
linkages are likely to reduce the direct risk exposures (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Okhmatovskiy, 
2010).  
As well as providing important resource and capability advantages, political connections have 
potential implications on the pragmatic legitimacy of the organization in consideration. Pragmatic 
legitimacy is an important sociologic outcome that is central to the resource dependence 
perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995). Pragmatic legitimacy is grounded in the 
self-interested assessment by immediate constituents of the value obtained through exchanges with 
a party under consideration (Suchman, 1995).  Relationships can be useful sources of mechanisms 
for such legitimacy. Hybels’ (1995) definition of legitimacy emphasizes the importance placed on 
relations: 
Legitimacy is better conceived as both part of the context for exchange and a by-
product of exchange [between an organization and its environment]. 
Legitimacy…exists only as a symbolic representation of the collective evaluation of an 
institution, as evidenced to both observers and participants perhaps more convincingly 
by the flow of resources…. (pp. 243). 
 
 
In addition to emphasizing the place exchanges occupy in legitimacy, the definition highlights the 
possible linkage between legitimacy and resources. In fact, the resource dependence perspective 
holds that organizations seek legitimacy as it enables them to have continued access to important 
resources to a sufficient level as to ensure their survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The link 
between legitimacy and relationships becomes more potent in the case of political relationships 
(Hillman & Wan, 2005). 
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The importance of legitimacy is even greater for MNEs whose subsidiaries operate in foreign 
locations. Acceptance and approval of MNE subsidiaries by stakeholders in the host country is 
instrumental for their performance (Forstenlechner & Mellahi, 2011). As a result, MNEs employ 
different strategies to secure host-country legitimacy. Kostova & Zaheer (1999) contend that hiring 
local employees, especially those who have the potential to confer legitimacy on the subsidiary, 
would help MNEs secure legitimacy. Another strategy employed by MNEs is to include influential 
personalities in the host country in the board directorship of the subsidiary (Hillman & Wan, 2005). 
Similarly, the need for legitimacy may require MNEs to have important political figures as part of 
their subsidiaries or to partner with the government or other influential parties. Relations between 
home and host states can also generate legitimacy advantages (Wang et al., 2012). 
Some home states are more inclined than others to engage in social and personal relations with 
host-country officials. For example, Chinese officials maintain a strong belief in the cultivation 
and management such relations to achieve their goals—for example, fostering commercial success 
of Chinese foreign subsidiaries (Eisenman, 2008; Li et al., 2013; Solomon, 1995). Attesting to this 
notion, Eisenman (2008) noted that between 2006-2008, the communist party of China (CPC) had 
established ties to at least 60 African political parties, including opposition parties. With the 
intention of creating stronger social and personal relations, CPC often arranges lavish state visits 
for the political leaders to develop feelings of goodwill, friendship, and associated obligations 
(Solomon, 1995).   
MNE-DEVELOPING HOST COUNTRY BARGAINING MODELS 
A seminal work in the IB literature regarding the relationship between MNEs and developing host 
countries is that of Vernon (1971). It introduced the obsolescing bargaining model that describes 
the bargaining process between the two parties. Describing the MNE-host country relationship 
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typical of the 1970’s and 80’s, the model specifies their bargaining as a function of negotiation 
and compromises on the goals, resources, and constraints of each party (Eden et al., 2004; 
Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1994). The model suggests that MNEs tend to have a better bargaining 
position at first, because they have firm specific assets appealing to many host countries, including 
modern technology. The bargaining power, however, gradually shifts to the host countries once 
the MNEs make commitments in the forms of fixed assets. As the initial contract expires and when 
the MNEs want to strike a new deal, they find themselves at a less favorable position because of 
the difficulty in relocating fixed investments. While the model aptly described the bargaining 
process especially in the natural resource industries, its application can readily extend also to any 
investment that requires commitment in the host country of significant fixed assets. 
From the 1990’s onward, the MNE-developing host state relationships has departed from the 
obsolescing bargaining model in at least two important ways. First, the spirit of competition 
underlying the obsolescing bargaining model makes way for more cooperative dealings between 
the two parties (Eden et al., 2004; Ramamurti, 2001). Developing host countries introduced 
multiple waves of reforms to open their markets, partly through their own initiatives and partly 
through pressures from home countries and such multilateral institutions as the World Bank, IMF, 
and WTO (Ramamurti, 2001).  
Second, other third parties including home countries and multilateral institutions became 
increasingly involved in the bargaining process, rendering the bargaining process more complex. 
One salient aspect of the complexity is the introduction of a level of bargaining between home and 
host countries or between multilateral institutions and the host countries. This new tier of 
bargaining, along with the bargaining at the traditional level (i.e., between MNEs and host 
countries) gave rise to a two-tier bargaining process (Ramamurti, 2001). The introduction of these 
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third parties was to ensure that MNEs would not suffer from a bargaining power that eventually 
becomes obsolete. In the two-tier bargaining model, tier-one represents bargaining between home 
countries (sometimes represented by multilateral institutions such as IMF and the World Bank) 
and host countries. Tier-one bargaining involves bilateral or multilateral negotiations on strategic 
issues of entry, market liberalization, and structural adjustments by host countries. In return, host 
countries receive development assistance often in the form of loans. The tier-one bargaining is to 
pave the way for tier-two bargaining between MNEs, affiliated to the home country or the 
multilateral institution, and the target host country. The tier-two bargaining focuses more on 
operational issues and carries much less significance than in the traditional obsolescing bargaining 
model as host governments have their bargaining positions weakened in tier-one bargaining 
(Ramamurti, 2001).  
The two-tier bargaining augments the bargaining power of MNEs because powerful home 
countries and/or multilateral institutions are on their side. As a result, the tendency for the 
bargaining power of the MNEs to become obsolete is highly unlikely, as even when the MNEs 
have committed considerable fixed assets, the presence in the background of such powerful 
supporters preserves the bargaining power with the MNEs. While this bargaining model 
contributed to the remarkable decrease in expropriation of subsidiaries by developing country 
governments, it had also deprived government in developing countries of their ability to protect 
their rights and secure equitable distribution of gains. Even when there is clear evidence that MNEs 
are involved in a high-profile transfer pricing activity in which they transfer their profits to 
subsidiaries located in tax havens, the host governments have but limited latitude to influence the 
behaviors of the MNEs (Eden & Rodriguez, 2004). Ramamurti (2001) observed that any action by 
the host government to clamp down on such behavior may be interpreted as aggression and the 
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home countries can impose crippling economic sanctions on the developing host countries. As 
well, bilateral and multilateral treaties as well as customary international law provide protections 
against adverse actions by host countries (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008).  
Similarly, provision of loans or cancellation of debts for developing host countries further 
weakened their bargaining power, limiting their ability to strike favorable deals with MNEs. In 
exchange for these loan provisions or debt cancellations, host country governments are required 
to meet the demands of the home countries, thereby ceding power to the MNEs from these 
countries. Further undermining the bargaining positions of developing host countries is the 
competition among many developing countries to attract inward FDI (Eden & Lenway, 2001). 
Such competition may entail use of generous subsidies and tax holidays. In general, this bargaining 
model makes for the maximization of MNEs’ returns, while reducing the share of host countries.  
Likewise, Eden et al., (2004) argued that the entry and obsolescing conditions underlying the 
obsolescing bargaining model are no longer applicable to the bargaining relationship between 
developing states and MNEs. They advanced a political bargaining model which suggests 
involvement of different parties including governments and MNEs negotiating on wide array of 
government policies. This model is consistent with the two-tier bargaining model in that the 
problem of the obsolescing bargaining power of MNEs is resolved by the introduction of third 
parties such as home governments to maintain the better bargaining positions of the MNEs. 
Similarly, most bargaining on entry conditions is either settled at the tier-one bargaining stage or 
is rendered irrelevant as host countries are pitted against each other to attract FDI and take their 
own initiative to lure MNEs.  
Nebus & Rufin (2010) attempted to extend the bargaining power paradigm into what they called 
the network bargaining model. Integrating insights from network theory, the model captures the 
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complexity of the environment in which bargaining takes place and the diversity of the actors 
involved in it. Particularly, the authors argued that MNE operation in host countries is a result of 
bargaining among state governments, multilateral organizations, MNEs and NGOs. As well, the 
model conceptualizes the bargaining process as being influenced by the power dynamics and 
interplay between or among these parties. 
Aside from the introduction of NGOs as relevant parties in the bargaining process and the 
integration of the network theory with the bargaining theory, the view advanced by Nebus & Rufin 
(2010) is fundamentally in line with those of the political bargaining model and the two-tier 
bargaining model. Central to each model is the notion that bargaining is not dyadic but involves 
parties other than MNEs and host-country government. Further, each model suggests that 
bargaining has multiple spatial dimensions, taking place at different levels and contexts and 
addressing different aspects of the bargaining results.  
A recent work by Li et al. (2013), however, pointed to the presence of a different form of 
bargaining model, with different structures and potential implications. In their study of outward 
investment of Chinese companies in Africa, especially those investing in the natural resources 
industry, the authors identified a bargaining model, which is different from the one used by the 
advanced economies. The Chinese model involves the home government directly negotiating deals 
with each host government on behalf of a consortium of investors. These investors get financial 
and infrastructural backing from the Chinese government. As well, the Chinese government works 
closely with potential host countries to identify opportunities for its affiliated firms. In this model, 
unlike in the two-tier bargaining model used by most advanced economies, the home government 
plays a more active role and works more closely with host governments to create favorable 
investment opportunities.  
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The dealing of the Chinese government differs from the two-tier bargaining model in three 
important ways. First, the Chinese government, unlike the governments of the advanced 
economies, deals with both the strategic issues of creating favorable investment host-country 
climate and the operational issues of identifying opportunities and facilitating the actual entry and 
operation of Chinese investors in the host country. In the case of the two-tier bargaining model, 
home country governments assume a limited role of facilitating the creation of favorable 
investment climate. Bargaining on operational issues is considered the responsibility of the MNEs.  
Second, the MNEs represented by the Chinese government are not required to engage in direct 
talks and relationships with the host governments; instead, they act as ‘ambassadors’ of the 
Chinese governments. Once a deal is brokered between the Chinese government and a host country 
and once a viable host-country opportunity is identified, these Chinese MNEs will invest in the 
host country and start operations. MNEs entering through the two-tier bargaining model need to 
directly interact with the host-country government; Chinese MNEs, however, have indirect 
relations with the host-country government. It should be noted, however, that indirect political 
connection can involve any third party conducting the entire political negotiation on behalf of the 
principal(s) (i.e., MNE(s)). This research considers one form of indirect political connection in 
which the third party is the home government (i.e. Chinese government).  
Third, the bargaining between Chinese governments and developing host-country governments 
has more to offer to the host-countries than is possible through the two-tier bargaining model. The 
bargaining spirit is more cooperative in that host countries, in return for creating a favorable 
investment climate and facilitating identification of local opportunities, receive development 
assistance in the form of infrastructural construction, low interest loans, and outright grants. 
Generally, since the bargaining model for the entry of Chinese MNEs involves bargaining between 
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the home government and host government, Li et al., (2013) called it the modified one-tier 
bargaining model, suggesting the similarity of this model to the traditional one-tier bargaining 
model (i.e., the obsolescing bargaining model). Table 12 provides a summarized description of the 
different bargaining models. 
TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS 
To theorize about the performance implications of the modified one-tier bargaining model, this 
research draws on Hillman & Hitt's (1999) arguments on the nature of political connections. They 
developed two important sets of arguments regarding the nature of political ties. The first involves 
the classification of political connections as transactional and relational. The transactional 
approach entails building relationships on specific issues perceived as important by the firm under 
consideration. It has a relatively short-term orientation, and during the planning of the transactional 
approach, emphasis is laid on the substance of the exchanges between the parties. In contrast, the 
relational approach requires building relations across multiple issues and over time. It has a more 
long-term orientation, and crafting a relational approach requires emphasis on the structure and 
process of the relationships. It can be argued that the modified one-tier bargaining model follows 
the relational approach. Active involvement of the Chinese government in host-country 
infrastructural development and the joint involvement of the Chinese government and host 
governments in identifying investment opportunities (Li et al., 2013) are indicative of the relational 
nature of the modified one-tier bargaining model. 
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Table 12: Comparison of the bargaining models for inward FDI to developing countries 
 One-tier bargaining Modified one-tier bargaining Two-tier bargaining 
Forms of bargaining State to MNE (i.e., host state to MNE) State to state (i.e., home country to host 
country) 
State to state (i.e., home country to 
host country)- tier-one 
AND 
State to MNE (i.e., host state to 
MNE)- tier-two 
Relationship with 
host government 
Mostly transactional Relational Transactional 
Parties involved Host government and MNE Home and host governments Home government, multi-lateral 
parties (e.g., IMF, World Bank), host 
government, and MNE 
Exchanges Host state  - opens up market 
- Incentives such as subsidies 
and tax holidays 
MNE – Tax revenues and firm specific 
resources such as technology and financial 
resources 
 
Host state   -opens up market 
-Incentives such as subsidies and tax holidays; 
mutually identifying investment opportunitiesa 
Home state -  Financial and technical support 
for host country infrastructure developmenta; 
low interest loans and outright grants to host 
country 
Host state  - opens up market 
- Incentives such as subsidies 
and tax holidays 
Home state -  loans 
Multilateral institutions- loans 
MNE – Tax revenues and firm 
specific resources such as technology 
and financial resources 
Issues bargained Both strategic and operational issues of 
investment at tier-two 
Both strategic and operational issues of 
investment at tier-one 
Strategic issues at tier-one and 
operational issues at tier-two 
Used by Early Western MNEs in developing 
countries 
Chinese SOMNEs in developing countries Western MNEs in developing 
countries 
Status of political 
relations of the MNE 
Individual-The MNE needs to create 
direct political connection 
Collective-Indirect political connection through 
the home country 
Individual-The MNE needs to create 
direct political connection 
Costs/benefits to the 
MNE 
Direct costs need to be incurred to 
generate direct benefits 
No direct costs incurred, but direct benefits are 
generated 
Direct costs need to be incurred to 
generate direct benefits 
Social capital to the 
MNE 
Direct costs need to be incurred to secure 
social capital 
Trickles down from home state legitimacy; thus, 
no direct cost by the MNE to secure social 
capital 
Direct costs need to be incurred to 
secure social capital 
a elements of the bargaining that define its relational nature 
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The second set of arguments concerns the parties involved in creating the political connection. 
Drawing on earlier works in political science, Hillman & Hitt (1999) theorized about political 
connections created through individual and collective actions. Connections through individual 
actions entail direct linkages and load the entire political cost on the participating firm. 
Connections through collective actions, in contrast, involve indirect linkage via third parties such 
as trade associations. Not only does such a linkage secure greater economies of scale, it facilitates 
sharing of political costs among members, thereby requiring lower direct expenditure by the target 
firm. The study contends that inherent in the modified one-tier bargaining model is the collective 
approach to political connections, with its attendant benefits.  
Integrating arguments on the two aspects of political connections, this study submits that the 
modified one-tier bargaining model is an empirical illustration of the collective-relational approach 
to political connection. As presented in Table 13, political connections to developing host countries 
may take any of the four types grouped into four quadrants, depending on the combination of the 
general approach (i.e., transactional or relational) and the level of participation (i.e., individual 
action or collective action) used. Quadrant-1 represents relational connections created directly by 
an individual firm. A direct long-term relationship created by an MNE with a host-country 
government falls into the individual-relational political connection presented in quadrant-1. 
Quadrant-2 and Quadrant-3 represent transactional approaches to political connections created 
through individual actions and collective actions respectively. The two-tier bargaining used by 
most advanced countries is shown in Quadrant 3. Quadrant-4, on the other hand, entails a 
collective-relational relationship, which involves long-term, multi-issue relationships formed by a 
collective unit (e.g., the Chinese government) on behalf of individual firms (e.g., Chinese MNEs). 
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Table 13: A typology of political connections with developing host states 
                                                                        Nature of political participation 
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The Collective Approach  
The Chinese government follows a hands-on approach in its bargaining with host developing 
countries. Through intensive political coordination with host governments, the Chinese 
government seeks to put its MNEs in better positions. Here, the study argues that the collective 
nature of the modified one-tier bargaining model provides resource and capability endowments 
that in turn offer competitive advantage to the MNEs and their subsidiaries in host countries. The 
collective approach of political connection enables the affiliated subsidiaries to access resources 
without incurring direct costs and to focus on developing market-based capabilities free of 
political distractions.  
Inherent in the design of the modified one-tier bargaining model are the potential advantages 
Chinese MNEs and their subsidiaries get because of their association with the home and host 
governments. The arrangement and the unique form of tie with host governments make it 
possible for the Chinese subsidiaries to access useful pieces of information on government 
policies. Clearly, such information has considerable value in anticipating changes in the policy 
environment and reducing political uncertainty (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In fact, literature in IB as 
well as in non-market strategy holds that interactions between businesses and government can be 
construed as a political market exchange in which business firms ‘procure’ vital information and 
policy favors (Boddewyn, 2016; Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman & Keim, 1995). As a result, by 
reducing the cost of critical information and helping subsidiaries better coordinate their activities 
in light of ex ante information, the collective nature of the modified one-tier bargaining model 
can contribute positively to the competitive advantage of the Chinese subsidiaries.  
Similarly, by virtue of their relationships with the home and host governments, MNEs and their 
subsidiaries can have better access to financial resources, in the form of either access to loans or 
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outright grants. The Chinese MNEs, because of their affiliation with the home government, 
receive financial backing (Li et al., 2013; Luo & Tung, 2007). Further, because of their indirect 
linkage with the host government, they are also entitled to privileged treatments in the form of 
subsidies and other special incentives. The combined effect of these advantages is likely to offer 
competitive advantages to the Chinese subsidiaries.  
Another important aspect of the modified one-tier bargaining model is the development assistance 
provided by the Chinese government on infrastructural building. A major challenge facing foreign 
MNEs operating in developing countries is infrastructure. Indeed, implicit in the higher operational 
risk associated with investing in developing countries is the challenges resulting from weak or 
inexistent infrastructure (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003). To mitigate such infrastructural challenges, 
organizations may need to incur additional expenses or devise alternative mechanism which may 
require investment of different sorts. The assistance for infrastructural development offered 
collectively by the Chinese government, whose interests are aligned with its MNEs, provides the 
opportunity to synchronize infrastructural development with the present and future investment 
directions of the MNEs (Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2011). Clearly, such synchronization will likely 
have a positive implication for the competitive advantage of the subsidiaries. Further, such a wide-
scale of assistance is unlikely to be imitated by other states or organizations, leading to the 
following proposition. 
             Proposition 1: Foreign subsidiaries whose MNEs draw on the collective approach to  
                          political relations with developing host-country governments are more  
              likely to achieve greater competitive advantage than those using the  
                         individual approach.  
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The Relational Approach  
The relational approach to political action has favorable legitimacy and social capital implications 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). This approach confers legitimacy upon the parties involved as well as 
their affiliates. In this case, these parties include the Chinese government and the consortium of 
MNEs it represents. Legitimacy assumes an even greater significance when investing in a foreign 
territory. Challenging foreign markets, such as those in developing countries, demand that MNEs 
achieve economic efficiency as well as legitimacy to become successful (Chan, Isobe, & Makino, 
2008; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Legitimacy of an MNE in a foreign country provides a mechanism 
to overcome the liability of foreignness and grants a social license to operate (Kostova, and Roth, 
2003).  
One major source of gaining such important legitimacy is by having long-term oriented working 
relationships with the host country government, which is assumed to represent the interests of the 
society in that country (Hillman & Wan, 2005). The relational approach inherent in the modified 
one-tier bargaining model provides the affiliated subsidiaries with legitimacy advantage. Owing 
to the special arrangement in place by the modified one-tier bargaining model, Chinese 
subsidiaries can gain legitimacy more than what a normal political tie is likely to provide. Such 
gain results from the relationship maintained by the Chinese government on a wide-array of issues, 
addressing host country interests on multiple fronts.  
The potential for obtaining and maintaining legitimacy through such a bargaining model is high in 
most developing countries where government officials wield considerable power and control in 
the formulation of policies and regulations pertinent to inward MNE investments. Acquaah (2007), 
for example, describes the value of political connections by explicating the substantial role played 
by Ghanaian government officials in controlling financial institutions, awarding major contracts, 
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and defining regulatory and licensing procedures. The CPC, with its distinctive negotiating 
behavior that relies heavily on developing strong interpersonal relationships with foreign officials, 
cultivates ties with these influential parties (Solomon, 1995).  
While government is a useful source of legitimacy, it may not give rise to social capital from other 
local constituents. In fact, legitimacy in each host country is a function of a goodwill not just from 
the host government but also from other stakeholders with which a foreign subsidiary interacts in 
its local operations (Suchman, 1995). The study argues that the development assistance the 
Chinese government offers as part of the bargaining model consolidates the relational status of 
political connection between home and host governments. That is, the reputation built for the 
Chinese MNEs, because of visible impact on infrastructure and agricultural sector, is likely to 
increase the popular legitimacy of China and by extension of its national subsidiaries. This 
argument is consistent with the suggestion by Forstenlechner & Mellahi (2011) that building 
goodwill with the wider community is key, especially when operating in emerging countries.  
          Proposition 2: Foreign subsidiaries whose MNEs draw on the relational approach to  
            political connections with developing host-country governments are more  
            likely to achieve greater social capital than those using the transactional  
           approach.  
 
The Collective-relational Approach  
That relationships are important sources of resources and capabilities is widely acknowledged 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). As with market relationships, non-market relationships, of which political 
relationships are a type, provide benefits with important performance implications. In addition, 
political resources are frequently in short supply and difficult to be copied by competitors 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Access to political figures is often limited and creating and 
maintaining political ties requires, among other things, experience (and capability) in dealing with 
political decision makers (Frynas et al., 2006). Invisibility and associated causal ambiguity makes 
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political resources difficult to imitate, thus serving as a useful source of competitive advantage 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).  
Particularly, the scale of political connection (because of the collective approach) and the level of 
benefits channeled to host country governments (because of the relational approach) in the 
modified one-tier bargaining model make it practically impossible for Western MNEs as well as 
their governments to remain competitive. Given that neither Western MNEs nor their home 
governments appear likely to match the scale and scope of support rendered by the Chinese 
government, it is reasonable to expect that Chinese subsidiaries will have enduring host country 
preferential treatment. As well, the CPC demonstrates a greater level of commitment to building 
strong relations with key host-country government officials than its western counterparts. A telling 
account of Chinese distinctive approach to such ties features in Eisenman (2008):  
“…While delegations looking to visit the United States…are subjected to an endless 
array of security procedures and red tape, Beijing has simplified procedures and 
supported delegations led by African political leaders. One former African ambassador 
to China recounted his own experience: ‘when I was arriving at my post, I was 
scheduled for a brief meeting and photo with President and CPC Chairman Jiang 
Zemin. Instead, we spoke for nearly an hour. President Jiang not only had a broad 
continental view of Africa, but I was also very impressed with his detailed knowledge 
of African issues and how close they were to his heart.’,” (p. 236). 
 
 
Empirical evidence abounds on the positive influence of political ties on organizational 
competitiveness and performance (e.g., Frynas et al., 2006; Hillman, 2005). However, an equally 
convincing body of literature shows the downsides of creating and maintaining political 
connections (e.g., Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun et al., 2010). The study argues that looking at the 
different types of political ties can help us appreciate the finer nuances in the relationships between 
political relations and firm competitiveness. The typology of political connections advanced here 
represents an attempt to understand these nuances. Such consideration can potentially help explain 
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the mixed results besetting this line of inquiry. It can, therefore, be argued that the indirect linkage 
Chinese MNEs and their subsidiaries have with the host government enables them to focus more 
on their core functions, while benefiting from spillover legitimacy resulting from their 
government’s political coordination and involvement in host country development activities.  
            Proposition 3: Foreign subsidiaries whose MNEs draw on the collective-relational  
               approach to political connections with developing host-country   
               governments are more likely to achieve greater competitive advantage than 
               those using the collective-transactional, individual-transactional, or  
               individual-relational approaches.   
 
Investment Motive as Boundary Condition 
 
Foreign direct investment by MNEs arise from the need to achieve a given investment motive(s). 
These motives define the rationale for which the investment was made and undergird pertinent 
strategy formulation and decision processes. Four major motives drive firms’ engagement in 
foreign value-adding activities in developing countries: market-seeking, resource-seeking, 
efficiency-seeking, and strategic assets seeking (Dunning, 1998). The motive(s) underlying MNEs’ 
foreign direct investments is (are) likely to have structural as well as strategic implications for the 
foreign subsidiaries. For example, structurally, a market-seeking subsidiary is much less integrated 
with its parent MNE as well as its sister subsidiaries. Strategically, it is more focused on host-
country markets (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010; Getachew and Beamish, 2017). In contrast, 
resource-seeking subsidiaries are vertically integrated extensions of their parent MNE. As such, 
they have a strategically important role in their respective MNE’s global value chain (Nachum and 
Zaheer, 2005). The key role such subsidiaries play in their parent network and their desire to access 
host-country resources, which the host government may consider strategic, are likely to result in 
different dynamics to the MNE-host country bargaining process. 
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A resource-seeking subsidiary is principally concerned with accessing useful resources that are 
not available in the home country of the investing firm, or are available at higher cost than could 
be obtained in the selected host country (Dunning, 1998). Foreign subsidiaries whose prime 
purpose is to access host-country natural resources and raw materials, which are immobile or costly 
to transport, represent ideal examples of such subsidiaries. Bargaining in the case of resource-
seeking investments is likely to be complicated for at least three reasons. First, resource-seeking 
subsidiaries often play an integral part in the global value-chain of their parent MNE, with key 
contributions to sister subsidiaries as well. With this key role such subsidiaries play comes a greater 
dependence of their respective MNEs on these subsidiaries and thus a greater need to establish 
their continued operation. Such dependence is likely to undermine the MNEs bargaining power 
over the host government (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Second, resource-seeking investments tend to be much larger and less mobile than other kinds of 
investments such as those which are market-seeking (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). As well, assets 
of resource-seeking subsidiaries are less fungible (or have greater asset specificity) and thus are 
less likely to be redeployed elsewhere (Anand and Singh, 1997; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; 
Williamson, 1985). As a result, MNEs with resource-seeking investments in a given host country 
tend to exercise lower bargaining power in their dealing with host government. Third, resource-
seeking investments carry greater policy/regulation risks because of the considerable strategic 
importance developing host countries attach to (natural) resources, the politically sensitive nature 
of resource use by foreign agents, and the negative externalities (for example, environmental 
degradation) associated with resource extraction (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Eden et al., 2004; 
Vernon, 1971). Therefore, an MNE employing an individual and/or transactional bargaining model 
is likely to suffer the consequences of a weaker bargaining power coupled with greater 
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policy/regulation risks. In contrast, an MNE using a collective-relational bargaining model is likely 
to command a better bargaining stand. A telling example is that of Chinese government, which not 
only has propelled Chinese MNEs to invest in gold mining in Ghana but also has reportedly 
managed to exert pressure on the Ghanaian government to allow firms to bypass local regulations 
(UNCTAD, 2007). This leads to the following proposition:  
       Proposition 4: The relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach to  
                    political connection and competitive advantage is stronger for a resource- 
                   seeking investment of MNEs such that, for investments of this kind, the     
        collective-relational approach is more likely to lead to a greater competitive  
                   advantage than the collective-transactional, individual-transactional, or  
                   individual-relational approaches.   
 
Institutional voids as Boundary Condition 
Institutional voids characterize economic markets of developing host countries and are largely 
responsible for the greater level of uncertainty MNEs encounter when operating in these countries 
(North, 1991; Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Three main challenges beset 
transformations and transactions in locations of high institutional voids: limited access to quality 
information, regulations that limit scale and/or scope of business operations, and issues in 
enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights. As well, the absence/lack of such 
institutional arrangements provide corrupt politicians with an opportunity to exploit firms for their 
private benefits. All these undermine the efficiency of MNEs while also subjecting them to greater 
uncertainty.  
Firms use political connection to mitigate the dual hazards of inefficiency and uncertainty (Inoue, 
Lazzarini, and Musacchio, 2013; Musacchio, Lazzarini, and Aguilera, 2015; Park and Luo, 2001). 
By nurturing and leveraging long-term reciprocal formal and informal ties with host-country 
governments, firms economize on transaction as well as transformation costs. Firms with such ties 
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are likely to gain better access to key resources and information, thus benefiting from potential 
improvements in efficiency and/or reduced uncertainty in the political and regulatory environment 
(Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000). Political connections also help in safeguarding property rights and 
mitigating contractual hazards (Luo et al., 2010). In fact, in locations of high institutional voids, 
politically connected firms tend to outperform their counterparts (Brockman et al., 2013).  
To mitigate challenges in property right protection, contract enforcement, and information 
availability, firms form political connections. However, the value of political connection as a 
substitute for weak economic institution is likely to decline as these institutions develop 
(Brockman et al., 2013; Musacchio et al., 2015). Development in economic institutions can render 
such political connection less useful and relevant. With improvements in economic institutions, 
the appeal of the collective-relational bargaining model is likely to diminish for two main reasons. 
First, developing institutions undermine the potential to get political rents through political ties 
and instead emphasize the need to secure market-based capabilities and efficiencies. Foreign 
subsidiaries drawing on the collective-relational bargaining model are often hybrids with dual 
objectives (i.e., economic and political objectives) (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Deng, 2009). As 
a business entity, these subsidiaries seek to secure economic returns (i.e., profits). However, by 
dint of their collective affiliation (i.e., affiliation to the home state), they intend to achieve the 
political interests of their home government.  For example, some of the Chinese state-owned 
MNEs (SOMNEs) which are operating in the African infrastructure and mining sectors are 
designed to satisfy both commercial and non-commercial purposes. Specifically, they are designed 
to increase the Chinese government’s influence in the continent, and foster partnerships between 
the Chinese government and the host governments (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). Such dual 
objectives can undermine the focus of the subsidiary and harm its market competitiveness. This is 
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likely to be truer in circumstances when developing economic institutions reduce the value of 
political rents. 
Second, the collective-relational bargaining model, which features direct involvement of the home 
country in the bargaining process, is likely to generate concerns of sovereignty breach and 
extraterritoriality. In fact, in most developing countries, there is a tendency to consider foreign 
subsidiaries as extensions of imperialistic rule (Chironga et al., 2011). With direct and active 
involvement of the home country, it is likely that such concerns will be even more intense. 
SOMNEs, which by design draw on the collective approach to bargaining, tend to be perceived as 
threats to the host’s national security because of their apparent ties with their home country 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2009) and are likely to suffer competitive disadvantages in attracting local 
customers (Cui & Jiang, 2012). The adverse effects of such concerns are likely to be more salient 
as economic institutions develop and market competition intensifies—developments that may 
undermine the upsides of political connections. The foregoing arguments, therefore, lead to the 
following proposition: 
            Proposition 5: Development of economic institutions in the host country attenuates the  
              positive relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach  
             to political connection and competitive advantage. As economic institutions 
            develop, the use of the collective-relational approach is less likely to secure 
            competitive advantage. 
 
Political Institutions as Boundary Condition 
By defining expectations and rules, host-country political institutions substantially influence the 
strategy and performance of foreign subsidiaries (Henisz, 2000; March and Olson, 1996; North, 
1991). Whereas political institutions constitute various aspects of shared meanings and practices 
that shape the actions and organization of political actors (including states and business 
organizations), a prime representation of political institutions exists in the governing mechanism 
151 
 
151 
 
underlying the political system of the country (i.e., democratic or autocratic) (Li and Resnick, 
2003). Although consensus has yet to be arrived on what constitutes democratic institutions, they 
include: 
“…government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence 
of free and fair elections, the protection of minorities and respect for basic human 
rights. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, due process and political 
pluralism,” (The Economist, 2007). 
 
 
Developments in democratic institutions have potential implications for the effectiveness of the 
collective-relational approach to political connection in at least two respects. First, such 
developments undercut the advantage MNE subsidiaries obtain from the strong partnership (or 
collusion) between the home and host governments. The nature of the principal-agent relationship 
between host government and the society it governs in the presence of democratic institutions is 
considerably different from when they are absent. Whereas, in general, autocratic political systems 
are characterized by potential asymmetry between the interests of government officials and that of 
the people, democratic political systems are better at aligning the interests of the two parties (Huber 
and Powell, 1994; Li and Resnick, 2003). Democratic institutions place constraints upon 
government officials and restrict their ability to grant special favours and prevent them from 
engaging in predatory rent seeking (Feng, 2001). Similarly, freedom of expression and free media 
characterizing democratic political systems promote better monitoring of elected officials and 
allow local stakeholders to have greater voice in policy formulations. These, therefore, limit the 
potential for the collective-relational approach to generate competitive advantage as well as 
political rents to foreign subsidiaries.  
Second, as well as limiting the rent-seeking benefits accruing to foreign subsidiaries through the 
collective-relational approach, democratic institutions provide mechanisms for credible property 
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right protection and contract enforcement (Feng, 2001; Olson, 1993; Pastor and Sung, 1995). The 
associated risks which foreign subsidiaries face in democratic political systems, therefore, are less 
than that in autocratic systems. One of the main reasons for political connection by MNEs in 
developing countries is to access a substituting mechanism for a better protection of property rights 
and enforcement of contracts. Ties to government officials can provide the needed buffer from 
property right and contractual hazards (Zheng, Singh, and Mitchell, 2014). By providing 
alternative   and less costly mechanisms, democratic institutions render the return to political 
connection inconsequential.  The foregoing arguments, therefore, lead to the following proposition 
and Figure 7 shows the entire theoretical model: 
             Proposition 6: Development of democratic institutions in the host country attenuates the  
               positive relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach 
              to political connection and competitive advantage. As democratic      
              institutions develop, the use of the collective-relational approach is less  
              likely to secure competitive advantage. 
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Figure 7. Theoretical model of the research 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
High institutional voids characterizing developing countries give rise to economizing challenges 
as well as strategizing benefits (Getachew and Beamish, 2017; Williamson, 1991). In such 
countries, MNEs often put in place strategies to mitigate economizing challenges and/or leverage 
strategizing benefits. Forging political connection with host-country government officials is one 
such strategy that may help tap strategizing advantages as well as attenuate economizing 
challenges arising from poor property right protection and contract enforcement as well as from 
limited access to useful, timely information. However, there are different approaches to political 
connections and not all political connections are equally effective in securing strategic advantages 
and/or reducing economizing challenges. By considering several approaches to political 
connection (i.e., bargaining models), this study seeks to develop a better understanding of the 
attributes and implications of different approaches to structure the relationship between MNEs and 
respective host countries. This study attempts to theorize about the different forms of political 
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connections in international business. In doing so, it draws on insights from prior literature that 
discusses political connections across the basic approach followed (i.e., transactional vs. relational) 
and the locus of action (i.e., individual vs. collective). It grounded its theorization in an illustration 
of the different kinds of bargaining model supporting foreign direct investments in developing 
countries. Specifically, it advance the notion that the collective-relational approach to political 
connections is likely to afford foreign subsidiaries a better competitive advantage when operating 
in developing countries. This approach often involves an active role of the home-country 
government in bargaining both strategic and operational issues on behalf of the MNEs hailing from 
the same country. For example, investment of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa leverages the collective-
relational approach to political connection and consequently reaps the benefits of the strategizing 
advantages set at their disposal (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Li et al., 2013; Luo et al. 2010; 
UNCTAD, 2007).  
Prior evidence on the performance implications of political connections is mixed at best. One 
potential approach to resolving such empirical challenge is by disaggregating political connection 
to its different formats. This paper does just that. By classifying political connections across the 
level and nature of political participation, it identifies four different typologies of political 
connection. The study positioned its theoretical arguments about these different types of political 
connection in the bargaining models characterizing foreign investment of MNEs in developing 
countries. In doing so, it not only engages the issue of political connection in the context of 
international business but it also grounds its theorization in the unique realities of developing 
countries where host states are more active and political connections more important. These 
different approaches to political connections reflect the different ways through which MNEs from 
different backgrounds (i.e., MNEs from advanced vs. emerging markets) seek to gain strategizing 
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advantages through political connections. As such, on a broader level, the theorization can 
contribute to a better understanding of the differences in the fundamental assumptions and strategy 
governing foreign direct investment of MNEs with disparate backgrounds.  
The typology identified to classify different kinds of bargaining models can be considered 
governance structures used to structure political exchanges between MNEs and their respective 
host governments. The notion of governance is central to the transaction cost economics in which 
different types of governance structures—namely, market, hierarchy, and hybrid—used to 
structure economic exchanges (e.g., Williamson, 2010). This paper attempted to extend this notion 
of governance to political exchanges in which MNEs and their host government engage in 
recurrent bargains on strategic and operational issues. The four different approaches identified can 
be considered alternative governance structures, providing the foundation on which political 
exchanges take place. The theoretical argument suggests that the collective-relational governance 
structure is likely to offer superior value in terms of competitive advantage for foreign subsidiaries 
operating in developing countries, ceteris paribus. Future research in this area can draw on the 
transaction cost politics (TCP) arguments to further refine our understanding of the nature as well 
as implications of these governance structures (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; North, 1991).  
By identifying and theoretically examining potential boundary conditions, this study further 
refined understanding of the relationship between the type of governance structures employed and 
the competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries leveraging these structures. It extended the 
transaction cost logics regarding asset specificity and governance structure to political exchanges 
and argued that the effectiveness of the collective-relational approach becomes stronger for 
resource-seeking investments—investment with greater asset specificity and thus less likely to be 
redeployed elsewhere (Anand and Singh, 1997; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Williamson, 1985). 
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It also puts forward arguments suggesting that developments in host-country economic as well as 
political institutions provide alternative mechanisms for MNEs to mitigate economizing 
challenges, rendering political connections somewhat redundant and less useful. Also, the 
theoretical arguments suggest that the influence of the bargaining model on competitive advantage 
is through improved resource/capability mobilization and social capital. By highlighting the 
intermediate mechanisms at work in the relationship of political ties and competitive advantage, 
this work provided an important theoretical connection.   
As well, this study extends theoretical discussions on several streams of inquiry. First, it provides 
additional support to arguments in strategy research that emerging market MNEs have different 
strategic orientations and studying these MNEs can generate useful insights for our existing 
theories (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Second, it contributes 
to a better understanding of the business environment in developing countries and supports the 
idea that such countries have unique features worthy of further exploration (Wright et al., 2005; 
Xu & Meyer, 2012). Third, the collective-relational approach introduced here uncovered the 
complementary nature of resource mobilization and legitimacy as explanations of competitive 
advantage. As such, this study has not only integrated perspectives from the RBV and the resource 
dependence perspective but also highlighted the value of doing so. Finally, it examined political 
connections, an important area in IB research, and points to the merits of considering non-market 
forces when dealing with MNE and subsidiary performance.  
Regarding practice, the theory developed in this study indicates that the collective-relational 
bargaining model—in which political connection in the host country involves an active collective 
actor (e.g., home state)—is likely to be more effective for MNE managers in securing better 
competitive advantage when operating in developing countries. This is especially true for 
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investments of a resource-seeking nature such as in mining and oil exploration. However, the 
effectiveness of the bargaining model is contingent on the development of economic as well as 
political institutions. That is, as host-country economic and/or political institutions develop, the 
extent to which the collective-relational bargaining model affords competitive advantage declines. 
Therefore, such bargaining model is likely to be most effective in less democratic (or more 
autocratic) developing countries with high levels of institutional voids. These dynamics suggests 
that the use by managers (or home states) of the collective-relational bargaining model needs to be 
informed by a thorough examination of both the current levels of economic and/or political 
institutions, and a clear understanding of how such institutions are likely to change going forward.  
In conclusion, this study encourages future research to further explore the relationships between 
market outcomes and non-market forces. By closely studying the roles of government-business 
interaction, such research can make important inroads regarding our understanding of the 
mechanisms through which social and business interests can be aligned. Also, the theoretical 
arguments forwarded in this paper need to be subjected to rigorous empirical testing. By doing so, 
future research will no doubt advance development of fine-grained insights about the relationships 
discussed herein as well as the mechanisms at work. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In recent decades, scholars in IB and strategic management have devoted a great deal of attention 
to understanding developing country contexts and their strategic as well as performance 
implications for businesses operating there (e.g., Beamish, 1985; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and 
Wright, 2000; Vernon, 1971). A salient feature of these contexts is the high level of institutional 
voids representing the lack or absence of market-supporting institutions (Mair and Marti, 2009). 
Insights from the new institutional economics (NIE) substantially inform our understanding of 
institutional voids as well as their strategic and performance implications (Williamson, 2000; 
North, 1991; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Per this perspective, institutional voids engender 
increased transaction costs in enforcing contracts, protecting property rights, and accessing 
information.  
In contrast, research in industrial organization theory suggests that institutional voids can 
contribute to a rather easier creation of market power by MNEs, which possess firm-specific 
advantage (Porter, 1981). Therefore, a more complete understanding of institutional voids and 
their implications for foreign subsidiaries requires engaging both the transaction-cost (economic) 
and market power (strategic) implications. This dissertation, therefore, has addressed two sets of 
research questions: (a) Whether, how, and when host-country market and institutional conditions 
have implications for the performance of foreign subsidiaries? And (b) Whether, how, and when 
investment purposes/motives for which foreign subsidiaries are established relate to the extent to 
which the subsidiaries/their parents overcome the hazards of or capitalize on the opportunities 
from operating in locations of high institutional voids? 
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Essay 1 (Chapter 2) draws on insights from NIE and industrial organization theory to examine the 
economic and strategic implications of entry to the African market. As well, by leveraging insights 
from the investment motives literature (e.g., Dunning, 1998; Nachum and Zaheer, 2005) and the 
subsidiary mandate/charter literature (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998), the 
essay examines the moderating roles of investment purpose diversity and market-seeking 
orientation. To empirically test the hypotheses in this essay, a paired-sample design of Japanese 
foreign subsidiaries entering Africa and OECD countries was used. This design helped minimize 
endogeneity concerns by comparing exit of foreign subsidiaries operating in Africa with 
counterfactual cases of subsidiary exits from the OECD countries (Reeb, Sakakibara, and 
Mahmood, 2012). Results from the extended cox regression models generate useful insights. First, 
the empirical evidence suggests that Japanese foreign subsidiaries that entered the African market 
have a greater likelihood of exiting than their counterparts in the OECD markets. This finding 
indicates that the economic (i.e., transaction cost) challenges of entry to the African market 
outweigh the associated strategic (i.e., market power) advantages.  
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that Japanese foreign subsidiaries that entered Africa with 
diverse investment purposes and/or greater market-seeking orientation have registered a lower 
likelihood of exit than their counterparts. These findings, thus, present investment purpose 
diversity and market-seeking orientation as potential mechanisms to mitigate the economizing 
challenges of institutional voids. Further, the findings as well as theoretical arguments associated 
with investment purpose diversity can contribute to extending the firm scope argument to a 
subsidiary level (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Wan, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003; Peng, Lee, and 
Wang, 2005). As such, the essay introduces the notion of subsidiary scope, here represented by 
the within-subsidiary diversity of purposes, and advance an understanding of its implications for 
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foreign subsidiary exit (or survival). As well, by considering investment purpose diversity, the 
essay addresses a call by Adner (2007) to engage the notion of flexibility by reassignment of 
resources (shifting resources to a more favorable activity in a subsidiary). Also, it finds that the 
unique structural and strategic attributes of market-seeking subsidiaries contribute to mitigating 
institutional hazards.  
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the effects of host-country market and institutional conditions on 
the survival likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries. Entry of these subsidiaries to their 
respective host markets is contingent on the presence/absence of sufficient market opportunities 
in the host country (Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol, 2008). This essay argues that the pattern of 
income distribution in the host country is an important variable in determining market 
attractiveness and seek to explore how this variable relates to the survival (or exit) probability of 
market-seeking subsidiaries. Drawing on insights from research in environmental munificence, 
market imperfection, and NIE, the essay intended to examine the complex ways in which host-
country income distribution is associated with survival of market-seeking foreign subsidiaries. As 
well, is explored institutional boundary conditions for the proposed relationship. 
Analyses of subsidiary-, parent-, and country-level data on 6,699 Japanese market-seeking 
subsidiaries operating in 47 countries suggests that host-country income distribution has a non-
linear relationship with subsidiary survival. Specifically, the essay finds empirical evidence 
suggesting a presence of a U-shaped relationship between income distribution and subsidiary exit 
in that subsidiary exit is high in host countries with highly egalitarian or highly dispersed income 
distributions. This empirical evidence supports the notion that market-seeking subsidiaries face a 
lower likelihood of exit in host countries with intermediate levels of income distribution (as 
measured by the Gini index). Post-hoc analyses indicates the inflection point to be at a Gini index 
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of approximately 38. The maximum and minimum Gini indices in the data are 57 and 22 
respectively, and lower Gini score indicates more egalitarian income distribution.  
Empirical findings also uncovered another layer of complexity in the relationship between income 
distribution patterns and exit of foreign subsidiaries. The study finds that development of free 
market institutions in the host country attenuates the relationship between income distribution and 
subsidiary exit. Host-country institutional development provide alternative mechanisms 
substituting for the hazard that extreme levels of income distribution (i.e., highly egalitarian or 
highly dispersed) pose. By reducing transaction and information costs associated with exchanges, 
free-market institutions compensate for the product and factor market limitations that extreme 
income distributions engender and improve host-country munificence (North, 1991; Shinkle and 
Kriauciunas, 2010; Xu and Meyer, 2013). As well as advancing a more nuanced understanding of 
how host-country income distribution relates with survival of market-seeking subsidiaries, this 
finding suggests the potential interaction between market and institutional factors and points to the 
need to examine such interactions to gain better understanding of subsidiary exit.  
Like Essay 1, this essay advances the notion that the effects of market and institutional factors on 
foreign subsidiary survival is contingent on the purposes for which the subsidiary is established. 
Of special consideration here are market-seeking subsidiaries which differ from other types of 
subsidiaries in both structural and strategic terms. Structurally, these subsidiaries are horizontal 
extensions of and are loosely integrated with their respective parent firm as well as ‘sister’ 
subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Strategically, they are heavily dependent on host-country 
market and institutional conditions (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). 
Such structural and strategic attributes of market-seeking subsidiaries provide an ideal context to 
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study the important issue of income distribution and its potential influence on subsidiary survival 
(Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-Mateo, and Sterling, 2013; Davis, 2015; Davis and Cobb, 2010).  
This essay makes several contributions. First, it extends our understanding of the subsidiary exit 
phenomenon by examining a variable—income distribution—that hitherto received a limited 
attention as a relevant factor in explaining business outcomes (Davis, 2015). Whereas the issue of 
income distribution has attracted a considerable public attention and remained central to studies in 
such disciplines as economics and sociology, it has yet to be considered relevant to studies in 
management (Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-Mateo, and Sterling, 2013; Davis, 2015). Given the 
substantial role businesses play in influencing income distribution (Davis and Cobb, 2010), such 
disregard is hard to justify. Second, this essay points to the importance of refining our 
understanding of foreign subsidiaries by considering the purposes(motives) for which they are 
established. Specifically, by considering market-seeking subsidiaries, this essay advances the 
notion that the interface between host-country environment and MNE subsidiaries is contingent 
on the kind of subsidiaries under consideration and that different aspects of the environment are 
relevant for different kinds of subsidiaries (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Third, the essay also contributes 
to research on income distribution by indicating the potentially complex ways through which it 
relates to, or affects, different organizational outcomes.  
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines the strategic implications of institutional voids by considering the 
potential effects of alternative governance structures to organize the relationship between MNEs 
and host countries. In emerging markets, where institutional voids abound, governments play a 
more active role in business activities and political connections yield greater benefits to business 
performance (Brockman, Rui, and Zou, 2013; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Whereas existing research 
indicates the presence of different governance structures (or bargaining models) underlying foreign 
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direct investments in developing countries, synthesizing these approaches and examining their 
comparative performance implication is largely limited. Essay 3 aims to contribute to filling this 
lacuna by identifying three alternative bargaining models—namely, the one-tier bargaining, the 
modified one-tier bargaining, and the two-tier bargaining models—and theoretically examining 
their characteristics using arguments from Hillman and Hitt (1999) about the nature of political 
actions. In doing so, the essay not only advances a better understanding of these bargaining models 
and their implications, but also offers a potential explanation for the increasing competitive edge 
of Chinese MNEs in such developing countries as those in Africa (Stevens and Newenham-
Kahindi, 2017; UNCTAD, 2015).  
Following Hillman and Hitt (1999), the essay categorized the three bargaining models along the 
two dimensions of the level and nature of political participation. The level of political participation 
takes either individual (i.e., MNE) or collective (i.e., state); the nature of political participation 
includes transactional or relational. Thus, using the dimensions, the essay identified that the 
modified one-tier model—typically characterizing Chinese resource-seeking FDI in such 
developing countries as those in Africa—follows the collective-relational approach to political 
connection. To establish a theoretical link between a given bargaining model and competitive 
advantage benefits spilling over to associated subsidiaries, the essay first forwarded theoretical 
mechanisms suggesting the marginal benefits of using collective as well as relational approaches 
to political connection. Then, it integrated mechanisms along the two dimensions to forward a 
proposition in support of a positive relationship between using the collective-relational approach 
(or the modified one-tier bargaining model) and competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries. 
The proposition suggests the presence of political rent and its influence on market competition. 
170 
 
170 
 
Resource-based view, resource dependence theory and NIE provided the requisite foundations for 
the theoretical development.  
The essay further refined its theoretical development by identifying relevant boundary conditions 
to the proposed relationship. It identified investment motive and institutional development 
(economic and political) as potential boundary conditions influencing my baseline argument (i.e., 
the positive relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach and competitive 
advantage). The greater asset specificity characterizing resource-seeking investments manifest 
itself in increased threat of opportunistic behavior by host-country government (Anand and Singh, 
1997; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Such investments, therefore, place MNEs at a less favorable 
bargaining position (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The collective-relational approach has a better 
potential of tipping the balance in favor of the MNEs and their respective subsidiaries. That is, the 
presence of a collective actor such as the home government and the inherent commitment to 
building long-term relationships underlying such approach has a potential to circumvent threats of 
reduced bargaining power. Also, the essay advances theoretical arguments suggesting the 
substitutive nature of advanced institutions and strong political connections. As economic and/or 
political institutions develop, MNEs tend to enjoy increasingly better protection of property rights 
and enforcement of contracts. Under this conditions, the potential spillover advantages flowing to 
foreign subsidiaries drawing on the collective-relational approach is likely to be inconsequential. 
This points to the potential tradeoff between market power advantage (through such strategizing 
efforts as political connection) and efficiency advantage (through reduced transaction costs) 
(Getachew and Beamish, 2017; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).  
Collectively, this dissertation makes the following empirical and theoretical contributions. First, it 
advances a more nuanced understanding of how host-country institutional conditions relate with 
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foreign divestment, by engaging both the economizing and strategizing mechanisms underlying 
institutional influences (Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 1991). Second, it integrates insights from 
the eclectic paradigm of foreign production and the investment motives literature to respond to 
calls for research looking at the interaction between location factors and investment motives 
(Dunning, 2009; Mesquita, 2016). Third, it contributes to the institutional voids literature by 
suggesting response mechanisms operating at the subsidiary level (i.e., investment purpose 
diversity and market-seeking orientation) and at the multi-party bargaining level (i.e., the modified 
one-tier bargaining model). Fourth, it contributes to our understanding of how the effects of host-
country (dis)advantages can be best understood by identifying a form of organization for which 
such factors are more relevant. Fifth, it extends the investment motives literature by indicating the 
useful insights to be generated by considering fine-grained aspects of investment motives (i.e., 
investment purposes). Finally, it advances our understanding of foreign divestment by considering 
how market conditions, market-supporting institutions, and their interactions with investment 
motives relate with the exit likelihood of foreign subsidiaries.  
This dissertation has important policy implications. It finds empirical evidence suggesting the 
potentially adverse effects of institutional voids for the viability of foreign subsidiaries. As such, 
improvement of host-country institutional conditions is important to realize the multi-faceted 
benefits of foreign investment to host country development. A particular emphasis may need to be 
placed on developing institutions pertinent to information access, property right protection, 
contract enforcement, and market entry. As well, the dissertation forwards theoretical arguments 
suggesting the benefits of institutional development in promoting social welfare by discouraging 
rent-seeking behaviors. Further, policies targeted at developing institutions can also contribute to 
limiting the adverse effects of such socio-economic conditions as extreme income distribution.  
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Limitations and future directions 
The theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation notwithstanding, some caveats are 
in order. Empirical tests of the arguments in Essay 1 and Essay 2 are based on data from a single 
home country (i.e., Japan). This limits the generalizability of the findings and thus future research 
needs to verify the robustness of these arguments and the associated theoretical implications drawn 
using data on foreign subsidiaries originating from other countries. Nonetheless, the use of firms 
from a single home country achieves an empirical purpose of avoiding potential variance arising 
from the home country effects. As well, the firm- and subsidiary level data used in these two essays 
are extracted from a dataset with an extensive coverage (both in time and space) of Japanese 
foreign subsidiaries.  
Another potential limitation lies in the measurement and operationalization of some of the 
constructs (or variables). For example, Essay 2 used the Gini index to measure the income 
distribution construct. While this measure is widely used and its data more comprehensively 
available, it may not fully capture the essence of the construct. In fact, influential research in 
income distribution has used the ratio measures such as such as top 5 percent shares as alternatives 
to the Gini index. Whereas a consensus on the specific measure to use for income distribution has 
yet to be reached, the value of verifying the robustness of the findings using alternative measures 
is unquestionable. Similarly, throughout the dissertation, the term ‘emerging markets’ was used as 
being synonymous with ‘developing countries’. Such use, while necessary for the practical 
purposes of this research, may not be conceptually accurate. Whereas emerging markets refer to 
countries characterized by rapid economic growth and government policies favoring liberalization 
and free markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000), not all developing countries subscribe to this 
characterization. Some African countries, for example, have neither rapidly growing economies 
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nor market-oriented government policies. Granted, there is a considerable overlap between the two 
(i.e., emerging market and developing countries) and both refer to contexts characterized by high 
institutional voids—a notion central to this dissertation.  
This dissertation provides useful theoretical and empirical evidence indicating the need to consider 
both the structural and transaction-cost market imperfections typifying locations of high 
institutional voids. However, further study is required to better understand the dynamics between 
structural market imperfections responsible for the strategizing benefits and transaction-cost 
market imperfections responsible for economizing challenges. Whereas Essay 1 and Essay 3 
examined subsidiary and country-level conditions influencing the dynamics between the two kinds 
of market imperfections, more needs to be done to determine additional boundary conditions, 
explore temporal dimensions, and understand the dynamics in light of evolutionary/revolutionary 
changes to the institutional environments of host countries.  
A key element of the dissertation is the divestment of foreign subsidiaries, which is a key response 
variable in Essay 1 and Essay 2. The contributions of these essays notwithstanding, more work 
remains to better understand the association between institutional voids and foreign divestment. 
Foreign divestment is an important construct in IB research not least because it indicates 
sustainability or long-term performance. Foreign divestment can be an indication of failure in that 
the foreign subsidiary has not been successful in registering the desired level of performance. In 
contrast, it can also be a corporate strategy through which the parent MNE seeks to respond to 
changes. For example, it can result from a decision by an MNE to shift from hierarchy to market 
in response to progresses in the development of market-seeking institutions (Williamson, 2000). 
Distinguishing between these aspects of foreign divestment requires, among other things, 
accessing qualitative data which provides further insights about the rationale behind divestment 
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decisions. Therefore, future research drawing on such qualitative data will no doubt foster better 
understanding of foreign divestment and its relationship with institutional voids.  
Another promising direction for future research resides in the study of investment motives (or 
purposes).  A core element in the strategy formulation process of an MNE contemplating a move 
to a given host country is a decision/determination of the underlying investment motive/purpose. 
The motive/purpose specifies the why of the investment and has a potential implication for the 
extent to which the MNE achieves its purposes. This dissertation provides evidence suggesting 
that subsidiaries differing in the investment motive underlying their establishment (i.e., market 
seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic-asset seeking) have different potentials 
of leveraging the strategizing advantage and/or mitigating the economic challenges of high 
institutional voids. That said, further research is warranted to verify these findings as well as 
identify additional mechanisms. Similarly, the dissertation indicated the value in disaggregating 
investment motives and consider specific purposes guiding foreign direct investment. A potentially 
fruitful future research agenda lies in considering the dynamic interactions between investment 
purposes (which may harbor MNE’s perceptions and expectations about the host-country 
environments) and institutional voids (which the MNE subsidiary faces).                                          
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